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CONTRACTING WORK OUT TO SELF-EMPLOYED WORKERS: DOES SOUTH AFRICAN 
LABOUR LAW ADEQUATELY RECOGNISE AND REGULATE THIS PRACTICE? 
Labour law is premised on the paradigm of a full-time, indefinite and bilateral employment 
relationship between employer and employee. Increasingly, this standard employment 
relationship model is being undermined by the proliferation of non-standard forms of work 
as employers seek greater labour market flexibility. These forms of work have been driven 
by three processes, namely casualisation (the engagement of workers on a fixed-term, 
casual or part-time basis), externalisation via commodification of the employment 
relationship (the engagement of workers in terms of a commercial contract, which excludes 
labour law from the relationship) and externalisation via intermediation (the use of 
intermediaries such as subcontractors).  
This study focuses on a work arrangement or practice referred to as contracting work out 
to self-employed workers. This involves contracting work out to individual workers who in 
turn employ other workers to assist them. The study considers the use of this practice in 
South Africa, where it emerged in the 1990s. It examines empirical research on the practice 
in the mining, clothing and construction sectors, and in relation to truck drivers. South 
African employers have argued that this practice advances government’s small business 
and black economic empowerment policies. 
This study argues that the real motivation for this practice is employers’ desire to avoid the 
risks and costs associated with directly employing workers. This is borne out by the case 
studies, which demonstrate that the self-employed worker is denied labour protection as 
they are designated as entrepreneurs and employers. In addition, the workers they employ 
are denied protection because the elf-employed worker with whom they have a 
contractual relationship is usually not in a position to comply with labour legislation. It is 
argued that the practice results in precarious and insecure work for self-employed workers 
and their workers and presents significant challenges for its egulation. 
The study analyses South African labour law to determine whether it regulates the practice 
of contracting work out to self-employed workers. It finds that while there is some direct 
recognition of the practice, it is not adequately regulated in South African law. This has 
allowed non-state institutions to regulate the practice in ways that may entrench the non-
protection of self-employed workers and their workers. The study argues for the adoption 
of legislation to regulate the practice to protect self-employed workers and to hold 
enterprises responsible for the labour rights of the workers engaged through self-
employed workers.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Work is important to people the world over, as most people depend on work to 
sustain themselves and to meet their material and other needs. To the average 
person, work is significant not only as a source of income, but as a critical aspect of 
one’s “sense of self” and a means of achieving personal fulfilment.1 It is also an 
important avenue through which individuals integrate themselves into society and 
the economy.2 Work therefore plays an important role in promoting societal well-
being, building social cohesion and advancing economic development.3  
 
Given its socio-economic significance, it is hardly surprising that societies are 
committed to building legal, social and economic structures that aim to promote job 
creation and regulate the conditions under which work is performed.4 Labour law is 
one of the central legal structures regulating the world of work and is the primary 
focus of this thesis. In this study, labour law will be understood as an amalgam of 
laws that regulate various aspects relating to work. 
  
Labour law has traditionally provided rules to regulate the formation and 
protection of workers’ and employers’ organisations and thereby facilitate collective 
bargaining between employers and workers.5 It also provides minimum working 
conditions relating to issues such as wages, working hours, time off and health and 
                                                          
1 See J Stiglitz “Employment,  social justice and social well-being” (2002) 141(1-2) International 
Labour Review 9.  
2 M Fortuny and J Al Husseini Labour Market Policies and Institutions: A Synthesis Report on the cases 
of Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Syria and Turkey (Geneva, International Labour Office, 2011) 39. 
3 See for example  UN Economic and Social Council “Promoting full employment and decent work 
for 
all” Commission for Social Development Forty-sixth session, 6-15 February 2008 3. 
4 See for example Fortuny and Al Husseini (note 2) 40-42. 
5 P Benjamin A Review of Labour Markets in South Africa: Labour Market Regulation: International 












safety in the workplace.6 In addition, labour law provides for employment- related 
social security schemes to cover unemployment and compensation for occupational 
diseases and injuries.7  Another function is the creation of mechanisms and 
institutions for the resolution of labour disputes.8 Finally, labour law promotes 
workplace equality and provides for skills development.9  
 
The above shows that labour law does not regulate the entire spectrum of 
arrangements or relationships by virtue of which work is performed, but is 
preoccupied with the employment relationship.10 Broadly speaking, it covers the 
workers in an employment relationship – employees – who work for another in 
order to earn a living.11    The employment relationship, which has also been 
referred to as the contract of employment, has therefore been understood as the 
port of entry into the realm of labour law.12  
 
Traditionally, labour law has been premised on the assumption that the 
employment relationship is asymmetrical by virtue of the employee’s subordination 
to the employer.13 It evolved out of he need to balance the power between the two 
parties by conferring rights and entitlements on the employee while imposing 
obligations and placing restrictions on the employer.14 On the basis of this 
                                                          
6 See generally D Du Toit, D, D Bosch, D Woolfrey,  S Godfrey, J Roussouw,  S Christie, C Cooper, G 
Giles, with C Bosch,  Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide (Fourth Edition) (Durban: 
LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003) 477. 
7 P Benjamin A Review of Labour Markets in South Africa: Labour Market Regulation: International 
and South African Perspectives (Johannesburg, Human Sciences Research Council: 2005) 4. 
8 See generally Du Toit et al (note 6) 79. 
9 See generally Du Toit et al (note 6) 589. 
10 G Casale  “The employment relationship: a general introduction” in G Casale (ed) The Employment 
Relationship: A Comparative Overview (Geneva: ILO, 2011) 1-33 33.  
11 See E Webster, “Making a living, earning a living: Work and employment in Southern Africa” 
(2005) 26(1) International Political Science Review  55.  
12 Casale (note 10) 33. 













assumption, labour law has excluded those who work for themselves and are 
referred to as independent contractors.15 Consequently, navigating the so-called 
“binary divide” between an employee and independent contractor has been, and for 
the most part continues to be, central to determining the scope of labour law.16  
 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND SCOPE OF THESIS 
 
This thesis is broadly concerned with the scope and application of labour law in a 
rapidly changing world of work marked by a multiplicity of working arrangements. 
The point of departure is that modern labour law assumes that employment 
conforms to the paradigm of the standard employment relationship.17 This 
paradigm evolved during the post War period of prosperity in North America and 
Western Europe.18 It is characterized by an indefinite, full-time, bilateral 
relationship where the employee is vertically integrated into the structure of the 
employing enterprise.19 As it became the dominant paradigm of work during this 
period, policy-makers chose the employment relationship as the site for the location 
of the rights and obligations created by labour law.20  
                                                          
15 A Perulli, “Subordinate, Autonomous and Economically Dependent Work: A Comparative Analysis 
Of Selected European Countries” in  G Casale (ed) The Employment Relationship: a Comparative 
Overview 137-187 (Geneva: ILO, 2011) 137-8.  
16 N Countouris, “The employment relationship: A comparative analysis” in G Casale (ed) (2011)  
The 
Employment Relationship: A Comparative Overview (Geneva: ILO, 2011) 35-68 38. 
17See for example D McCann Regulating Flexible Work (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 10; J 
Theron “The erosion of workers’ rights and the presumption as to who is an employee” (2002) Law, 
Democracy and Development  22 42.  
18 See for example N Countouris The Changing Law of the Employment Relationship (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2007) 25.  
19 See for example S Vettori The Employment Contract and the Changed World of Work (Aldershot, 
Ashgate, 2007)8-9. 
20 J Stanford and L F Vosko, “Challenging the Market: The  Struggle to Regulate Work and Income” in 
J 













There is broad consensus that the world of work has changed dramatically 
and that work arrangements falling outside the standard employment relationship 
have proliferated in both developing and developed countries.21 These changes in the 
world of work have been primarily driven by the quest for flexibility in the labour 
market.22 The quest for labour market flexibility has in turn been fuelled by 
ideological forces: neoliberalism claims that rigid labour markets limit employers’ 
ability to adjust their workforces and labour costs in response to rapidly changing 
market conditions.23 Neoliberalism’s advocates argue that rigid labour markets 
hamper employers’ ability to compete in an integrated global economy characterized 
by more open markets and greater competition.24  
 
Employers have therefore sought to minimize the risks and costs associated 
with employment. Employers increasingly employ workers for a fixed term or limited 
duration, on an “as-needed basis” or for fewer hours than the average working 
week.25 These kinds of relationships alter the temporal dimensions of the standard 
employment relationship and can be grouped under the banner of the process of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill Queen’s University Press, 2004) 3-30 7. 
21 Countouris (note 18) 45-52; P Benjamin “Subordination, parasubordination and self-
employment: 
a comparative study of selected African Countries” in G Casale (ed) The employment relationship: a 
comparative overview(Geneva: ILO, 2011) 95-136, 95-102. 
22 McCann (note 17) 11. 
23 See for example OECD, The OECD Jobs Study Facts, Analyses and Strategies (1994), accessed at 
http://www1.oecd.org/sge/min/job94/part1.htm   on 10/01/2011; World Economic Forum, 
Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2010) 7. 
24 World Bank Doing Business 2005 (Washington DC: Oxford University Press, 2004) 31. 
25 J Giesecke “Socio-economic effects of atypical employment: evidence from the German labour 
market” (2009) 25(6) European Sociological Review 629 630; S Mills, “The Situation of the Elusive 
Independent Contractor and Other Forms of Atypical Employment in South Africa: Balancing Equity 
and Flexibility”(2004) 25 ILJ 1203 1218-9; J Theron and S Godfrey, Protecting Workers at the 
Periphery Development and Labour Monograph 1/2000 (Cape Town: Institute of Development and 












casualisation.26  Another process driving change in the world of work is 
externalization. This is a process whereby employers structure their operations to 
reduce the amount of work performed in terms of employment contracts and 
increase the amount of work performed in terms of commercial agreements.27  
 
Employers may directly externalize the work of individual workers by 
engaging them on the basis that they are independent contractors.28 This is known 
as externalization by commodification of the employment relationship.29 
Alternatively, they may externalize workers indirectly by engaging their services 
through a third party with whom they have a commercial contract for the 
performance of services or for the supply of temporary workers.30 The third party 
operates as an intermediary and the process shall therefore be referred to as 
externalization via intermediation.31  
 
Importantly, the three processes described above do not occur in isolation, 
but often overlap and intersect each other.32 It is therefore easy to envisage a 
flexible employment practice, such as the use of a temporary employment agency, 
                                                          
26 Theron and Godfrey (note 25) 9-11. 
27 Labour and Enterprise Policy 
Research Group, UCT, “Changing Nature of Work and ‘Atypical’ forms of employment in South 
Africa”Unpublished Synthesis Report prepared for the Department of Labour (Cape Town, 2003) 4; 
R Le 
Roux, The World of Work: Forms of Engagement in South Africa Development and Labour Law 
Monograph Series 02/2009, (Cape Town: Institute of Development and Labour Law, 2009) 18. 
28 P Benjamin, “Who needs labour law? Defining the scope of legal protection” in J Conaghan ,R  
Fischl 
and K Klare, Labour Law in an Era of Globalization: Transformative Practices and Possibilities 
(Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 75-92, 85. Mills (note 25) 1203 
29 Le Roux (note 27) 18. 
30 H Sato “Atypical employment: a source of flexible work opportunities?” 2001 4(2) Social Science 
Japan Journal 161 163.  
31 Le Roux (note 27) 18. 












which involves both externalization via intermediation (with the agency being the 
intermediary) and casualisation where the workers are employed on a fixed term 
basis.33 Such arrangements are more complex as compared to those that simply 
involve one of these processes. 
The arrangements described above are neutrally referred to as non-standard 
or atypical forms of work or positively couched in the language of flexibility and 
choice. However, the underlying characteristic of work under these arrangements is 
their precariousness. According to Fudge and Owens: 
Precariousness is a complex phenomenon, and involves four dimensions:(1) the degree of 
certainty of continuing employment; (2) control over the labour process, which is linked to 
the presence or absence of trade unions and professional associations and related to control 
over working conditions, wages and the pace of work; (3) the degree of regulatory 
protection; and (4) income level… identifying precariousness can be a difficult task because 
its different dimensions may intersect in numerous ways.34 
 
This definition of precarious work shows that the workers experience a high degree 
of uncertainty and risk and the workers tend to be vulnerable. Their vulnerability 
may result from socio- economic factors such as poverty, unemployment and/or 
under-employment.35  According to Klerck: 
The increasing use of ‘flexible’ employment, however, presupposes the prior existence of a 
group of workers whose labour power can be deployed in an intermittent and precarious 
manner. High levels of under and unemployment, combined with the absence of both a 
viable subsistence sector and a comprehensive welfare system, have forced many workers 
to take whatever jobs are on offer an not to report abusive labour practices and non 
compliance with minimum standards.36 
 
                                                          
33 A Buzuidenhout, S Godfrey, J Theron with M Modisha, “Non standard employment and its policy 
implications” Unpublished Research Report submitted to the Department of Labour, (2003),  48-9; 
Le Roux (note 27) 29. 
34 J Fudge and R Owens “Precarious work, women and the new economy: The challenges to legal 
norms” in J Fudge and R Owens (eds) Precarious Work, Women and the New Economy: The 
Challenges to Legal Norms (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006) 3-27 5.  
35 G Klerck “Labour market regulation and the casualisation of employment in Namibia” (2003) 
Winter South African Journal of Labour Relations 63 65, 67, 81. 












The vulnerability of the workers under these arrangements may also depend on 
certain social characteristics which enable enterprises to enforce their demands on 
the workers. 37 Thus, there tend to be many women, minority and marginalized 
ethnic groups and migrants working under precarious work arrangements.38 
  
Precarious work is also associated with the absence or limited application of 
legal regulation to the workers involved. This means that most workers who labour  
under non-standard work arrangements do not have the benefit of labour law’s 
protection. This is because labour law continues to focus on the standard 
employment relationship and is yet to develop the appropriate conceptual tools to 
address the challenges that non-standard forms of work present for regulation.39 
These regulatory challenges  are exacerbated in cases involving the intersection of 
different processes driving the processes that have given rise to non-standard forms 
of work.40  
 
1.1.1 Contracting work out to self-employed workers: the focus of the 
thesis 
 
This thesis is broadly concerned with the changes in the world of work and the 
challenges they present for labour law. Given the diversity of the working 
arrangements or practice that employers have embarked on to achieve flexibility, 
this practice focuses on one practice in particular. This shall be referred to as 
contracting work out to self-employed workers. The thesis considers the employers’ 
                                                          
37 M Castells and A Portes “World underneath: the origins, dynamics, and effects of the informal 
economy” in A Portes (ed) The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed 
Economies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989) 11-37 26.  
38 Fudge and Owens (note 34)12. 
39 J Fudge “Fragmenting work and fragmenting organizations: the contract of employment and 
the scope of labour regulation” 44 Osgoode Hall Law Journal (2006) 609 648. 












use of this practice in South Africa. The case studies below illustrate how the 
practice has been used in South Africa. 
 
Box 1: Contracting work out to self-employed workers41 
 
Case study 1: Homeworking  
Taryn is a qualified machinist who worked for a large clothing manufacturer, TJ Fashions, in Cape 
Town for ten years. In 1998, TJ Fashions retrenched about half of its skilled and unskilled workers 
and began to contract work out to skilled workers operating from their homes. Some of them are 
former employees of the firm. Taryn is one such worker and frequently receives orders from the 
factory. The firm provides the fabric and other materials for each order. The firm pays Taryn a fixed 
rate per garment produced. It exercises strict control over the quality of the garments through 
detailed product specifications and penalties for products that fail to meet the required standards. 
The orders she receives from the TJ Fashions are often very large and the deadlines for delivery 
would be impossible for her to meet on her own. She therefore employs three to four other workers 
to assist her to complete these orders. But the supply of work from this firm is never guaranteed 
and there are periods when she does not receive orders from it. During dry spells she seeks orders 
from other firms that may require extra labour to fill any “rush orders”.  
Case study 2: Owner-drivers 
BBB Limited is a manufacturing company that produces a variety of frozen foods and snacks. It has 
been operating for forty years. The firm used to employ drivers to distribute its products 
throughout the country. Since the early 1990s it has given its truck-drivers the option of becoming 
entrepreneurs and owners of their vehicles. Drivers who opt for the owner-driver scheme are 
required to resign from employment with BB Limited and enter into an exclusive owner-driver 
agreement. The owner-driver enters this agreement through the medium of a close corporation 
that s/he is required to register prior to entering the agreement. The close corporation then enters 
into a hire purchase agreement for the purchase of the vehicle from BB Limited. The firm pays the 
close corporation a fixed fee per delivery and makes a lump sum payment each month less the 
monthly truck rental fee and maintenance costs.  
Jabu was employed as a driver by BB Limited for five years before opting for the owner driver 
scheme in 2001. He hires three workers to assist him with the deliveries. BB maps out the exact 
route that he has to follow to each destination. His truck continues to bear the BB logo and he is not 
                                                          
41 These are hypothetical examples constructed from the empirical research discussed in Chapter 4, 












allowed to use it to deliver products from other firms. He and his workers are also provided with 
clothing bearing the BB logo and are required to wear them at all times when making deliveries.  
 
The above scenarios are marked by several key features. First, TJ Fashions and BB 
Limited contract work out to Taryn and Jabu on the basis that the latter are 
entrepreneurs operating their own businesses. Second, Taryn and Jabu personally 
perform the work contracted out to them and hire assistance to help them to 
complete the work.  
 
Third, the work that the enterprises contract out to Taryn a d Jabu is the kind 
of work that they would ordinarily employ workers to do as it must be performed 
on an ongoing as opposed to an occasional basis. A fourth feature is that Taryn and 
Jabu do not have the resources to purchase the tools and equipment and purchase 
the materials necessary to perform the work they undertake to do. Finally, the firms 
exercise some degree of direct and/or indirect control over the work performed by 
Taryn, Jabu and the workers they employ.   
 
Research conducted in South Africa shows that the practice described above 
first emerged on the mines in the late 19th century and was abandoned in about 
1922.42 The practice resurfaced in the mining and other sectors such as clothing, 
construction and in relation to truck drivers during the 1990s.43  Although the 
                                                          
42 A Buzuidenhout, “New Patterns of Exclusion in the South African Mining Industry” in K Bentley 
and A Habib (eds) Racial Redress and Citizenship in South Africa (Pretoria: HSRC Press, 2008) 179 
208 187-9; B Kenny and A Buzuidenhout, “Contracting, Complexity and Control: An Overview of the 
Changing Nature of Subcontracting in the South African Mining Industry” (1999) The Journal of the 
South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 185 188-9. 
43 See for example, Buzuidenhout (note 41) J Crush, T Ulicki, T Tseane and E Jansen van Vuuren, 
“Undermining Labour: The Rise of Sub contracting in South African Gold Mines” (2001) 27(1) 
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extent of the practice has not been quantified, there is consensus that the prevalence 
of the practice has increased over the years.  
 
The empirical research indicates that contracting work out in this manner has 
been encouraged and justified on the basis that it advances government policies to 
develop small businesses, which are perceived to be a key driver of economic 
growth and employment creation.44 The practice is also associated with the 
empowerment of black workers and seen to be in line with the constitutional 
imperative to address the injustices of apartheid and with the black economic 
empowerment policies which give effect to the constitutional imperative.45  
 
In this thesis, it is argued that the real objective behind this practice is “to 
contract out of the employment relationship and the regulation that comes with 
it.”46  The practice allows firms like TJ Fashions and BB Limited to benefit from the 
labour of Taryn, Jabu and their workers without bearing the risks and obligations 
that would come with employing them. It will be argued that this is achieved by 
bringing together the processes of externalization by commodification in respect of 
Taryn and Jabu, and externalization via intermediation in relation of the workers 
Taryn and Jabu employ.  
 
Taryn and Jabu are engaged in terms of commercial contracts, and the 
protection of labour law is therefore excluded from their relationships with TJ 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
regulation Monograph 2/2005 (Cape Town, Institute of Development and Labour Law, 2005); Mills 
(note 25); H Cheadle and M Clarke, “Country Study: South Africa” International Labour Office 
National Studies on Workers Needing Protection (2000) 35-6. 
44 Crush, Ulicki, Tseane and Jansen van Vuuren (note 39) 9-10; C Skinner and I Valodia, 
“Informalising the Formal: Clothing Manufacture in Durban, South Africa, unpublished paper, 
University of KwaZulu Natal School of Development Studies 11. 
45 Mills (note 25) 1213-4. 












Fashions and BB respectively.47 These firms designate Taryn and Jabu as 
independent contractors, thereby commodifying their (would-be) employment 
relationships with them.48    However, the designation as independent contractors 
does not translate into equal bargaining power vis-à-vis the firms that contract 
work out to them. These relationships are typically asymmetrical, with the likes of 
Taryn and Jabu having little bargaining power or influence over the terms of their 
contracts.49 
 
The firms also externalize the labour of the additional workers on the basis 
that they are employed by Taryn and Jabu. The liability for the working conditions 
and obligations in terms of labour law are shifted onto the Taryn and Jabu who are 
ostensibly their employers.50 On a strictly contractual analysis, these workers have 
no rights or recourse against TJ Fashions or BB because they have no direct 
contractual relationship with them.51 This has been described as externalization via 
intermediation. 
 
The intersection of the two processes of externalization has far-reaching 
consequences for the working conditions and labour rights of Taryn and Jabu and 
                                                          
47 Ibid at 22-57. 
48 Le Roux, R “The regulation of work: Whither the contract of employment?: An analysis of the 
suitability of the contract of employment to regulate the different forms of labour market 
participation by individuals” Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Cape Town, 2008 191.  
49 Godfrey, Clarke, Theron with Greenburg (note 43) 15; C Van der Westhuizen, “Women and Work 
Restructuring in the Cape Town Clothing Industry” in E Webster and K Von Holdt, Beyond the 
Apartheid Workplace 335-355 347. 
50  European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Industrial Relations and Social 
Affairs Transformation of Labour and the Future of Labour Law in Europe (Luxembourg, EC 
Commission, 1999)[“The Supiot Report”] 9; J Fudge, “The Legal Boundaries of the Employer, 
Precarious Workers and Labour Protection” in G Davidov and B Langille (eds) Boundaries and 
Frontiers of Labour Law: Goal and Means in the Regulation of Work (Oregon: Hart 2006)295-316 
302; 
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their workers. As already mentioned, Taryn and Jabu are designated as independent 
contractors and purportedly removed from the scope of labour law. In addition, 
their ability to remunerate and provide fair conditions to their workers largely 
depends on the terms of their service contracts with the firms they contract with.  
 
In light of the pressures to lower service fees to outbid the competition, it is 
more than likely that Taryn and Jabu are unable to pay decent wages or provide for 
social security schemes to cover risks such as unemployment, sickness and 
retirement. 52 Taryn and Jabu are unlikely to be able to provide their workers with 
secure employment or guaranteed working hours as they have little control over the 
duration of their service contracts or the amount of work provided.  
 
The above suggests that there is inequality between workers who labour 
under these contracting arrangements and those who fall under the standard 
employment relationship. 53 This fragments workers and undermines the power of 
organised labour and collective action.54 Case studies undertaken in South Africa 
highlight the difficulty of organizing amongst these workers, many of whom are 
vulnerable due to the precariousness of their jobs and their low wages.55 These 
studies indicate that fear of victimization and dismissal inhibits most workers from 
joining trade unions.56     
                                                          
52 Godfrey et al 37; P H Bamu and S Godfrey  An Analysis of Collective Bargaining Arrangements in 
the Construction Industry, (Cape Town, Labour Research Service, 2009).  
53 Crush et al (note 39) 14; Godfrey et al (note 43) 17. 
54 Castells and Portes, (note 37) 31, as cited in E Webster, A Benya,  X Dilata, C Joynt, K Ngoepe, M 
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This section has used case studies to help provide an overview of the practice 
that shall be referred to as contracting work out to self-employed workers in this 
thesis. It has outlined the key features of the practice and highlighted the 
consequences for the workers involved. What remains is to define, in broader terms, 
the parties that have thus far been referred to as JT Fashions and BB Limited, Taryn 
and Jabu and the workers of Taryn and Jabu. These definitions shall be used to refer 
to parties in a similar position throughout this study.  
 
Firms such as JT Fashions and BB Limited shall be referred to as core 
enterprises in this study. These are the firms or entities that give the work out to self-
employed workers and who ultimately benefit from the work done in terms of the 
contracts.  
 
Those in Taryn and Jabu’s position shall be referred to as self-employed 
workers in this thesis. The juxtaposition of the terms “self-employed” and “worker” 
brings together the fact that the person actually performs the work personally 
(albeit with some assistance), and that s/he does so ostensibly on the basis that s/he 
works for her/himself. These are distinguished from own account workers, who 
personally perform the work, but do not employ other workers to assist them.57 
Finally, workers in a similar position to that of Taryn and Jabu’s workers shall be 
referred to as the workers of self-employed workers or workers employed by self-
employed workers. 
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1.1.2 Aims and significance of this study 
 
This thesis is broadly concerned with the challenges that labour law faces in 
regulating non-standard working arrangements in the changed world of work. It 
therefore provides an analytical account of how these arrangements have developed 
and their consequences for the workers involved from a broad international 
perspective.  
  
Given the sheer diversity of the work arrangements that characterize the 
changed world of work, it would be impossible to do justice to all of them in this 
study. The study therefore focuses on the contracting out of work to self-employed 
workers. It uses this as a prism within which to analyse the broader debates about 
the limitations of conventional labour law to regulate non-standard working 
arrangements. In order to provide a concrete leg l framework within which to 
analyse the regulation of the practice, this study focuses on the South African legal 
system, within which the author is very familiar.  
 
 The key research question in this study is whether and to what extent South 
African labour law recognis s and regulates the practice of contracting work out to 
self-employed workers. There are several reasons for focusing on this practice as 
opposed to other working arrangements or practices. The first is that this practice 
has not been subjected to as much rigorous academic debate amongst legal scholars 
as other forms of work such as part-time, fixed term and temporary agency work. To 
the extent that the practice has been considered in academia, these analyses have 
largely been confined to the field of sociology, with less being written about it in the 













 The second reason is that despite the prevalence of the practice, it has hardly 
featured in legislation nor been the subject of detailed and sustained scrutiny by 
courts in South Africa or in other jurisdictions. There is therefore very little hard law 
regulating the practice. Consequently, there is a need to interrogate and 
conceptualise this practice from a legal perspective, to consider the extent to which 
it is already regulated and to put forward some tentative suggestions as to how it 
should be regulated.  
 
Third, the practice provides some insight into the challenges that labour law 
faces in addressing multi-dimensional non-standard work arrangements. As has 
been mentioned, he practiced to be scrutinized in this thesis is constituted by the 
intersection of externalization via commodification and externalization via 
intermediation. It therefore interrogates what solutions the law does or should 
provide to regulate the position of a worker whose status is unclear and who is 
ostensibly an employer. This raises questions about the legal consequences for the 
workers employed by the self-employed worker. Labour law is therefore challenged 
to develop a holistic approach that recognises and provides solutions to such multi-
dimensional arrangements.  
 
Fourth, the practice that will be scrutinized is also significant because it 
present a policy dilemma which calls on policy-makers to navigate between the 
goals of labour protection on the one hand, and small business promotion and black 
economic empowerment on the other. This is aptly captured by Theron:  
 
Should this emergent contractor be regarded as being in a vulnerable position, and should 
the relationship between the emergent contractor and the core enterprise be regulated? 
The core business controls such satellite enterprises or contractors through commercial 
contracts, of which service agreements ... are common forms. To seek to regulate this kind of 
[relationship] transgresses the boundary between commercial and labour regulation that 












the emergent contractor is simply an entrepreneur of the very kind industrial policy should 
seek to promote and who should as far as possible be left to his or her own devices.58 
 
These dilemmas have far-reaching consequences for self-employed workers and the 
workers they employ, as well as for the core enterprises that contract work out to 
them.  
 
Should labour law cover the self-employed worker to ensure that s/he may 
claim protection in relation to matters such as working hours, paid leave, minimum 
wages and termination of employment against the core enterprise? Or should self-
employed worker be receiving business support to enable them to expand their 
enterprises and enable them to comply with labour legislation in relation to her/his 
workers? Are these options mutually exclusive? And should the workers of the self-
employed worker be allowed to bargain with the core enterprise in relation to 
working conditions or have legal recourse against the core enterprise for unfair 
treatment? While there are no easy solutions to these dilemmas, this study attempts 
to engage and grapple with them.  
 
 To return to the key research question, this thesis considers whether and to 
what extent South African labour law recognises and regulates the practice of 
contracting work out to self-employed workers. As the empirical studies on the 
practice will show, self-employed workers and their workers do not receive the 
benefit of labour law’s protection in South Africa. Through an analysis of the body of 
South African law that regulates non-standard working arrangements, the study will 
consider whether South African labour law has developed legal principles to 
regulate this practice and whether its existing principles regulating other 
arrangements could be extended to be applied to the practice under scrutiny.  
                                                          












The key finding of the study is that South African labour law recognises and 
directly regulates the practice of contracting work out to self-employed workers  to 
a limited extent. In addition, some of legal approaches that have been developed to 
regulate other working arrangements may be extended and developed to cover the 
practice under scrutiny. It will therefore be found that to a large extent, the 
ingredients for the regulation of the practice under scrutiny are already part of 
South Africa’s labour law regime. These existing principles could potentially be 
applied to extend labour rights to self-employed workers and to  impose liability on 
the core enterprise for the working conditions and labour rights of the workers of 
self-employed workers.  
 
The study argues that not only is there the potential for the improved 
regulation, but there s also an urgent need for more robust regulation of the practice 
in the South African context. This is because, in the absence of clarity on the labour 
rights of self-employed workers and their workers, non-state institutions have 
developed their own initiatives to regulate the practice at a sector or firm level. 
These initiatives exclude labour law’s application to the self-employed workers and, 
for the most part, absolve the core enterprise from any liability in relation to the 
workers employed by self-employed worker. There is therefore a need for clear 
legislation to set out the labour rights of self-employed workers and their workers 
in order to guide the initiatives embarked on by trade unions, bargaining councils 
and corporations.  
 
The study also examines the extent to which the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) recognises and regulates the practice of contracting work out to 
self-employed workers. It does so through an analysis of the ILO’s debates on 
contract labour and the discussions on the employment relationship which 












Relationship. It will be found that while the ILO recognised the existence of the 
practice and the dilemmas it presents, it failed to translate these into binding legal 
instruments. The analysis of the discussions within the ILO, however, highlights 
some principles which could be applied when regulating the practice under 
scrutiny.  
 
Finally, drawing on the lessons learned from the analysis of South African 
law, and lessons gleaned from non-state institutions and the ILO, this thesis 
proposes a framework for legislation that would regulate the practice under 
scrutiny. The proposed framework adopts a holistic approach that considers the 
dynamics of the relationships between the core enterprise, the self-employed 
workers and the workers employed by self-employed workers.  
 
1.1.3 Methodological approach adopted in this thesis 
 
This study comprises a desk-based analysis of existing sources relating to the 
subject matter covered. Although located within the field of law, it is not a purely 
doctrinal study of the law on the changed world of work. Instead, it adopts a broader 
“law in context” approach that recognises that law does not operate in a vacuum and 
must be considered within the context in which it operates.  
 
 The study therefore engages with a broader body of sources and literature 
than the statues, court decisions, international law and legal commentary. It 
considers literature from the fields of history, sociology and socio-legal studies to 
examine how the world of work has changed and the forces behind these changes. 
Importantly, it considers the literature on the political economy to provide an 












flexibility. It also recognises and considers the efforts of non-state institutions such 
as trade unions, bargaining councils and enterprises their strategies to regulate the 
practice under scrutiny.  
 
While the core of this study is located within the South African jurisdiction, a 
comparative approach has been adopted to the analysis of the broader issues 
discussed herein. This is necessary because labour law and the employment 
relationship were originally developed in the global North and was transplanted 
into the global South. It is therefore prudent to make use of the wealth of 
jurisprudence and scholarship that has been developed in these countries, with the 
aim of considering how the debates and the discourse apply in the South African 
context.  
 
In addition, the literature on the practice of contracting work out to self-
employed workers has not been fully developed in South Africa. It is therefore 
necessary to consider comparative jurisprudence and the commentary of legal 
scholars from other jurisdictions to conceptualise the practice and gain an 
understanding of the challenges it presents for legal regulation. Looking beyond the 
South African jurisprudence and literature will also contribute to developing an 
understanding of the practice’s implications for labour regulation and for 
considering possible legal solutions.  
 
1.2 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
 
The present chapter is an introduction which has identified the nature of the 












It is important to understand why the scope and application of labour law is a 
matter of concern for legislatures, lawyers, workers, judges, and broader society. 
Chapter two aims to provide the necessary background to understand what labour 
law is, why it exists and who it applies to. It is divided into two main parts. It first 
addresses the what and the why dimensions by identifying the key features of labour 
law and canvassing a number of theoretical and institutional justifications for its 
existence. 
 
The chapter then addresses the who question by discussing the employment 
relationship, which labour law seeks to govern. It canvasses the broad 
developments across a number of jurisdictions, beginning with the binary divide 
between employees and independent contractors. It considers how labour law has 
progressively developed strategies to expand the scope of the employment 
relationship, for instance, by widening the range of criteria for identifying an 
employee. It also shows that some jurisdictions have recognised intermediate 
categories of workers and provided them with limited labour protection. The 
chapter demonstrates that while the scope of labour law continues to evolve and 
appears to be expanding, it is still firmly based on the employment relationship.   
 
Chapter three points to a trend that seems to contradict the trend towards 
the expansion of labour law’s scope discussed in chapter two. It argues that labour 
remains preoccupied with a particular paradigm of employment known as the 
standard employment relationship. It considers the origins of the standard 
employment relationship and the circumstances under which was chosen as the 
paradigm for the application of labour law and work-related social protection. It 
then considers the socio-economic and political changes that have led to the 












neoliberalism and globalisation, which have combined to fuel a quest for labour 
market flexibility.  
 
The forms of non-standard work are canvassed in detail and discussed in 
terms of three processes, namely casualisation, externalization by commodification 
and externalization by intermediation. These processes increasingly hamper labour 
law’s ability to protect workers and the work associated with them is precarious 
and insecure. Importantly, it is argued that these forms of work do not occur in 
isolation but often intersect with each other. This exacerbates the challenges of legal 
regulation and is a further impediment to the provision of labour protection.  
 
Chapter four narrows the discussion from the broad processes discussed in 
chapter three to focus on the core subject of this thesis. It considers the contracting 
out of work to self-employed worker in the South African context.  It argues that the 
practice of contracting work out is the point where externalisation via 
commodification intersects with externalisation via intermediation.   
 
The first part of this chapter presents evidence that employers are 
contracting work out to workers on the basis that they are independent contractors 
who employ other workers to assist them. The discussion begins with a historical 
account of the practice in Britain where it first developed in the 18th century and 
was known as the “gang labour” or “butty system”. It then considers the early 
emergence of the practice on the mines in South Africa from late 19th century until 
its abolition in 1922. The discussion then focuses on the re-emergence and 
contemporary use of this practice by South African employers, drawing from 













The second part of the chapter identifies the forces that are driving the 
proliferation of this practice in South Africa.  Many businesses have justified it on 
the grounds that it empowers workers, furthers small business development and is 
in line with black economic empowerment (BEE) policies. It is however argued that 
the growth of the practice has been fuelled by a desire to avoid the costs and risks 
associated with labour legislation in a labour market that is perceived to be 
inflexible. 
 
The third part considers the consequences of the practice of contracting out 
as the point of intersection between the two forms of externalisation. It shows how 
externalisation by commodification has effectively excluded self-employed workers 
from the scope of labour protection by virtue of their designation as independent 
contractors and employers. It considers how externalisation via intermediation 
designates the self-employed worker as the employer of the workers s/he purports 
to employ despite the fact that s/he is not in a position to fulfil the obligations 
relating to employment. It argues that the externalisation of the labour of the self-
employed worker and her/his workers makes it easier for employers to casualise 
their labour, adding a further dimension to the practice. The consequences for the 
workers involved are that they work under precarious conditions and do not have 
the benefit of labour law’s protection.  
 
The purpose of chapter five is to consider the regulation of the practice of 
contracting work out to self-employed workers in South Africa. Its point of 
departure is that the practice under scrutiny presents two key challenges to labour 
law. The first relates is that the practice undermines certain key assumptions on 
which conventional labour law is based. The practice also presents a challenge to 












casualisation, which give it a multi-dimensional character. It is argued that labour 
law must overcome these challenges in order to adequately regulate the practice.  
 
The chapter analyses the body of South African labour laws and principles 
that have been developed to regulate non-standard work. These relate to addressing 
externalisation via commodification and externalisation via intermediation.   The 
analyses reveals that the recognition and direct regulation of the practice in South 
African law is limited, but that a number of broader principles within the labour law 
regime could be extended to regulate the practice. It is submitted that there is a 
need to enact legislation to specifically regulate the practice, given the fact that non-
state institutions have developed their own approaches to regulating the practice 
and determining whether and when labour law applies to self-employed workers 
and their workers. 
 
Chapter six considers the history of the ILO’s efforts to regulate what it has 
referred to as “contract labour”. It traces the evolution of the ILO’s understanding of 
contract labour. The discussion covers three key periods which highlight important 
events in the history of the ILO, spanning from 1956 to the present. It analyses how 
the ILO’s conceptualisation of contract labour and formulation of responses to the 
problem has changed over time. The purpose of the analysis is to determine the 
extent to which the ILO specifically recognized and regulated the practice of 
contracting work out to self-employed workers.  
 
 The chapter shows that the ILO’s discussions on contract labour recognised 
the fact that some contractors more closely resembled dependent workers than 
entrepreneurs. They recognised the difficulties of such situations for the contractors 












its recognition of the existence of and the challenges posed by this practice into legal 
principles into binding international instruments.  
 
 The discussion ends with an analysis of the final outcome of the discussions 
on contract labour, namely Recommendation 198 on the Employment Relationship. 
It argues that this is a blunt instrument that reinforces the binary divide, focuses on 
bilateral relationships and is almost silent on triangular and multilateral 
arrangements. It does very little to regulate the practice under scrutiny. 
 
Finally, chapter seven draws together the key issues raised in this thesis and 
to provide some tentative recommendations as to how the practice under scrutiny 
could be regulated in the South African context. The first part of this chapter seeks 
to draw out the critical issues in what shall be called the broader debates canvassed 
in chapters two and three, particularly in so far as they relate to the scope of labour 
law. The second part looks more closely at the situation of self-employed workers 
and their workers and how the law has attempted to regulate the practice. 
Importantly, it makes some recommendations as to how the practice can be better 
regulated in South African law, drawing on existing principles in South African law 













CHAPTER 2: WHAT IS LABOUR LAW AND WHO DOES IT APPLY 
TO? 
 
The introduction to this thesis outlined the scope of this work and identified the 
practice that it seeks to analyse. It described this practice as contracting work out to 
self-employed workers. This is one of many practices that have enabled employers 
to take work outside the scope and protective realm of labour law. A detailed 
discussion on the means through which workers are increasingly falling outside the 
scope of labour law is canvassed in chapters three and four.  
 
This chapter aims to provide the necessary background to understand those 
chapters by outlining what labour law is, why it exists and who it applies to. It is 
divided into two main parts. The first part addresses the what and the why 
questions by identifying the key features of labour law and canvassing a number of 
theoretical and institutional justifications for its existence. The second part seeks to 
address the who question by discussing the employment relationship, which labour 
law seeks to govern. The conclusion draws together the implications of the 
interrelationship between the three questions discussed.  
 
These three questions relating to labour law are universal as they have been 
the subject of intellectual debate, legislative deliberations and judicial decisions in 
all jurisdictions, albeit to varying degrees. Thus, the following discussion draws 
widely from various authors, legislation and case law developments from around 
the world. The majority is drawn from the developed world, where labour law was 
originally developed and where it has been subjected to rigorous analysis for longer. 












South Africa, an attempt is made to pay particular attention to how the debates have 
unfolded in this jurisdiction.  
 
2.1 LABOUR LAW AND ITS PURPOSE 
 
A look into the statute books and judicial decisions of any jurisdiction will reveal 
that it has laws that regulate the labour market,1 that is, the place where people 
exchange their productive capacity (or labour) for remuneration. These laws may 
allow workers to form and join organisations through which they can bargain with 
employers to determine the terms and conditions of work. They may set limits on 
the number of hours and days that a person should be allowed to work and set 
minimum periods which a worker can spend away from work for various reasons. 
They may even stipulate the minimum amount that workers should receive and any 
benefits that employers should grant them. Importantly, labour laws set out the 
circumstances under which an employer may dispense with the services of a 
worker.  
 
Labour laws may also stipulate the precautions and measures that employers 
must take to safeguard the health and safety of workers, and may require employers 
to compensate workers for occupational injuries and diseases. Moreover, they may 
provide for the training of workers to ensure that they keep up with the demands of 
their work and have the knowledge and skills to improve their prospects for 
advancement. Labour laws may prohibit employers from discriminating against 
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is to regulate the labour market. P Benjamin A Review of Labour Markets in South Africa: Labour 
Market Regulation: International and South African Perspectives (Johannesburg, Human Sciences 












workers on the basis of characteristics such as their gender, nationality, or sexual 
orientation.  
 
Broadly speaking, these are some of the main issues that are typically covered 
by the body of laws referred to as labour law. Different jurisdictions cover some or 
all of them to varying degrees, placing emphasis on some aspects more than others. 
The definitions, scope and application of the various principles also differ from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. And, over the years, the labour laws of each country have 
evolved to adapt to and reflect the prevailing socio-economic circumstances and the 
political convictions of those in power. Given the diversity of labour law across 
jurisdictions and its historical evolution, one would be hard pressed to identify a 
unifying principle which underlies and provides a justification for the existence of 
labour law.  
 
This part considers why there is a need for labour law. Put differently, it 
considers the purpose or vocation of labour law. It does so firstly from the 
perspective of commentators who have tried to give theoretical perspectives on 
labour law’s purpose. These accounts are descriptive, that is, they explain what 
labour law actually seeks to do and prescriptive, that is, they consider what labour 
law should seek to achieve.  The theoretical perspectives are discussed in section 
2.1.1.  
 
This is followed by a discussion from the perspective of two institutions 
responsible for the making of labour law at both the international and national 
levels in section 2.1.2. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) will be 












objectives will be considered as they underpin the international labour law 
instruments adopted and inform member states’ labour legislation and policy.  
 
The South African legislature (through selected constitutional provisions and 
labour statutes) will be examined as the national body responsible for labour 
legislation in South Africa. South Africa presents a pertinent case study as it is the 
selected jurisdiction for this paper. Its labour laws have also been strongly 
influenced by the country’s political history, its transition to a constitutional 
democracy and its membership in the ILO. 
 
2.1.1 Theoretical perspectives on labour law’s purpose 
 
This part considers the purpose of labour law, beginning with the classical account 
that asserts that labour law aims to address the imbalance of power between 
employers and employees. It then considers a number of alternative accounts which 
have essentially argued that labour law’s purpose is broader than the protection of 
workers. Finally, it considers the market failures approach that states that labour is 
not about protecting workers, but about correcting labour market failures.  
 
 The classical account of labour law is premised on the notion that 
employment relationships differ from other commercial relationships established 
by ordinary contracts. It has long been accepted that employment relationships 
differ substantially from ordinary commercial contracts in that they are 
characterized by inequality of bargaining power between employers and 
employees.2 One of the foremost proponents of the classical account of labour law – 
                                                          
2 B Langille “Labour Law’s Back Pages” in G Davidov and B Langille (eds) Boundaries and Frontiers 












Sir Otto Kahn-Freund – argued that the relationship between an employer and an 
isolated worker was inherently unequal, being one between “a bearer of power and 
one who is not a bearer of power”.3  
 
The characterisation of the employment relationship as unequal was based 
on the assumption that the employment relationship necessitated submission and 
subordination on the part of the employee.4 This assumption was closely related to 
Coase’s theory on the emergence of the capitalist firm as a result of a trade-off 
between two possible modes of organising production. These were contracting on 
the market outside the firm on the one hand, and internal co-ordination of 
production by the entrepreneur within the firm on the other.5 The capitalist firm 
was established as a result of a choice to integrate productive functions under the 
entrepreneur’s control.6 According to Coase, the firm was therefore constituted by 
the establishment of employment relationships whereby workers agreed to obey 
the directions of the employer in exchange for remuneration.7  
 
 Consequently, the exercise of hierarchical control over these integrated 
functions has traditionally been regarded as essential to ensuring that the exercise 
                                                          
3 O Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law (2nd Edition) (London: Steven and Sons, 1977) 6.  
4 E Herz, “The Contract of Employment: I” 31 International Labour Review (1935) 837, at 846; Kahn-
Freund (note 3) 6. 
5 Coase’s theory explaining the emergence of the capitalist firm highlights the significance of 
transaction costs for the choice between different ways of organizing production. He identified two 
alternative means of organizing production, namely market exchanges outside the firm on the one 
hand and internal coordination of production by the entrepreneur on the other hand. R H Coase 
“The nature of the firm” (1937) 4(16) Economica 386 at 388. 
6 Coase argued that the reason for the existence of the firm was that it reduced some of the high 
transaction costs associated with market transactions. Coase (note 5) 388-392. “Although 
transaction costs are hard to define, they do not include the principal costs of making a product 
such as the raw materials and labour, but identify the ancillary costs which comprise the costs of 
making the necessary business arrangements and the costs of monitoring performance of 
contracts.” H Collins “Quality assurance in subcontracting” in S Deakin and J Michie Contracts, Co-
operation and Competition ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 284-306 292. 












of these functions can be flexibly moulded and directed in line with the firm’s aims 
and needs.8 The employment relationship has traditionally been regarded as the 
medium through which this hierarchical control is exercised, and therefore, an 
essential tool for business organisation.9 Thus, the exercise of hierarchical control or 
authority by the employer over the worker has been seen as an indispensable 
characteristic of the employment relationship.10 In terms of Coase’s theory, the 
employer’s right of control was the factor distinguishing employees from 
independent contractors.11  
 
 Proponents of the classical theory therefore argue that labour law’s purpose 
is “to be a countervailing force to counteract the inequality of bargaining power 
which is inherent and must be inherent in the employment relationship”.12 Labour 
law has therefore traditionally focused on the hierarchical relationship between 
employer and employee and regarded as a mechanism to balance or redistribute the 
uneven power between employer and employee.13 It is for these reasons that labour 
law has traditionally applied (and for the most part, continues to apply) to the 
employees as opposed to independent contractors. 
 
 On the basis of this classical account, labour law has used two main 
mechanisms to redress the imbalance of power between employers and employees. 
One mechanism involves the use of procedural tools to facilitate the representation 
and empowerment of workers and enable them to participate in decision-making 
                                                          
8 G Casale “The employment relationship: a general introduction” in G Casale (ed)  The employment 
relationship: a comparative overview  (Oregon: Hart, 2011) 1-33 17-9. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Coase (note 5) 403-4. 
12 Kahn-Freund (note 3) 6. 
13 K Klare, “The Horizons of Transformative Labour and Employment Law” in J Conaghan, R Fischl, 
and K, Klare,  Labour Law in an Era of Globalization: Transformative Practices and Possibilities 












through collective bargaining.14 It has however been argued that that collective 
bargaining does not guarantee a just outcome for employees.15 The second 
mechanism is to rewrite the bargain, through minimum standards such as wage-
setting and safety standards16 and through rules limiting the employer’s decision 
making powers relating to employee discipline, demotions and dismissals.17  
According to Hyde, the recognition of the employment relationship as the site of the 
greatest need for legal intervention also led to its recognition as the logical site to 
administer social security measures.18  
 
While the classical account has been widely accepted, there are other 
accounts of the purpose of labour law. The accounts of Langille, Davis and 
Freedland, and that of Benjamin claim that labour law’s vocation not only includes 
but goes beyond merely redressing the imbalance of power between the parties to 
secure worker’s welfare. Other critics such as Hyde, reject the notion that the aim of 
labour law is to address unequal relations and argue that labour law seeks to 
address market failures that arise when work is unregulated. These accounts are 
discussed below.  
 
Davis and Freedland reject the idea that labour law is “simply about securing 
the welfare of workers” and argue that labour law must also meet the requirements 
of efficiency.19 By this they mean that labour law should serve, or at the very least 
not compromise, the economic viability and competitiveness of employing 
                                                          
14 A Hyde, “What is Labour Law” in Davidov and Langille Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law: 
Goals and Means in the Regulation of Work (Oregon: Hart 2006) 37- 61, 47; Langille, (note 2) 24; 
Benjamin (note 1) 5. 
15 Langille (note 2) 25.  
16 Benjamin (note 1) 5; Langille (note 2) 25.  
17 Casale (note 8) 19-20. 
18 Hyde (note 14) 47.  
19 P Davies and M, Freedland, “Labor Markets, Welfare and the Personal Scope of Employment Law” 












enterprises at a micro-economic level.20  Von Prondzynski has similarly argued 
while the protection of the rights and interest of workers remains central to labour 
law, it needs to take a more explicit and positive view of employer interests and the 
promotion of business success.21 Central to these arguments is the notion that 
labour law must balance these two objectives, namely securing workers’ welfare 
and meeting the requirements of efficiency.  
 
Benjamin argues that labour lawyers have begun to reassess labour law’s 
vocation and recognize that it can no longer be restricted to protecting employees.22 
He suggests that modern labour law has four broad objectives. The first is to 
promote allocative and productive efficiency and economic growth. The second is 
macroeconomic management, by achieving wage stabilization, high employment 
levels and international competitiveness. The third is to establish and protect 
fundamental rights. The fourth is to redistribute wealth and power in employment 
contexts.  
 
Adopting a different approach, Langille contends that a number of changes 
including the growing informality of work have called the classical account of labour 
law into question. In his view, the classical account of labour law with its focus on 
redistribution and constraining market activity has presented labour law as being 
opposed to investment, market activity and globalisation.23 He rejects the view that 
social justice and economic development are mutually exclusive, but argues that 
                                                          
20 Ibid at 233. 
21 F Von Prondzynski, “Labour law as a business facilitator” in H Collins, P Davies  and R Rideout The 
Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation  (London: Kluwer House, 2000) 99-110 109-10. 
22 Benjamin (note 1) 5. 












“human freedom is both the goal of and the necessary precondition to the 
construction of just and durable economies and societies”.24  
 
Langille argues for the “development as freedom” approach as an alternative 
to the classical account. On this approach, labour law extends beyond redressing the 
power imbalance to include liberating and enabling them to realise their human 
capital.25  Realising workers’ human capital enhances labour productivity and 
efficiency, which in turn encourage economic development.26 Langille argues that in 
order to fulfil these purposes, labour law must integrate policies relating to 
education, family care, training and active labour market policies more closely into 
its framework.27  
 
Stiglitz also provides an argument for enhanced worker protection as an 
important part of the process of development. He argues that development is about 
more than capital accumulation, but is about the transformation of society and the 
improvement of people’s living standards.28 He argues that development must be 
equitable, sustainable, democratic and must conform to the principles of social 
justice.29 In the context of this broader understanding of development, the 
improvement of the welfare and security of workers through labour rights is central 
and becomes an end in itself.30   
 
                                                          
24 Ibid at 33. 
25 Ibid at 34. 
26 Ibid at 33-4. 
27 Ibid at 34. 
28 J Stiglitz “Employment, social justice and social well-being” (2002) 141(1-2) International Labour 














The above accounts of Davies and Freedland, Benjamin and Langille argue 
that labour law’s vocation is broader than redressing the imbalance of power and 
securing the welfare of workers and include serving broader economic objectives 
such as increasing productivity, efficiency and economic development. These 
commentators argue that the classical account provides an incomplete explanation 
for the existence of labour law.  
 
Another account of labour law’s purpose relates to market failures. On this 
account, labour law prevents socially sub-optimum or inefficient outcomes that 
result when markets are left unregulated because “economic actors are individuated 
and cannot overcome collective action problems”.31 On this account, unregulated 
markets are characterized by labour market failures, including inelasticity of supply, 
collective action problems, low trust and opportunism that prevent the formation of 
efficient long-term contracts, inadequate incentives for investment in human capital 
and information asymmetries.32 Hyde argues that through techniques such as 
collective bargaining measures, minimum contractual terms and dispute resolution 
institutions, labour law addresses these market failures to achieve socially beneficial 
outcomes.33  
 
At a glance, the market failures approach seems opposed to the classical 
account of labour law as a mechanism to achieve protection and redistribution. 
Some scholars have however argued that the relationship between these two 
accounts is more complex than this.34 Collins argues that in some cases they overlap 
                                                          
31 Hyde (note 14) 53.  
32 H Collins, “Justifications and Techniques of Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation” in H 
Collins, P Davies and R Rideout, The Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation  (London: Kluwer 
House, 2000), 3-28, 6; Hyde (note 14) 54. 
33 Hyde (note 14) 53.  
34 Collins (note 32) 6, 16; L Dickens, “Problems of fit: changing employment and labour regulation” 












and may be complementary, and may be used in conjunction justify similar policies 
and interventions.35 Dickens contends that the two accounts are different sides of 
the same coin, and can be used as alternative explanations to justify the same 
legislative interventions, depending on the audience.36 
 
The above discussion shows the diversity of theoretical perspectives on the 
purpose of labour law. The need to redress the power imbalance between 
employers and employees is a recurring theme amongst the perspectives presented 
and continues to provide a solid foundation for the existence of labour law. 
However, this cannot be seen as an end in itself, but a means of achieving desirable 
social ends such as ensuring the welfare of workers and their families and 
improving their standard of living, thereby fostering broader social and economic 
development.  
 
 Although the greater protection of workers is often seen to be inimical to 
those of employers, it can be argued that this can be beneficial to employers. Labour 
law is an important mechanism for preventing reliance on destructive competition 
strategies such as low wages and unsafe working conditions.37 By setting minimum 
conditions within which employers must operate, labour law forces  them to focus 
on constructive competition strategies aimed at improving and innovating 
management systems, technology, products processes, worker organisation and 
worker competence.38  
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36 Dickens (note 34) 607.  
37 Benjamin (note 1) 6. 
38 W Sengenberger, “International Labour Standards in the globalised economy: obstacles and 
opportunities for achieving progress” in J, Craig and M, Lynk, (eds) Globalization and the future of 












 In addition, by requiring employers to make “reliable assurances of fair 
treatment, employment security as well as mechanisms for worker participation in 
the management of the businesses”,39 labour law fosters worker motivation and 
commitment to an enterprise. The latter are indispensable for the improvement of 
efficiency, competitiveness and productivity.40 Sengenberger argues that worker 
participation through freedom of association, collective bargaining and social 
dialogue fosters cooperation and mutual trust, which enhance both micro- and 
macro-economic performance.41  
 
 Having considered the purpose of labour law at a theoretical level, it is 
necessary to consider some institutional perspectives about the purpose of labour 
law. 
 
2.1.2 Institutional perspectives: the ILO and the South African legislature 
 
                                                          
39 Benjamin (note 1) 6.  
40 J Heintz, Globalization, economic policy and employment: Poverty and gender implications, 
Employment Strategy Papers, 2006/3, Employment Policy Unit, Employment Strategy Unit 
(Geneva: 
International Labour Office, 2006), 68;  Benjamin (note 1) 6; Sengenberger (note 38) 338; K Banks, 
“The impact of globalization on labour standards: A second look at the evidence” in J Craig and M 
Lynk, (eds) Globalization and the Future of Labour Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006) 77-107, 86; G Klerck “Labour market regulation and the casualisation of employment in 
Namibia” (2003 Winter South African Journal of Labour Relations 63 , 87-8; ILO, International 
Labour Conference. 95th Session 2006 Report V(1) The Employment Relationship (Geneva: 
International Labour Office, 2006) , 10; K Rittich, “Rights, Risk and Reward: Governance Norms in 
The International Order and the Problem of Precarious Work” in J Fudge and R Owens (eds), 31-
52,37. 
41 Sengenberger (note 38) 338. He contends that these results come about in various ways. Firstly,  
workers’ contribution of their knowledge and experience improve managerial decision-making. 
Second, consultation and negotiation ensure that conflicting interests are considered and 
accommodated. Third, collective agreements brings transparency to wage-setting and avoids 
discontent. Fourth, collective bargaining outcomes bring about predictability, accountability and 












The ILO’s main objective is to “advance the opportunities for men and women to 
obtain decent work in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dignity”.42 
Its main aims are to promote workers’ rights, to encourage decent work 
opportunities, to enhance social protection and to strengthen social dialogue on 
work-related matters.43 Decent work is at the centre of the ILO’s agenda and 
programmes. According to the ILO: 
 
[d]ecent work sums up the aspirations of people in their working lives. It involves 
opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair income, security in the 
workplace and social protection for families, better prospects for personal development and 
social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns, organize and participate in 
the decisions that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women 
and men… These objectives hold for all workers, women and men, in both formal and 
informal economies; in wage employment or working on their own account; in the fields, 
factories and offices; in their home or in the community.44 
 
The first pillar, job creation, requires that labour law promote inter alia skills 
development, job creation and sustainable livelihoods.45 Guaranteeing rights at 
work is the second pillar in the Decent Work Agenda and entails that labour law 
secure recognition and respect for the rights of workers.46 These would include 
freedom of association, protection against unfair discrimination, and protection of 
security of employment.47  
 
The third pillar is extending social protection, which requires the promotion 
of inclusion and productivity for working men and women. These goals are secured 
                                                          
42 “About the ILO”, accessed from the ILO website, www.ilo.org on 20/02/2010. 
43 Ibid. 
44 ILO “Decent Work” accessed at www.ilo.org/Themes/Decentwork on 15/09/2009 and “Decent 
Work for All” accessed at 
http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Mainpillars/WhatisDecentWork/lang-en/index.htm on 
15/09/2009.  
45 ILO, “Decent Work Agenda” accessed from http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/decent-














by ensuring that working conditions are “safe, allow adequate free time and rest, 
take into account family and social values, provide for adequate compensation in the 
case of lost or reduced income and permit access to adequate health care”.48 The 
final pillar is the promotion of social dialogue involving workers’ and employers’ 
organisations, which is essential to increasing productivity, avoiding workplace 
disputes and building social cohesion.49 
 
At the individual level, decent work contributes to one’s general well-being 
and empowerment as well as the realisation of one’s personal dignity and fullest 
potential as a human being. At the community level, it contributes to the stability of 
families, peace and improved standards of living in communities. At the broader 
societal level, decent work contributes to social justice, poverty reduction, economic 
prosperity and equitable, inclusive and sustainable development.  
 
One of the key ways in which the ILO drives the Decent Work Agenda is 
through the adoption of international labour standards. By ratifying ILO 
conventions, member states undertake to ensure that they take measures to uphold 
the standards in their domestic spheres. The alignment of domestic labour law with 
these international standards is therefore important. In addition to their specific 
undertakings, member states by joining the ILO undertake “to work towards 
attaining the overall objectives of the Organization to the best of [its] resources and 
fully in line with [its] specific circumstances”.50 One could also argue that in addition 
to South Africa must strive to realise the aspirations of workers as expressed in the 
Decent Work Agenda.  
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Turning to labour law in South Africa, it is necessary to briefly consider the 
historical context. During the 19th and 20th centuries the British and later the 
apartheid governments enacted a myriad of master and servant laws, pass laws, 
land deprivation and other laws to secure coloured and African workers as cheap 
and docile labour in the agricultural, mining and manufacturing sectors.51 Labour 
law during that period was therefore part of a complex legal regime designed to 
achieve and maintain the systematic repression of black workers.52 This political 
and ideological vision informed labour market policy for decades until it gradually 
dismantled from the 1970s.53 It was replaced by an inclusive system after the 
transition to a constitutional democracy in 1994.  
 
In 1996, Parliament adopted the Constitution as the supreme law of South 
Africa in order to inter alia “[h]eal the divisions of the past and establish a society 
based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights”.54 This 
transition involved a shift to a constitutional order in a sovereign and democratic 
state whose founding values included human dignity, the achievement of equality 
and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.55 These democratic values are 
                                                          
51 D Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide (Fourth Edition) (Durban: 
LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2003) 6-8. 
52 From 1924, discrimination in the labour market was entrenched through a dual industrial labour 
relations system which denied Africans membership in registered trade unions and excluded them 
from the mainstream labour relations system. This protected white workers from competition from 
cheaper black labour and also served the interests of employers. S Terreblanche, A History of 
Inequality in South Africa: 1652-2002 (Scottsville: University of Natal Press, 2002), 10-14; Du Toit et 
al (note 51) 6-8. 
53 This began with the repeal of the master and servant laws in 1974 and the deracialisation of 
industrial relations law in 1981. Du Toit et al (note 51) 10-11. 
54 Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 












affirmed and the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights56 which is “a cornerstone of 
democracy in South Africa”.57  
Importantly, the Bill of Rights enshrines the right of “everyone” to fair labour 
practices in section 23(1). The Constitution does not define the concept of fair 
labour practices and the Constitutional Court has held that it is incapable of precise 
definition and has held that what is fair will ultimately depend on the circumstances 
of a particular case and that this will involve a value judgment.58 In National 
Education Health and Allied Workers’ Union v University of Cape Town and Others,59 
the Court found that guidance may be sought from domestic experience and 
international experience as reflected in ILO instruments, as well as foreign 
instruments.60  
 
An analysis of the South African Constitution reveals that is more than a 
document specifying the rights of the country’s citizens against the state and 
delineating the power of the various organs of government. 61 It is an instrument 
that is “self conscious about its historical setting” and its commitment to social 
transformation through the realisation of social justice and the achievement of 
substantive equality.62 According to Klare: 
 
The Constitution envisages equality across the existential space of the social world, not just 
within the legal process. Implicit is an understanding that foundational law is not and 
                                                          
56 Chapter 2 of the Constitution.  
57 Section 7 of the Constitution.  
58 National Education Health and Allied Workers’ Union v University of Cape Town and Others (2003) 
24 ILJ 95 (CC), paras 33-34. 
59 Supra note 58. 
60 National Education Health and Allied Workers’ Union v University of Cape Town and Others  supra 
para 34. 
61 K Klare, “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 South African Journal of 
Human Rights 146 at 153. 












cannot be neutral with respect to the distribution of social and economic power and of 
opportunities for people to experience self-realization.63 
 
South African society is thus committed to “the systematic implementation of 
policies and measures that are necessary to promote the values and achieve the 
social order envisaged by the Constitution of the Constitution as the highest source 
of legal authority”.64 This commitment has been referred to as transformative 
constitutionalism.65  
 
The concept of transformative constitutionalism sets the context within 
which the right to fair labour practices must be understood.66 An examination of 
country’s key labour statutes reveals how they fall within the broad project of 
transformative constitutionalism. It demonstrates how the legislature has given 
effect to the right to fair labour practices and other constitutional rights and values 
such as equality and dignity. This brief discussion focuses on the Labour Relations 
Act, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, the Employment Act and the Skills 
Development Act which are the central labour statutes in South Africa.  
 
At the centre of the legislative framework is the Labour Relations Act (LRA).67 
This Act states that its purpose is “to advance economic development, social justice, 
labour peace and the democratization of the workplace by fulfilling the primary 
objects of this Act”.68 The LRA’s primary objects include the provision of a 
framework for collective bargaining to determine terms and conditions of 
                                                          
63 Ibid at 154. 
64 Social Law Project “Advancing domestic workers rights in a context of transformative 
constitutionalism”, Paper presented at the Domestic Workers’ Research Project Conference, Cape 
Town, 2010 9. 
65 Originally developed by Karl Klare (note 13) above. See also Social Law Project (note 64) 9. 
66 Social Law Project (note 64) 10. 
67 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA). 












employment and formulate industrial policy.69 It also aims to promote orderly 
collective bargaining, sectoral level collective bargaining employee participation in 
decision making in the workplace70 and effective dispute resolution.71 Importantly, 
(though not mentioned in the objects) the LRA defines unfair labour practices and 
unfair dismissals and provides for the employee’s remedies in such cases.72 
 
The Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA)73 is another key statute 
which gives effect to section 23(1) of the Constitution. It aims to advance economic 
development and social justice by inter alia establishing basic conditions of 
employment and regulating the variation of basic conditions of employment.74 The 
Employment Equity Act (EEA)75 is another key South African labour statute. Its 
preamble acknowledges the “disparities in employment, occupation and income 
within the national labour market” resulting from apartheid. The Act thus aims to 
promote “equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment through the 
elimination of unfair discrimination”.76 It also provides for “affirmative action 
measures to redress the disadvantages in employment experienced by designated 
groups, in order to ensure their equitable representation in all occupational 
categories and levels in the workforce”.77 
 
The Skills Development Act (SDA)78  is also an important part of the 
legislative framework on labour matters. Its key objectives include the provision of 
                                                          
69 Section 1(c) of the LRA.  
70 Section 1(c) of the LRA.  
71 Section 1(d) (iv) read with the long title of the LRA.  
72 See Chapter VIII of the LRA. 
73 Act 75 of 1997. 
74 Section 1 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997.  
75 Act 55 of 1998. 
76 Section 2 of the Employment Equity Act. 
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opportunities for employees to acquire new skills and to enable new labour market 
entrants to obtain work experience.79 It pays particular attention to the needs of 
marginalized workers, including those that are historically disadvantaged, 
retrenched workers and workers who have difficulty in finding employment.80 The 
SDA envisages that its measures will improve the quality of life of workers, as well 
as their job prospects and labour mobility.81 In addition, it aims to benefit 
employers, by enabling them to find qualified workers; to improve their 
productivity and competitiveness and to improve their return on investment in 
training and skills development.82  
 
This brief overview shows that South Africa’s labour law is informed and 
underpinned by the constitutional values, rights and commitment to social 
transformation. In addition it shaped by South Africa’s position as a member of the 
international community. More particularly, it is shaped by the country’s obligations 
as a member of the ILO. These obligations include South Africa’s specific obligations 
in terms of conventions that it has signed ratified.83  Thus, the purpose clauses of the 
LRA and BCEA expressly include giving effect to South Africa’s international law 
obligations as a member of the ILO.84 In addition, South Africa as a member of the 
ILO has an obligation to uphold and promote the fundamental objectives and 
promote the principles of the ILO. 
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International law is also indirectly operative in South Africa’s domestic 
sphere by virtue of section 233 of the Constitution which governs the interpretation 
of legislation. This provision requires that any court, tribunal or forum interpreting 
any legislation must prefer “any interpretation of the legislation that is consistent 
with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with 
international law”.85 This would apply to the interpretation of all labour legislation 
in South Africa. The EEA expressly provides that it must be interpreted in 
compliance with South Africa’s international law obligations, and particularly those 
contained in ILO Convention 111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of 
Employment and Occupation.86 
 
The perspectives of the ILO as expressed in its mission and Decent Work 
Agenda and the South African legislature expressed through the Constitution and 
labour legislation confirm the conclusions drawn on the theoretical perspectives in 
3.1.1 above. These institutions are unashamedly biased in favour of workers. It is 
clear that they regard labour law as addressing the power imbalance and protecting 
workers not as an end, but as a means to achieving a number of desirable social 
outcomes. They envisage labour law not only governing, but transcending the 
relationship between employer and worker and driving social transformation at the 
level of the individual, the community and of broader society. It is submitted that the 
concept of decent work encompasses the universal aspirations that labour law seeks 
to pursue. Thus, labour law must address the areas covered by the four pillars 
identified in the Decent Work Agenda, namely job creation, rights at work, extending 
social protection and promoting social dialogue.87 
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The brief outline evolution of labour law in South Africa raises two key issues 
about the purpose of labour law within particular jurisdictions. The first is the 
possibility of a disjuncture between the above notion of the ideal purpose of labour 
law in the broad sense and the actual purposes that the labour laws of a particular 
jurisdiction may seek to achieve. Apartheid labour laws provide an example of how 
labour law was used to achieve the most pernicious objectives. The second is that 
the actual purposes of labour law in a jurisdiction are not immutable and may 
evolve over time or change drastically as a result of inter alia political agendas and 
regime changes. While these observations capture the reality in some jurisdictions 
at particular points in time, they do not undermine the ideal purpose of labour law, 
but rather point to the need to align labour laws with the ideal.  
 
Having canvassed the purpose of labour law, it is necessary to consider the 
legal parameters within which labour law operates. When does labour law apply 
and when does it not? Who is covered by its protective features and who falls 
outside of its scope? According to the classical account, labour law specifically 
focuses on the employment relationship which differs radically from other legal 
relationships. The next section considers the employment relationship as the 
gateway to labour law and how it has been conceptualised and identified in different 
legal systems.  
 














There is broad consensus on the centrality of the employment relationship to the 
application of labour law.88 In general terms, the employment relationship 
establishes the legal link between the employee or worker on the one hand and the 
employer, to whom the worker provides services in return for remuneration under 
certain conditions.89 The employment relationship is the medium through which 
reciprocal rights and obligations between employer and the worker are created.90 
The employment relationship arises as a result of an agreement between the 
employer and the employee. The contract of employment is the framework for the 
employment relationship.91  
 
Closely related to labour law’s focus on the employment relationship is the 
binary divide between employment and self-employment which is “at the heart of 
the classification of work relationships”.92  The binary divide has traditionally been 
used as the basis on which to draw the line between workers who should benefit 
from labour law protection and those who do not.93 Legislatures, judges and 
academics all over the world have thus been preoccupied with distinguishing 
between an employee who is subject to an employment relationship, and an 
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independent contractor who is subject to the ordinary commercial law. Drawing this 
line and identifying the employment relationship has been the cause of much 
contention and confusion both within and across jurisdictions.  
 
Section 2.2.1 considers the broad international developments in relation to 
the identification of the employment relationship. Section 2.2.2 focuses on the 
evolution of the employment relationship and the tests for identifying it in the South 
African context.  
 
2.2.1 Developments on the employment relationship: comparative 
perspectives 
 
This section considers the broad international trends in defining and identifying the 
employment relationship. It considers the legislative and common law criteria for 
identifying the employment relationship and distinguishing between an employee 
and an independent contractor. It also identifies recent legislative and other 
approaches that have been adopted to provide greater clarity on the identification of 
the employment relationship. Because the intention is to provide a broad picture of 
the different approaches adopted, much reliance is placed on recent international 
and comparative surveys of these developments. In some cases, the approaches 
adopted in specific jurisdictions are discussed to give a more concrete illustration of 
the developments. 
 
The labour law in the statute books is the starting point for understanding the 
nature of the employment relationship in most jurisdictions. Most labour laws 
define the employment contract and may define the parties to it, that is, the 












substantive or descriptive and vary in the terminology and level of detail.94 
Substantive definitions establish the conditions that constitute an employment 
relationship and distinguish it from other contracts.95 Thus, an employment contract 
may be defined as an agreement under which the worker agrees to work under 
conditions of submission to the employer or under the employer’s direction, 
authority, supervision or control.96  
 
Descriptive definitions, on the other hand, describe the employment contract 
without identifying any factors that characterize it as such.97 For example, a contract 
of employment may simply be defined as a contract between an employer and an 
employee.98 Descriptive definitions feature in most common-law jurisdictions.99  
 
In most cases, the legislative definitions (whether substantive or descriptive) 
are insufficiently precise and the courts have played an important role in 
determining the exact detail and content of these terms.100 Over time, the courts 
have developed a number of tests to identify an employment relationship and 
distinguish it from ordinary commercial contracts.  
 
Initially, the main indicator was the performance of work under the 
employer’s supervision and control in return for wages.101 It has been suggested in 
chapter two that the use of this criterion was closely linked to the theory that the 
capitalist firm was constituted by contracts under which workers undertook to 
                                                          
94 International Labour Office (note 88) 20. 
95 Casale (note 8)26. 
96 Ibid. 
97 International Labour Office (note 88) 21-22. 
98 Casale (note 8) 26. 
99 International Labour Office (note 88) 21-22. 
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submit to the control of the entrepreneur-employer. The initial requirement was the 
exercise of actual control over the performance of work, but this became less 
relevant due to the increase of technically skilled workers who determined the 
technical aspects of their work.102 Gradually, courts moved towards a test requiring 
the employer’s right or ability to exercise control.103  
 
With time, the courts acknowledged the inadequacy of the control test as a 
complete test104 particularly in light of socio economic changes and the proliferation 
of non-traditional forms of work.105 A number of alternative tests have been 
developed. These include the integration test which seeks to determine whether the 
worker was a part of the organisation for which they were performing work.106 
Another test is the business test, which seeks to determine whether the worker is 
performing work for his or her own account, with a negative answer regarded as 
indicating that the worker is an employee.107  
 
Most jurisdictions have adopted a multi-factor test, which involves making an 
assessment of each situation on the basis of a combination of factors.108 These 
include the duration and permanency of the relationship, the extent of supervisory 
control and authority exercised, the periodicity of payment, the party responsible 
for social security payment and provision of tools, integration of the work into the 
enterprise’s normal activities, and the relative investments of the worker and the 
enterprise.109 Although no single factor is decisive of the existence of an 
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employment relationship, the subordination and control factor is often given greater 
weight as it is still regarded as “the hallmark of an employment relationship”.110 
 
Despite the adoption of several tests for this purpose, the determination of 
the existence of an employment relationship remains a difficult task in most 
jurisdictions. A number of strategies have been developed to provide greater clarity. 
For example, some jurisdictions have adopted codes of practice which provide 
guidelines as to how to determine the existence of an employment relationship. 
These codes may provide a set of factors that indicate the existence of an 
employment relationship. They may also outline principles to guide decision 
makers, for instance, the emphasis on primacy of fact over form.111 
 
Codes of practice are usually the product of consultation and consensus 
between the social partners, that is, employers’ organisations, workers’ 
organisations and government.112 Codes of good practice do not constitute 
legislation but are “soft law” instruments which are not binding on decision-makers. 
However, the latter are required to consider them when making decisions as to 
employment status. Ireland and South Africa have adopted codes of good practice 
on the employment relationship.113 
 
In addition, some jurisdictions have introduced legislative provisions to 
facilitate the establishment of an employment relationship and to ease the burden of 
                                                          
110 Ibid.  
111 See for example Item 16 the South African Code of Good Practice on Who is an Employee, 
Government Gazette No 29445, General Notice 1774 of 2006 issued 1 December 2006. 
112 For example, the Irish and South African codes were formulated by the tripartite Employment 
Status Group and the National Economic Development and Labour Council respectively.  
113 See South African Code of Practice, Government Gazette No 29445, General Notice 1774 of 2006, 
1 December 2006; Ireland “Code of Good Practice for determining employment or self-employment 
status of individuals” accessed from http://www.welfare.ie/EN/Publications/Documents/code-of-












proof which the worker needs to discharge in order to prove entitlement to labour 
protection.114 One approach has been to provide for a presumption of employment if 
certain factors are proved. Legislation may provide for a “substantive” presumption 
of employment, whose effect is that an employment relationship is conclusively 
established if specified conditions are met.115 Alternatively, legislation may provide 
for a “procedural” presumption, which means that “if certain indicators are present, 
the relationship is deemed to be an employment relationship” subject to the alleged 
employer or the objective facts demonstrating otherwise.116 
 
In South Africa, amendments to the Labour Relations Act and the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act created a rebuttable presumption of employment, 
“regardless of the form of the contract”, if one or more of certain listed factors are 
proved. 117   Once one or more of these factors are proven and the presumption is 
triggered, the onus rests on the employer to present evidence to rebut the 
presumption. The factors are as follows:118 119 
 
(a) the manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction of another 
person; 
(b) the person’s hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another person; 
(c) in the case of a person who works for an organisation, the person forms part of that 
organisation; 
                                                          
114 International Labour Office (note 88) 28. 
115 Casale (note 8) 28. 
116 Ibid.  
117 Section 200A of the Labour Relations Act and section 83A of the Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act.  
118 Section 200A (1) LRA and section 83A of the BCEA.  
119 However, in terms of section 200(A) of the LRA The provisions creating the presumption 
expressly exclude workers who earn above a certain income threshold from its benefit. The 
threshold is periodically determined by Minister of Labour in terms of section 6(3) of the BCEA. 
Benjamin argues that the rationale for this is to exclude skilled and professional workers who 
presumably have the bargaining power and would not be in need of labour protection. P Benjamin, 
“Who needs labour law? Defining the scope of legal protection” in J Conaghan, R Fischl, and K Klare,  
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(d) the person has worked for that other person for an average of at least 40 hours per 
month over the last three months; 
(e) the person is economically dependent on the other person for whom he or she works or 
renders services; 
(f) the person is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the other person; or  
(g) the person only works for or renders services to one person. 
Another legislative mechanism that has been developed to ease the recognition of 
employees is the deeming of certain categories of workers as employees. Deeming 
provisions differ from presumptions in that while the latter focus on the particular 
circumstances of the particular worker, the former rely on the circumstances 
relating to a particular category of workers. Australia is one of the few jurisdictions 
where such provisions have been enacted and implemented. Several Australian 
states provide for the deeming of certain classes of workers as employees.  
 
Two general approaches to deeming can be identified. In terms of the first 
approach, the legislature delegates the deeming power to an administrative body 
which decides on an ad hoc basis. This approach was adopted by Queensland’s 
Industrial Relations Act.120 Section 275 of that Act empowers the Queensland 
Industrial Relations Commission to declare a class of persons who were not 
employees to be employees for the purpose of the Act. The Commission may make 
such a declaration on application by an organisation, a state peak Council or the 
Minister. A statement by the then Minister of Employment, Training and Industrial 
Relations made it clear that section 275 was intended to recognise and protect 
categories of workers who were contractors but who would normally be employed 
as workers.121 
 
                                                          
120 Queensland Industrial Relations Act of 1999. 
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In determining whether a class of persons would more appropriately be 
regarded as employees, the Commission may consider a number of factors.122 These 
factors relate to the nature of the work done and any circumstances that make the 
workers vulnerable, including the relative bargaining power of the persons, their 
economic dependency and the particular circumstances of low-paid workers.123 In 
the first decision that applied the provision, the Commission declared 90 
independent contractors engaged by a security contractor to be the latter’s 
employees for the purposes of the Act.124 This approach provides for some flexibility 
in allowing the Commission to make a determination on a case by case basis but fails 
to provide certainty from the outset. 
 
The second approach to deeming is the blanket approach, whereby legislation 
stipulates the categories of workers that are to be deemed employees.125 Schedule 1 
to the Act deems inter alia milk vendors, cleaners, painters, bread vendors, 
outworkers in clothing trades, blinds fitters, public lorry drivers to be employees for 
the purposes of the application of the Act.126 For each category of workers, the 
Schedule stipulates which party will be regarded as the employer of the deemed 
employee.127 The schedule also provides for regulations to deem any person or class 
of persons to be employees.128 While this provides for more certainty from the 
                                                          
122 Section 275(3) of the Act.  
123 Other factors include whether the contract was designed to avoid the provisions of labour 
legislation, and the circumstances of particular groups including women, young persons and 
outworkers. 
124 ALHMWU v Bark Australia [2001] QIRComm 22 (28 February 2001); 166 QGIG 254. 
125 New South Wales Industrial Relations Act 1996 No 17.  
126 See Items 1(a) to (l) of Schedule 1 to the NSW Industrial Relations Act.  
127 For instance, bread manufacturers who manufactured, prepared or baked the bread or bread 
rolls were taken to be the employer of the bread vendors. 












outset, a closed list of workers excludes unlisted categories of workers who may be 
equally vulnerable. 129 
 
Thus far, the discussion has focused on the divide between employees and 
independent contractors and focused on how a distinction is drawn between these 
two categories. Some jurisdictions have moved beyond the binary distinction and 
recognised a third category of workers in the so-called grey zone between 
employees and independent contractors. This intermediate category of workers is 
typically recognised in terms of legislation and granted a more limited set of labour 
rights than employees. These third categories are recognised in the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Italy and certain states in Canada.  
 
In Canada, the Ontario Court of Appeal was the first to recognise the existence 
of an intermediate category of a worker who deserved some degree of protection. In 
Carter v Bell & Sons Canada Ltd130 the Ontario Court of Appeal found that the 
plaintiff was not the defendant’s employee. It had to determine whether the plaintiff 
nevertheless had a right to reasonable notice of termination of an contractual 
relationship. The Court found that despite the commercial nature of the relationship 
between the parties, there were factors that indicated that the relationship was of “a 
more permanent character”.131 The Court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to 
reasonable notice. The Court’s reasoning was as follows: 
 
                                                          
129 The Australian Federal Independent Contractors Act of 2006 subsequently amended the 
deeming provisions in states’ laws. The new Act inter alia, aims to protect the freedom of 
independent contractors to contract and to prevent interference with the terms of genuine 
independent contract agreements. Section 7 (1) of the Independent Contractors Act overrides all 
state and territory laws which deem certain categories of workers to be employees and grants them 
employment rights. However, section 7(2) preserves such state or territory laws to the extent that 
they relate to outworkers and those that relate to owner drivers and contract carriers. 
130 1936 O.R. 290.  












There are many cases of an intermediate nature where the relationship of master and 
servant does not exist but where an agreement to terminate the arrangement upon 
reasonable notice may be implied. This is, I think, such a case. The mode of remuneration 
points to a mercantile agency pure and simple, but the duties to be performed indicate a 
relationship of a more permanent character. The choice of sub-agents and their training, the 
recommendation of them to the company for appointment, the supervision of these men 
when appointed, all point to a more permanent relationship.132 
 
In 1986 the Woods Task Force on Labour Relations adopted a recommendation that 
dependent contractors be recognised and covered in terms of collective bargaining 
legislation.133 This was in response to an article written by Harry Arthurs who 
argued for the recognition of dependent workers, who were economically and 
would find it difficult to survive without collective action.134 Ontario is one of seven 
jurisdictions that adopted the concept of dependent contract rs and granted them 
equal rights as employees in their collective bargaining legislation.  Section 1 of the 
Ontario Labour Relations Act of 1995 defines an employee to include a dependent 
contractor. It then defines a dependent contractor as follows: 
 
“dependent contractor” means a person, whether or not employed under a contract of 
employment, and whether or not furnishing tools, vehicles, equipment, machinery, material, 
or any other thing owned by the dependent contractor, who performs work or services for 
another person for compensation or reward on such terms and conditions that the 
dependent contractor is in a position of economic dependence upon, and under an obligation 
to perform duties for, that person more closely resembling the relationship of an employee 
than that of an independent contractor (“entrepreneur dépendant”). 
 
Two key characteristics relating to the terms and conditions under which the work 
is performed define a dependent contractor. The first is that the terms and 
                                                          
132 At para 7. 
133 Canadian Industrial Relations: The Report of the Task Force on Labour Relations (1969) at 30, as 
discussed in M Bendel, “The Dependent Contractor: An Unnecessary and Flawed Development in 
Canadian Labour Law” 32(4) (1982) University of Toronto Law Journal 374 at 375. The Report 
recommended that the Canada Labour Relations Board be given discretion to recognise groups of 
dependent contractors as bargaining agents within a specified market and grant them immunity 
from the criminal law of restraint of trade and from the operation of combines’ legislation.  
134 H W Arthurs, “The Dependent Contractor: A Study of the Legal Problems of Countervailing 












conditions place the dependent contractor in a position of dependency to the person 
for whom s/he works. The second is that the terms and conditions put the 
dependent contractor in a position that more closely resembles an employee than 
an independent contractor. Workers meeting these criteria and therefore being 
dependent contractors are given the same treatment as employees for the purposes 
of the Act, which regulates and promotes collective bargaining, employee 
involvement and communication between employees and employers in the 
workplace.135 
 
Dependent contractors are only recognised and afforded collective bargaining 
rights in terms of the Ontario Labour Relations Act. However, subsequent Court 
decisions have obiter endorsed the recognition of dependent contractors for the 
purposes of the common law right to reasonable notice. 136  In McKee v Reid’s 
Heritage Homes Ltd137 the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the recognition of an 
intermediate category was in line with the statutory category of a dependent 
contractor in the Ontario Labour Relations Act.138   
 
The United Kingdom also recognises and grants rights to workers in the 
intermediate grey zone between employment and self-employment. In the case of 
this jurisdiction, two categories of intermediate “workers” are recognised and are 
afforded different degrees of protection. The broader category of worker is 
                                                          
135 Section 3 of the Ontario Labour Relations Act of 1995. 
136 In Slepenkova v Ivanov [2007] O.J. 4708 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that the 
plaintiff was an employee and entitled to Reasonable notice. In an obiter dictum, it opined that even 
if it had found that the plaintiff was not an employee, it would have found that she was a dependent 
contractor and entitled to reasonable notice at paras [61]-[64]. The circumstances and finding of 
the Ontario Court of Appeal were similar in McKee v Reid’s Heritage Homes Ltd [2009] ONCA 916.  
137 [2009] ONCA 916. 












recognised and protected by race and sex discrimination legislation.139 The statutes 
define an employee to include a person working under “a contract personally to 
execute any work or labour”.140 141  It has been suggested that this definition is 
broad enough to cover independent contractors, provided that they perform the 
work personally.142  
 
The definition has had far reaching effects on the definition of employment in 
the realm of discrimination law. Davies and Freedland argue that the framers of the 
legislation did not intend to redefine the boundary of employment legislation in 
general,143 but wished to prohibit discrimination in access to all opportunities, 
including those that were not characterized by inequality of bargaining power and 
vulnerability to economic exploitation. 144 
 
The second concept of a worker is found in post-1996 UK labour legislation 
and is narrower than the broad worker definition in discrimination.  Section 230(3) 
of the Employment Rights Act (ERA) of 1996 refers to a worker, defined as a person 
who has entered into or works under a) a contract of employment (and is therefore 
an employee)145 and b) “any other contract... whereby the individual undertakes to 
do or perform personally any work or services for another party to the contract 
whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client of a client or customer of 
                                                          
139 Section 82 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and section 78 of the Race Relations Act 1976. 
140 Ibid  
141 Although it does not specifically mention the word ‘worker’, commentators have taken this 
broader definition of employment to create the concept of a “worker” in the UK. See for example A C 
L Davis, Perspectives on Labour Law (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 87. 
142 Davis (note 141) 88. 
143 This is because it was not drafted by the Department of Employment, “the institutional 
embodiment of the tradition and craft of employment legislation”, but by the Home Office, where 
less emphasis was placed on this.  Davies and Freedland (note 19) 236. 
144 Ibid at 236-7 
145 Section 230(1) of the Employment Rights Act of 1996 provides that an employee is an individual 












any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual.” This definition 
has been included in subsequent UK labour legislation. 146 
 
In terms of section 230(3) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, a worker is a 
person who has entered into or works under a contract of employment or any other 
contract that fulfils three criteria: that there is mutuality of obligation between the 
parties to the contract; that the worker must be under a duty to perform the work 
personally; and that the worker must not be running a business.147 The criterion for 
establishing the third requirement is whether the worker is dependent on the 
alleged employer.148 
 
Workers in the narrow sense are protected by provisions which regulate 
working time, rest periods, leave;149 minimum wages, access to wage related 
records;150 wage protection151 and protected disclosures.152 They may not be 
discriminated against on the basis of their part-time status.153 Workers are also 
entitled to be accompanied and assisted at grievance and disciplinary hearings154 
and their collective bargaining rights are protected.155 Finally, are protected from 
                                                          
146 The National Minimum Wage Act 1998 (section 54), the Working Time Regulations of 2000 
(SI1998/1833), Regulation 2, the Part Time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment 
Regulations of 2000 (SI 2000/1551), Regulation 1; The Employment Relations Act 1999, and the 
Employment Relations Act of 2004 (section 13). 
147 Davis (note 141) 87. 
148 Ibid at 88. 
149 See the Working Time Regulations 1998.  
150 Sections 1 and 9 of the National Minimum Wage Act.  
151 Section 13 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
152 Section 47B read with sections 43A to L of the Employment Rights Act 1996.  
153 See the Part-Time Work Regulations, which, with the exception of regulation 7, apply to workers. 
154 Section 10 of the Employment Relations Act 1999. 












suffering any detriment in employment as a result of exercising or enforcing any of 
the rights mentioned above.156  
 
Despite the extension of many rights to the narrow category of workers, they 
are excluded from a range of protections.  These include protections relating to the 
provision of employment particulars, the right to guarantee payments, time off 
work, suspension from work, maternity and parental leave, termination of 
employment, unfair dismissal, redundancy payments and rights on insolvency of 
employers. 157  
 
According to Davies and Freedland,  “[t]he ‘worker category seems to be 
designed consciously to include those in an employee-like situation who, it is now 
felt, should be within the actual or potential sphere of application of the core 
provisions of labor law.”158 The UK has thus developed a four-tier system of 
protection with the degree of protection increasing along the continuum. At the 
bottom are independent contractors who do not perform work personally and are 
excluded from all labour legislation. The second category covers workers in the 
broad sense (including independent contractors) who perform work personally and 
                                                          
156 See regulation 31 of the Working Time Regulations, sections 23 and 24 of the National Minimum 
Wage Act, section 12 of the Employment Relations Act, and regulation 7 of the Part-time work 
Regulations. Workers are however not protected from being dismissed for reasons related to their 
enforcement of their rights, as such rights are restricted to employees.  
157 See the Employment Rights Act: Part I relating to the right to employment particulars; Part III 
relating to guarantee payments; Part IV relating to Sunday working for shop and betting workers; 
Part V providing for rights not to suffer detriment (with the exception of those relating to protected 
disclosures); Part VI relating to time off  work; Part VII relating to suspension from work; Part VIII 
relating to maternity leave and parental leave; Part IX relating to termination of employment; Part 
X relating to unfair dismissal; Part XI relating to redundancy payments and Part XII relating to 
rights on insolvency of employees.  
158 Davies and  Freedland (note 19)237-8. They argue that “The impression that this case is greatly 
strengthened by the admittedly somewhat opaque provision of Section 23 of the Employment 
Relations Act of 1999, which gives powers for the making of statutory regulations to alter the 
personal scope of existing employment legislation; the underlying intention appears to be to enable 












are covered by discrimination legislation. Next are workers in the narrow sense, 
who perform work personally outside of a profession or a business undertaking. 
These are protected discrimination legislation and have a limited set of broader 
labour rights. Finally, employees who work in terms of a contract of employment 
have the full range of labour and social protections.  
 
Germany has also recognised an intermediate category of worker. In 1974 
German law recognised the notion of abeitnehmerahnliche Person defined as 
“persons who [in spite of their formal independence] are economically dependent 
and, like an employee, in need of social protection”.159 To be part of this category, 
the worker must work alone and most of her/his work must come from a single 
employer.160 These quasi-employees enjoy procedural labour rights, protection 
against sexual harassment, social security contributions and protection and health 
and safety protection.161   
 
While there is some support for recognizing that some workers who do not 
fall squarely within the binary divide and therefore need protection, some problems 
with this expanded approach have been identified. Freedland has argued that the 
multiplicity of categories of protected workers creates uncertainty and confusion as 
to how the two worker categories relate to each other and to the contract of 
employment.162 Another problem is the disjointed scheme of the protection, which 
has led to a failure to provide a rational and coherent system of protections for all 
workers.163 
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160 Ibid.  
161 Ibid. 
162 M Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 23, 25-
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At the international level, the ILO attempted to adopt international 
instruments on contract labour in 1998.164 The draft convention on contract labour 
defined the latter to cover inter alia “workers having a direct contractual 
relationship (other than a contract of employment) with the user enterprise where 
there was dependency or subordination similar to those characterizing an 
employment relationship”.165 In terms of this draft convention, States would have to 
ensure that contract workers received adequate protection as regards working time 
and other working conditions, maternity protection, occupational safety and health, 
remuneration, and statutory social security.166  
 
The International Labour Conference failed to reach a consensus on the 
adoption of international instruments on contract labour in 1998. The Conference 
adopted a resolution to identify workers in need of protection.167 This led to a series 
of discussions which culminated in the adoption of the ILO Recommendation 198 on 
the Employment Relationship in 2006.  
 
The Recommendation encourages member states to formulate and apply a 
national policy for reviewing, clarifying and adapting the scope of relevant laws and 
regulations.168 It also suggests that member states consider a number of measures 
in determining the existence of an employment relationship including deeming 
                                                          
164 See International Labour Conference, 86th Session, Geneva June 1998, Report V(1) Contract 
Labour, Fifth Item on the Agenda; International Labour Conference 86th Session, Geneva, June 1998, 
Contract Labour Report V (2A), (Geneva: ILO, 1998). 
165 Draft article 1 of the draft Convention on Contract Labour, see International Labour Conference, 
86th Session, Geneva June 1998, Report V(1) Contract Labour, Fifth Item on the Agenda.  
166 Article 6 of the first Draft Convention on Contract Labour. 
167 International Labour Conference, 86th Session, June 1998, “Resolution concerning the possible 
adoption of international instruments for the protection of workers in the situations identified by 
the Committee on Contract Labour”. 












provisions and presumptions of employment.169 In addition, it lists a number of 
factors that could indicate the existence of an employment relationship.170 The ILO’s 
attempts to regulate contract labour and the employment relationship are discussed 




This section covered the broad international trends in identifying an employee and 
distinguishing the latter from an independent contractor. It considered the 
substantive and descriptive statutory descriptions and the various judicial tests that 
have been adopted in different jurisdictions. It showed how some jurisdictions have 
adopted strategies to provide greater clarity and ease in identifying an employee. 
These include presumptions of employment, deeming provisions and the 
development of codes of practice on identifying an employee.  
 
In some jurisdictions, the binary divide between employees and independent 
contractors has been found to be inadequate and an intermediate category of 
workers has been recognised and granted limited labour rights. At the international 
                                                          
169 See paragraph 11 of Recommendation 198. 
170 Paragraph 13 of Recommendation 198. 13. Members should consider the possibility of defining 
in their Laws and regulations, or by other means, specific indicators of the existence of an 
employment relationship. Those indicators might include:(a) the fact that the work: is carried out 
according to the instructions and under the control of another party; involves the integration of the 
worker in the organization of the enterprise; is performed solely or mainly for the benefit of 
another person; must be carried out personally by the worker; is carried out within specific 
working hours or at a workplace specified or agreed by the party requesting the work; is of a 
particular duration and has a certain continuity; requires the worker's availability; or involves the 
provision of tools, materials and machinery by the party requesting the work;(b) periodic payment 
of remuneration to the worker; the fact that such remuneration constitutes the worker's sole or 
principal source of income; provision of payment in kind, such as food, lodging or transport; 
recognition of entitlements such as weekly rest and annual holidays; payment by the party 
requesting the work for travel undertaken by the worker in order to carry out the work; or absence 












level, a recommendation has been adopted to encourage states to take measures to 
provide clarity on the employment relationship. The following section briefly 
considers the development of the employment relationship in South Africa. It is 
important to place these developments in context because South Africa is the main 
focus of this work.  
 
2.2.2 The development of the employment relationship in South Africa 
 
Deakin argues that the contract of employment has evolved at a different pace and 
in response to different socio-economic circumstances in each jurisdiction.171  This 
section briefly considers how the contract of employment has evolved over time in 
South Africa. This discussion draws heavily on the work of Le Roux because it is the 
most authoritative account of these developments from the arrival of Jan van 
Riebeck in the 17th century through to the 21st century.172  
 
The discussion considers two main developments, namely, the development 
of a unified concept of employment and the establishment of a binary divide 
between employees and independent contractors. Le Roux’s account demonstrates 
that these distinct but related developments took place as a result of complex 
interactions between various strands of law, including English law, Roman Dutch 
law, social security legislation, industrial relations legislation and judicial decisions. 
                                                          
171 S Deakin, “The Comparative Evolution of the Employment Relationship” in Davidov and Langille, 
Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law: Goals and Means in the Regulation of Work (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2006) 89-109; S Deakin, “The Many Futures of the Contract of Employment” in J 
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172 R Le Roux, “The Regulation of Work: Whither the Contract of Employment? An Analysis of the 
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Le Roux’s account shows that the coverage of the earlier legal arrangements 
governing workers was highly fragmented and that South African law only 
recognised a unitary concept of employment during the late 1970s. This was 
attributable to three main factors. One factor was the law’s differential treatment of 
workers according to their race, with black workers being subject to Master and 
Servant Laws173 while the “white upper class workforce” was subject to the general 
contract of employment and to industrial relations legislation that expressly 
excluded black workers.174  Another factor was the application of the control test to 
identify an employee, which “had the effect of excluding, in particular, higher status 
workers from the protection of these laws”.175 The third fact r was the application 
of social welfare legislation, which excluded workers on the basis of their earnings 
and certain categories of workers such as casuals, outworkers, subcontractors, 
domestic workers and agricultural workers.176  
 
Le Roux argues that the movement towards a more unified concept of an 
employee began in the late 1970s, with the gradual deracialisation of the labour 
legislation.177 In addition, the abandonment of the control test as the determining 
factor for the existence of an employment relationship ended the exclusion of upper 
class workers from the protection of labour laws.178 Another important 
                                                          
173 These made the registration of contracts compulsory and made breaches of contract (including 
failure to commence work, desertion, negligence, insolence) criminally punishable. Despite their 
punitive nature, they also had some protective elements, for instance, the provisions for paid sick 
leave, notice for contracts of service for more than a month, and the provision of food and lodging 
for servants required to live on the masters’ premises. Le Roux (note 172) 29-30. 
174 Ibid at31-6. 
175 Ibid at 45-7. 
176 Ibid at 36-41, 68, footnote 301 
177 This was the result of the abolition of Master and Servant Laws in 1974 and the inclusion of 
black workers in industrial relations legislation following the recommendations of the Wiehan 
Commission of Enquiry into Labour Legislation in 1979. See Ibid at  40. 












development was the more unified concept of employment in key social security 
statutes, which have a limited number of exclusions from their application.179 
 
Related to the development of a unitary concept of employment has been the 
recognition of a binary divide between an employee and an independent contractor. 
Most scholars trace this to the Appellate Division’s decision in Colonial Mutual Life 
Assurance Society Ltd v MacDonald.180 According to Le Roux, the judgment played an 
important role in establishing “the subsequent division between an employee and 
independent contractor that eventually became so deeply entrenched in South 
African law”.181 Over four decades later the Appellate Division in Smit v Workmen’s 
Compensation Commissioner,  appears to have assumed that the distinction between 
employees and independent contractors originated from the Roman Dutch law 
locatio conductio operarum (contract of service) and the locatio conductio operaris 
(contract for services).182  
 
While Le Roux has questioned the supposed Roman-Dutch law pedigree of 
the binary distinction,183 there is no doubt that these judicial developments have 
                                                          
179 For example, the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act of 1993 and the 
Unemployment Insurance Act of 2000. See Ibid at 40-1. 
180 This decision considered a principal’s vicarious liability for delicts (or torts) committed by its 
agent, and held that vicarious liability only arose where the agent was an employee of the principal, 
as opposed to a contractor or sub-contractor. 
181 Le Roux (note 172) 46. 
182 Ibid. See Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner (1979) 1 SA 51 (A). 
183 She argues that had this been the case, the Courts would have made more than “mere occasional 
references” to it in previous decisions. She argues that instead, the Smit decision reflects a purist 
attempt to shift the dichotomy that was emerging under the influence of Colonial Mutual and the 
control test onto Roman-Dutch law categorizations. During the twentieth century, a battle raged 
between the purists and the pragmatists or modernists about the legitimacy influence of English 
law in the South African legal system. The purists regarded Roman-Dutch law as the basis of 
modern South African and sought to eradicate any impure influences from English system. The 
pragmatists were a looser group of lawyers who respected Roman-Dutch Law but nevertheless 
were happy to apply English law to modernize the rapidly dating Roman-Dutch law. Le Roux (note 












had an impact on how an employee has come to be understood and defined in terms 
of industrial relations law. Thus, while pre-1995 labour legislation did not define 
employees in terms of a contract of employment, or the express exclusion of 
independent contractors,184 the courts began to interpret the definition of employee 
to require the existence of a contract of employment and to exclude independent 
contractors.185 She argues that this practice developed in the context of the 
establishment of an Industrial Court to hear ‘unfair labour practice’ disputes 
instituted by individual employees which made it necessary to determine the 
employment status of a litigant. 186 
 
Consequently, the express exclusion of independent contractors from the 
definition of employees has been incorporated in almost all South African labour 
legislation.187  The legislation contains a two part definition of an employee.188 The 
first part defines an employee as a person (excluding an independent contractor) 
who works for another person and receives or is entitled to receive remuneration. 
The second part is an alternative to the first part, and defines an employee as “any 
other person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the business of 
an employer”. 
 
                                                          
184 Ibid at 72-76, where she discusses the Industrial Disputes Prevention Act 20 of 1909, the 
Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924, the Industrial Conciliation Act 36 of 1937, the Industrial 
Conciliation (which later became the Labour Relations Act) Act 28 of 1956. 
185 Le Roux  (note 172) 80-82.  
186 The Industrial Court invariably relied on the common law understanding of an employee in 
terms of the dominant impression test and invoked the employee/independent contractor 
dichotomy. 
See Ibid at 80-82.  
187 An exception is the section 1(1) (ix)  of Occupational Health and Safety Act 85of 1993, which 
does not expressly exclude an independent contractor from the definition. 
188 For instance, section 213 of the Labour Relations Act, section 1 of the Basic Conditions of\ 












Having discussed the development of a unitary concept of employment and 
the codification of the binary distinction, it is necessary to consider how South 
African courts draw the distinction between an employee and an independent 
contractor. Originally, the Courts applied the control test, with Colonial Mutual Life v 
MacDonald189 being regarded as the locus classicus in this regard.190 In terms of this 
test the employer’s right to control and prescribe the work that had to be done and 
the manner in which it was done was essential to determining the existence of an 
employment relationship.191  
 
The control test remained the test for employment for over four decades until 
the Appellate Division’s decision in Ongevallekomissari v Onderlinge Versekerings 
Genootskap AVBOB.192 In that decision, the Court adopted a broader approach, 
holding that it was necessary to consider all the relevant facts to determine the 
dominant impression which the contract made upon a person. This test was 
confirmed in the Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner,193 where the Court 
found that it was necessary to qualify the Colonial Mutual Life194  principle that the 
right of supervision and control was an indispensible requirement for the existence 
of a contract of service.195 While the Court acknowledged that the degree of control 
had significant weight in determining whether a contract was one of service, it held 
                                                          
189 Supra. 
190 Most standard labour law texts cite it as authority for this test, for instance, Du Toit et al (note 
51) 69. 
191 For a critique as to whether this decision can correctly be used as authority for the use of the 
control 
test to distinguish between employees and independent contractors see Le Roux (note 172) 43-6. 
192 1976 (4) SA 446 (A). 
193 1979 (1) SA 51 (A). 
194 Supra. 












that this was merely one factor among other potentially important factors, 
depending on the circumstances of a case.196 
 
The Appellate Division in the Smit decision also outlined the factors that may 
be considered when attempting to distinguish the contract of employment from the 
contract for services.197 These have been subsequently endorsed and applied by the 
courts.198 They are listed in the table below. 
 
Employee  Independent Contractor 
The object of the contract of service is 
the rendering of the personal services by 
the employee to the employer. 
The object of the contract of work is the 
performance of a specified piece of work 
or the production of a specified result. 
The contract of service places the 
employee at the employer’s disposal and 
binds him/her to render personal 
services at the employer’s behest. 
The independent contractor is not 
(unless otherwise agreed upon) obliged 
to perform the work himself and may 
engage assistance or employees to do the 
work or to assist him in carrying out the 
work. 
The employee places his services at the 
disposal of the employer who has a  
discretion to decide whether or not he 
wants the employee to render them. 
An independent contractor is bound to 
perform the specified work or produced 
the specified result within the time 
agreed upon or within a reasonable time 
where no time has been agreed upon. 
The employee is subject to the 
employer’s will and must obey his lawful 
orders and instructions regarding what 
work must be done and how it must be 
performed. 
The independent contractor is on an 
equal footing with the employer and 
bound by the terms of the contract as 
opposed to the instructions of the 
employer 
The death of an employee terminates a 
contract of service. 
The death of the parties to a contract of 
work does not necessarily terminate it. 
The contract of service terminates at the 
end of the period of service agreed upon. 
A contract of work terminates only when 
the specified work is completed or the 
                                                          
196 At 62 D. 
197 At 61 A-H. 
198 See for example SABC v MacKenzie (1999) 20 ILJ 585 at  para [9]; Mandla v LAD Brokers (2000) 












specified result has been produced. 
 
Although it has been criticized for failing to establish a test that identifies the 
characteristics of the employment relationship,199 the dominant impression test 
continues to be the common-law test to determine whether a person is an employee 
or an independent contractor.200  A Court or arbitrator deciding on a matter must 
therefore determine the person’s status after considering the totality of the 
circumstances in a given case. The determination of whether one is an employee or 
an independent contractor continues to be a contested issue. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this work to embark on an in-depth discussion of 
how the courts have approached this question. However, some trends can be 
identified and a few are highlighted here. Courts give primary attention to the actual 
terms of the contract between the parties, but also consider the realities of the 
relationship between them to determine the nature of the relationship.201 In other 
words, the Courts place “substance over form” as the determinative criterion.202  
The Courts have placed much emphasis on the object of the contract, with Courts 
emphasizing that the object of the contract of employment is to place the employee’s 
productive capacity at the disposal of the employer.203 
                                                          
199 See for example SABC v MacKenzie supra  at para [8]. Brassey, “The Nature of Employment” 1990 
(11) ILJ 889, p 920-1.  
200 Sanlam Life Insurance Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & 
others (2009)30 ILJ 2903 (LAC); St Clair and CFS Aviation CC t/a Corporate Flight Services (2010) 
31 ILJ 486 (CCMA); Linda Erasmus Properties Enterprise (Pty) Ltd v Mhlongo NO & others (2007) 
28 ILJ 1100 (LC). 
201 SABC v MacKenzie supra at  para [10]; Board of Executors Limited v McCafferty (1997)  18 ILJ 949 
(LAC) para [25]; Niselow v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd (1998) 19 ILJ 752 (SCA); Denel v 
Gerber (2005) 26 ILJ 1256 (LAC).  
202 Denel v Gerber (2005) 26 ILJ 1256 (LAC). 
203 Board of Executors Limited v McCafferty supra para [26]; Niselow v Liberty Life Association of 
Africa Ltd supra; Bezer v Cruises International CC (2003) 24 ILJ 1372 (LC); Erasmus v Saambou 













The boundary between employees and independent contractors continues to 
be the subject of much litigation and intense academic debate. In 2002, the 
legislature amended sections 200 and 83 of the Labour Relations Act and the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act respectively to provide for a presumption of 
employment if certain facts are proved.204 This was followed by a Code of Good 
Practice on who is an employee, which was published in 2006.205 Both measures aim 
to provide more clarity and guidance to decision-makers who must decide whether 
or not a party before them is an employee. These have been mentioned in part 2.2.1 
above and are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
 
*** 
This section considered the development of the employment relationship in 
the South African context. It showed that the country’s social and political history 
shaped the development of a unitary concept of employment and the development 
of a binary divide between the employee and the independent contractor. The 
evolution of the tests for distinguishing between the two categories and identifying 
the employment relationship has nevertheless followed the international trends 
outlined in section 2.2.1 above. Further measures to clarify the scope of the 
employment relationship include the presumption of employment and the adoption 
of a code of practice.  
 
Having considered the various approaches to categorising workers both 
internationally and in South Africa,  the next section considers the significance of the 
employment relationship for the scope of labour law. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Pty) Ltd (2006) 27 ILJ 2721 (LC); Borcherds v C W Pearce & J Sheward t/a Lubrite 
Distributors (1993) 14 ILJ 1262 (LAC). 
204 These amendments are reflected in sections 200A and 83A of the LRA and BCEA respectively.  













2.3.3 The significance of the employment relationship 
 
The discussion in the above sections showed how the law determines entitlement to 
labour law protection. It demonstrated that “[t]he need to categorize and define 
workers by employment status to determine the personal scope of labour protection 
and benefits ... is a central question”.206 The legal categories are not merely 
theoretical concepts in reserved for abstract academic debate. They determine 
whether a worker can be allowed to join forces with other workers and engage with 
the employer as a collective. They determine whether a worker may refuse to work 
more than a stated number of hours per day. They determine what recourse a 
worker has should her/his employer inform that her/his services are no longer 
required. In short, the legal categories significantly affect the realities and 
experiences of workers.   
 
The employee and an independent contractor are the legal categories that 
most legal systems have and continue to use to determine eligibility for labour law 
protection.  There are different historical views about this. One view is that it is a 
universal and deeply embedded distinction that has permeated the jurisprudence 
and legislation of different legal systems over long periods of time.207 According to 
this view, the distinction can be traced to the Roman law distinction between the 
locatio conductio operarum whereby a worker undertook to render personal 
                                                          
206 L F Vosko, “Precarious Employment: Towards an Improved Understanding of Labour Market 
Insecurity” in L F Vosko, (ed) Precarious Employment: Understanding Labour Market Insecurity in 
Canada (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006) 3-39, 12.  












services to an employer and  locatio conductio operaris where an independent 
contractor undertook to perform certain work or produce a specified result.208  
 
Another view is that it developed “out of a series of profound economic, 
political, social and legal changes that took place in the European continent between 
the eighteenth and early twentieth centuries”.209 These changes include the 
industrial revolution and the evolution of the capitalist firm210and the development 
of the social welfare system in Great Britain.211 According to this view, the 
dichotomy is not an enduring and universal legal concept, but one that developed as 
a result of a particular set of social policies imposed by legislation upon a specific 
labour market in a certain jurisdiction at a given moment in time”.212 This second 
view, which defies the conventional wisdom, is explored in more detail below. 
 
Proponents of the second view argue that the law’s preoccupation with this 
dichotomy presupposes the factual existence of a single model or unitary concept of 
employment that has never existed.213 Their accounts point to the existence of 
diverse working arrangements during the period when labour law’s boundaries 
were being established.214 Deakin describes the contract of employment as an 
artificial model imposed on a more complex reality of labour relations.215 According 
to Countouris:  
 
there is little doubt that the consolidation of an all-embracing unitary notion of the contract 
of employment exercising a centripetal force in respect of a vast variety of work 
                                                          
208  Vetorri (note 93) 3. 
209 Countouris (note 92) 38. 
210 Perulli, (note 93) 137. Countouris (note 92) 38. 
211 Deakin (note 171)104; Freedland (note 162) 19-20. 
212 Freedland (note 162) 19. 
213 Ibid at14-16. 
214 Deakin (note 171) 104;  Freedland (note 162) 17;  Countouris (note 92) 38-9. 












relationships, was just as much a product of deeper political pressures of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, as it was of economic ones. For instance, if it is true that the new 
industrial production arrangements caused a decline in ‘intermediate forms of labour sub-
contracting’, legislation and to some extent judge-made legal principles also had an 
important role in further curbing the use of some of these pre-industrial employment 
practices, often by explicitly outlawing some of them. In the case of Britain, a country whose 
doctrinal analysis has been influential for other common law systems, legal history suggests 
that the employment relationship was largely the result of a socialising influence of [inter 
alia]... a wider set of political and legal pressures geared towards the decasualisation of 
work and discouraging heterogeneity in employment.216 
 
This shows that the unitary concept of employment is not a pre-existing legal 
phenomenon, but a social construct whose emergence was the product of political 
decisions based on expedience. Freedland thus refers to the “false unity of the 
contract of employment”.217 He argues that closely related to this, and equally false, 
is the assumption that “there is a strong and clear distinction between dependent 
employment and independent working”.218  
 
Proponents of the second view have characterised the employment contract 
as an evolutionary notion that has adapted in “the face of changes in economic 
relations and political imperatives”.219 This was highlighted in Le Roux’s account 
that shows that the unitary concept of employment and the binary distinction in 
South African law developed out of a series of economic and political changes. In 
addition, the courts and legislatures have progressively broadened the criteria for 
identifying the employment relationship, and devised a number of strategies aimed 
at doing so. One could argue that these developments have progressively expanded 
the scope of the employment relationship and thus shifted the boundary defining 
the binary divide.  
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217 Freedland (note 162) 15. 
218 Ibid at 20. 
219 S Deakin, The Many Futures of the Employment Contract (CBR Working Paper No. 191, 2001) 













Moreover, some jurisdictions have expanded the scope of labour law more 
explicitly by introducing additional categories of workers who enjoy some of the 
protection afforded to employees. These developments point to the fact that the so-
called traditional categories determining labour law’s scope are hardly immutable 
and were never cast in stone. Rather, the legal categories are and continue to be 
subject to negotiation and the boundaries between them are constantly being tested 
and redrawn.   
 
There can be no doubt that the choice of the employment relationship as the 
gateway to labour law protection has raised a number of challenges. While various 
legal systems have adopted measures to address these, it is evident that there are no 
easy solutions to these challenges. Faced with these difficulties and with the 
increasing number of workers who are excluded from labour law’s scope, some 
critics have argued for the elimination of the legal categories and look beyond the 
employment relationship as the gateway to labour law.220 Others have argued that 
the problems associated with defining the employment relationship do not render it 
redundant, but rather point to the need to adapt it to changing environmental 
conditions.221 These arguments are more fully canvassed in chapters five and seven, 
                                                          
220 J Fudge, “Self-Employment, Women and Precarious Work”,  in Fudge and Owens (eds), 
Precarious Work, Women and the New Economy: The Challenges to Legal Norms (Oxford and 
Portland, Hart Publishing, 2006), 219-220; J Fudge, “New Wine into old bottles?: Updating legal 
forms to Reflect changing employment forms” (1999-2000) 33 University of Columbia Law Review 
129-152 at 148; R R Carlson, “Why the Law Still Can't an Employee When It Sees One and How It 
Ought to Stop Trying” (2001) 22 Berkley Journal of Employment and Labour Law 295 at 368; K 
Sankaran, “Protecting the Worker in the Informal Economy: The Role of Labour Law” in G Davidov, 
and D Langille, Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law: Goals and Means in the Regulation of Work 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006) 205-220; A, Brooks,  “Myth and Muddle – An Examination of 
Contracts for the Performance of Work” 1988) 11 University of New South Wales Law Journal 48 at 
91-2. 
221 Deakin, (note 171) 104; Deakin, “The Many Futures of the Contract of Employment” (note 171) 












which (respectively) reflect on the challenges that the changed world of work 




This chapter sought to lay a foundation for the following chapters by considering the 
purpose and scope of labour law. It determined that labour law’s purpose is to 
ensure the protection of workers vis a vis their more powerful employees and thus 
balance the power imbalance between the parties. It established that this played a 
role in economic development and social transformation. Thereafter, the scope of 
labour law was considered and it was established that while the employment 
relationship remains the cornerstone, most legal systems have introduced measures 
to expand the concept or introduced additional categories of workers who receive 
limited labour law protection.  
 
The following chapter presents a picture that runs parallel and yet seems to 
contradict the apparent expansion of labour law’s scope. It considers the growing 
trend for workers to work under precarious conditions outside the protective ambit 
of labour law. It demonstrates that this is largely because despite its tendency to 
expand the scope of employment relationship, modern labour law has held on to 
certain assumptions about the employment relationship. Labour law has therefore 
failed to cover a growing number of workers who do not conform to the paradigm 
or model of employment that it assumes.  
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As has been shown in section 2.2.3, labour law has historically focused on one 
paradigm of work to the exclusion of other working arrangements and this is 
therefore not a new development. What is new, are the circumstances under which 
a growing number of workers are falling outside of this paradigm and are therefore 
excluded by labour law. The circumstances under which these forms of work have 


















Chapter two explained the purpose of labour law and discussed the employment 
relationship to which it applies. It outlined the evolution of the employment 
relationship and the development of the binary divide between employment and 
self-employment. Importantly, it explained how labour law in different jurisdictions 
has sought to redefine the employment relationship and to redraw the boundaries 
of the binary divide in order to expand the scope of labour law’s protection.  
 
The point of departure of this chapter seems to contradict the trend towards 
the more expansive approach to defining the employment relationship described in 
chapter two. This chapter argues that notwithstanding the progress in expanding 
the tests and criteria for defining employment, the employment relationship 
continues to be conceptualised and understood in terms of what has come to be 
known as the standard employment relationship, which emerged in the 1940s in 
Western Europe and North America. Labour law continues to assume that the 
employment relationship involves a full-time, indefinite relationship between the 
employer and the employee, where the latter works upon the premises of the 
former. The standard employment relationship and the circumstances under which 
it became the model of employment underlying labour law are discussed in part 3.1 













In this chapter, it is argued that labour law’s focus on the standard 
employment relationship excludes workers engaged in other forms of work (herein 
referred to as non-standard forms of work) from its protection. It is argued that 
non-standard forms of work predated the emergence of the standard employment 
relationship and, have continued to exist alongside the latter. It is further argued 
that in the past few decades, these non-standard forms of work have proliferated as 
a result of the quest for greater labour market flexibility. This quest has largely been 
driven by the neoliberal agenda which has set the tone for economic and social 
policy in developed and developing countries in an era of globalisation. The quest 
for flexibility and the forces behind it are considered in part 3.2 of this chapter.  
 
The next part describes the non-standard forms of work in greater detail. 
These include the seasonal, temporary and casual work; the employment of workers 
through temporary employment agencies and the use of various contracting 
arrangements. Instead of concentrating on the various forms of work per se, 
emphasis is placed on the processes that are driving the proliferation of these forms 
of work. These processes provide a better conceptual framework within which to 
understand how work is increasingly deviating from the standard employment 
relationship.  
 
Casualisation explains how work is increasingly deviating from the time-
related features of the employment relationship and moving more towards fixed-
term, part-time and casual forms of work. By externalisation, employers are 
increasingly able to benefit from the labour of people who are not their employees. 
This may be either because workers are styled as independent contractors (and are 












employed through third parties with whom the employer has a commercial contract 
(and are there fore externalization through externalization through intermediation) 
 
The final part (part 3.4) argues that the term non-standard is neutral and 
disguises these working arrangements as the function of choices made by the 
workers and camaflouges the ramifications of these forms of work for the workers 
involved. One important consequence is that work is rendered as labour law does 
not apply or cannot be effectively applied to the workers involved. The second, 
which follows from the first, is that the working conditions of these workers are 
precarious and insecure. It is argued that these processes undermine the protection 
of workers and the realization of decent work. The meaning f the terms “informal” 
and “precarious” will be more fully discussed to demonstrate the consequences of 
these processes for workers. The conclusion recapitulates the salient points raised 
in this chapter and draws out the implications thereof for the remainder of this 
thesis. 
 
The debates and circumstances discussed in this chapter apply to both 
developed and developing countries and this chapter therefore adopts a global 
perspective. However, much reliance in the first and second parts of this chapter 
relies on literature from developed countries. This is because the historical analysis 
is grounded in North America and Western Europe and because the overwhelming 
majority of the literature relating to the standard employment relationship and the 
rise of neoliberalism and globalisation originates from these countries.  However, 
attempts have been made to incorporate perspectives from developing countries 
including South Africa, particularly relating to non-standard forms of work and their 













3.1 THE STANDARD EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
 
Modern labour law is based on an employment model that has come to be known as 
the standard employment relationship.  This part outlines the political and socio-
economic context within which this model emerged. It also defines the key 
characteristics of the standard employment relationship. It draws extensively on the 
work of Standing, Vosko, Vettori, and the joint work of Stanford and Vosko because 
these authors provide a more detailed analysis of the circumstances under which 
the standard employment relationship became the norm.  
 
The standard employment relationship emerged and became accepted as the 
norm for employment relations during the post War period of economic prosperity.1 
The post War period was generally marked by “the gradual extension of 
government commitment to labour standards and statutory protective regulations”, 
and the expansion of labour rights and social security.2 This commitment is known 
as welfare state capitalism and it emerged when the international community and 
policy makers in North America and Western Europe “recognized the dangers of 
socio-economic inequality, and the global economic pressures tending to increase 
it”.3 Its development was accelerated by pressure from workers and employers, 
with the former demanding greater security and the latter driven by concerns about 
productivity.4  
                                                          
1 A Kalleberg “Nonstandard employment relations: part-time, temporary and contract work” (2000) 
26 Annual Review of Sociology 341 341, 342; J Stanford and L F Vosko, “Challenging the Market: The  
Struggle to Regulate Work and Income” in J Stanford, and L F Vosko, (eds) Challenging the Market:  
The Struggle to Regulate Work and Income (Montreal & Kingston: McGill Queen’s University Press, 
2004) 3-30, 7.  
2 G Standing, Global Labour Flexibility: Seeking Distributive Justice, (London: McMillan Press, 1999) 
55- 6. 
3 Ibid at 53. 
4 L F Vosko, “Precarious Employment: Towards an Improved Understanding of Labour Market 












Welfare state capitalism was characterized by a strong state role in altering 
the balance of power and control between employers and workers through 
legislation and institutions that promoted neo-corporatist bargaining.5 Unionisation 
and collective bargaining increased substantially between the mid-1940s and mid-
1970s, in the broad context of a regulatory structure that was “progressive and 
egalitarian, enhancing economic security and equality for some groups of workers”.6 
During this period, labour became increasingly influential in the political sphere and 
was able to secure significant gains in wages and welfare benefits.7  
 
The period was also marked by the expansion of the welfare state and the 
growth of various income security and public programmes, which helped to 
increase the incomes and income security of millions of workers.8 This was a result 
of the Keynesian consensus on macro-economic policy, which emphasized inter alia, 
the importance of full employment, and the role of the state as a guarantor thereof.9 
Standing argues that although there was overall progress in most respects, the pace 
of progress varied from country to country.10  
 
The dominant model of production during the era when welfare state 
capitalism prevailed in the North was Fordism.11 Fordism was based on concepts of 
mass production and mass consumption, where economies of scale dictated that an 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Canada (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006) 3-39, 6-7. 
5 Standing (note 2) 53, 55. 
6 Stanford and Vosko (note 1) 6; Standing (note 2) 57. 
7  I Ul Haque “Globalization, Neoliberalism and Labour” United Nations Conference on Trade and  
Development Discussion Paper No. 173, 2004, 6. 
8 Ibid. Stanford and Vosko (note 1) 6. 
9 Ul Haque (note 7) 6; Standing (note 2) 74; Stanford and Vosko (note 1) 6. 
10 Standing (note 2) 55-6. 













enterprise needed many employees in order to survive.12  Firms also followed the 
Taylorist system of a highly technical division of labour and a hierarchical job 
structure.13  This was based on internal labour markets with orderly and predictable 
pay systems and promotion patterns.14 Under these conditions, labour and social 
policy was organized around the “standard” employment relationship which was 
characterized by full-time hours, stable tenure and extensive non-wage benefits.15 
 
The standard employment relationship revolved around a particular 
employment form, that is, full-time, permanent wage work, and entailed a bilateral 
relationship where the employee worked on the premises controlled by the 
employer.16 The standard employment relationship was also shaped by the 
normative model of the “gender contract”, which entailed that that the male 
breadwinner worked as a standard employee who earned a social wage while the 
woman performed unpaid care work, possibly received a secondary wage and 
received social benefits through her spouse.17  
 
                                                          
12 S Vettori, The Employment Contract and the Changed World of Work (Hampshire, Ashgate: 2007) 
8.  
13 Standing (note 2) 54. 
14 K Stone, “Flexibilization, Globalization, and Privatization: Three Challenges to Labour Rights in 
Our 
Time” in B Bercusson and C Estlund (eds) Regulating Labour in the Wake of Globalization: New 
challenges, New Institutions (Hart Publishing: Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2008) 115-36, 116. 
15 It was therefore indirectly biased in favour of white men and to the exclusion of women, 
immigrants and marginalized race groups. This has led some to argue that despite the progressive 
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employees. Standing (note 2) 54; Stanford and Vosko (note 1) 6. 
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The standard employment relationship developed in industrialized countries 
during the post-war period and became “the normative model around which states 
designed and delivered labour and social policy”.18 The standard employment 
relationship was necessary for the socio-economic exchange of the era of Fordism.19 
The exchange involved the employee receiving security and stability of employment 
through long-term contract in return for subordination to the employer’s control, 
rules and directives.20 The standard employment relationship gave the employer a 
maximum degree of management prerogative and flexibility, allowed for the 
standardization of skills, and facilitated the rationalization of production and 
provided an efficient basis for profit generation.21 The standard employment 
relationship also had macro-economic advantages, the chief ne being that it 
created some stability in occupational categories and skills which facilitated 
enterprise- and national level planning.22 
 
Two key points must be made about the standard employment relationship. 
The first is that while it may have been chosen as the norm around which labour and 
social security law were constructed in the post War period, it was never the only 
employment relationship in European and North American labour markets. 
Kalleberg, for example, argues that “history is replete with examples of peripheral 
labour forces and flexible labor markets in which work is unstable and 
temporary”.23  
 
                                                          
18 Stanford and Vosko (note 1) 7. 
19 Vettori (note 12) 9. 
20 B Langille, “Labour Law’s Back Pages” in Davidov and Langille (eds) Boundaries and Frontiers of 
Labour Law: Goals and Means in the Regulation of Work (Oregon: Hart 2006) 13-36, 27; Vettori 
(note 12) 9. 
21 G Z Mhone, “Atypical Forms of Work and Employment and Their Policy Implications” (1998) 
19(2) ILJ 197 203.  
22 Ibid. 












The post War Fordist era in these countries was preceded by the practice of 
inside contracting where management provided machinery, factory space and raw 
materials and capital and entered agreements with contractors who hired and paid 
workers to produce goods.24 While the number of standard jobs increased in 
industrialised countries during the post War Fordist period and became the norm 
by the 1950s, other forms of work continued to exist alongside it25 despite policy 
pressures to suppress these forms of work.26 Employers continued to rely on these 
forms of work to contain labour costs and as a buffer to protect standard 
employees.27  
 
The second observation is that while welfare state capitalism and the 
standard employment relationship originate from and reflect the socio-economic 
context in post War North America and Western Europe, they had an impact on 
social policies and labour law in other states in the South. Welfare state capitalism 
gradually extended its influence to low-income and developing countries in the 
South. 28 In Africa, this was largely a result of colonialism and the imposition of the 
labour laws of colonising states on their colonies.29  
 
The wholesale adoption of these labour laws brought with it assumptions 
about the socio-economic realities and assumptions underpinning the labour law 
                                                          
24 Ibid. 
25 Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson, “Bad jobs in America: standard and nonstandard employment 
relationships and job quality in the United States” (2000) 65(2) American Sociological Review 256 
257. 
26 N Countouris “The employment relationship: A comparative analysis” in G Casale (ed) (2011) The 
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27 Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson (note 25) 257. 
28 Standing (note 12)74; Stanford and Vosko (note 1) 6. 
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systems existing in the colonising states.30 Thus, the standard employment 
relationship was also adopted as the model underpinning labour legislation in South 
Africa31 and arguably in other African countries. However, the socio-economic and 
political context in these countries differed from that obtaining in the colonising 
states. It is submitted that within the African context, many workers were employed 
in terms of arrangements falling outside the standard employment relationship.   
 
One of the reasons for this was the racial discrimination that underpinned 
colonial labour markets and labour regulation, which saw black workers as a source 
of cheap labour that needed to be organised and controlled.32 In this context, the 
majority of workers were employed on a fixed term, seasonal and casual basis and 
as outworkers and were excluded from labour and social security legislation.33 The 
standard employment relationship was therefore the exclusive preserve of a 
minority of white workers.34  
 
These labour policies were reformed and deracialised by colonial 
governments under pressure to decolonize35 and/or by new governments at the 
attainment of independence.  These changes may have reduced the incidence of 
non-standard forms of work amongst black workers. Le Roux argues that the 
inclusion of black workers in the industrial relations system, the prohibition and 
                                                          
30 Ibid. 
31 J Theron, “The Shift to Services and Triangular Employment: Implications for Labour Market 
Reform” (2008) 29(1) ILJ 1 6-7. 
32 Fenwick, Kalula and Landau (note 29) 3. 
33 R Le Roux, “The Regulation of Work: Whither the Contract of Employment? An Analysis of the 
Suitability Of the Contract of Employment to Regulate the Different Forms of Labour Market 
Participation by Individual Workers”, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Cape Town, 2008 139-
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limitation of outwork and casual labour and the increase in full-time employment 
and agriculture led to the standard employment relationship began to taking hold in 
the late 1970s and 1980s.36 It is submitted that even though such policy changes in 
South Africa and in other African countries may have increased the incidence 
standard employment, they did not completely eradicate employment relationships 
falling outside this standard.  
 
The above observations point to the pre-existence of working arrangements 
falling outside of the standard employment relationship. They also point to the co-
existence of non-standard employment relationships with the standard employment 
relationship even when it became a more common working arrangement. The 
proportion of standard to non-standard employment may be debatable and may 
have varied between different countries and within countries over time. 
Nevertheless, one can conclude that despite being the hallmark of labour law, the 
standard employment relationship never captured the totality of the working 
arrangements in industrialised and developing countries.  
 
Whatever the position might have been during the post War Golden age, there 
is broad consensus that the world of work is undergoing significant changes and 
that more and more workers fall outside of the standard employment relationship. 
The boundaries defining the scope of labour law have been brought into question, as 
“traditional communities of workers who once aspired to or enjoyed protection no 
longer receive it, and the new communities with equally compelling claims to 
protection are likely to be denied it”.37 This is a problem in both developed and 
developing countries.38   
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In part 3.3 these developments in the world of work will be discussed in 
detail and it will be argued that the increasing non-protection of workers is due to 
the resurgence, adaptation and proliferation of old (non-standard) forms of work 
under new conditions. This is preceded by part 3.2, which outlines the new 
conditions under which these old forms of work have resurfaced. Essentially, it is 
argued that these forms of work have re-emerged as a result of the quest for 
flexibility which has been driven by the neoliberal agenda in an increasingly global 
environment.  
 
Before proceeding to a detailed discussion of the neoliberal agenda, it is 
necessary to explain the circumstances under which the egalitarian policies 
embodied in welfare state capitalism were eroded. Welfare state capitalism began to 
decline in the North began in the 1970s, when the post War economic boom began 
to slow down due to a number of factors.39 These include oil price shocks, high 
inflation, student youth protests, global financial instability, mass unemployment, 
and challenges posed by liberation movements in developing countries.40 Business 
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profits became squeezed as a result of workers’ collective strength, the growth of 
the non-profit sector and increasing competition from other companies.41 
 
The decline of the post-war Golden Age resulted in disenchantment with 
welfare state capitalism and the Keynesian policies,42 which had failed to deliver 
sustained economic growth despite earlier indications.43  Consequently, intellectual 
debates about appropriate models of economic and social regulation took a new 
direction. According to Cahill, the crisis of the 1970s “provided the context in which 
previously marginal neoliberal ideals enjoyed new legitimacy” and began to appeal 
to policy makers.44 Intellectuals who advocated libertarianism and free markets 
formed alliances with business and formed influential “think tanks” and began to 
influence politicians such as Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the 
United States.45 These events marked the emergence of neoliberalism. 
 
3.2 THE QUEST FOR LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY 
 
This part considers the context within which the quest for flexibility in labour 
markets and labour law has arisen. It begins with a discussion of neoliberalism, 
which is the pre-eminent ideology shaping economic policy in most modern 
economies. The discussion outlines its fundamental precepts and its relationship 
with globalisation in section 3.2.1. It then discusses the neoliberal principles in 
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labour markets and labour regulation, and the implications thereof in section 3.2.2.  
Essentially, it is argued that the combined effect of neoliberalism and globalisation 
has been a quest for flexibility in labour markets which has led to changes in 
perceptions about labour regulation and changes in working arrangements. 
 
3.2.1 Neoliberalism’s fundamental precepts and its link with globalisation 
 
Neoliberalism encompasses a host of theories that dominate thinking on economic 
governance in both developing and developed nations and has gained greater 
prominence in an increasingly globalised world. It is a highly contested ideology and 
has been given different meanings in different contexts. This thesis adopts Harvey’s 
definition, which defines neoliberalism as: “a theory of political economic practices 
that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by the maximization of 
entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by 
private property rights, individual liberty, free markets and free trade”.46  
 
Neoliberalism aims to secure the dominance of private enterprises and 
investors in economic, political and social life.47 One of its central tenets is that 
markets must be unfettered to ensure that they deliver the fairest distribution of 
income and the fairest economic results.48 Neoliberalism’s advocates claim that 
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47 Stanford and Vosko (note 1) 11. 
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flexibility is necessary to allow firms to adjust to new market conditions without 
being encumbered by unnecessary regulation.49  
 
The above implies that neoliberalism envisages the weakening and 
withdrawal of government powers. However, some commentators have shown that 
neoliberalism has allowed for active and powerful government regulations, 
provided these are favourable to businesses and investors.50 In fact, neoliberalism 
recognises that the critical role of the state in creating and preserving an 
institutional framework that promotes individual and commercial freedom.51  
 
According to Cahill, this apparent conflict regarding the role of the state 
exemplifies the “significant disparity between neoliberalism theory and practice”.52 
He argues that “[r]ather than withering away, as neoliberal theory would have it, the 
state has played an active, indeed activist, role in the introduction, implementation 
and reproduction of neoliberalism.”53 Thus, states must take measures to safeguard 
property rights, to secure the integrity of money, create markets, support markets, 
and promote free trade.54 This entails reforms in areas such as taxation, monetary 
and fiscal policies55  and the public sector.56  
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53 Ibid. 
54 Harvey (note 45) 14. 
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Importantly, neoliberalism advocates the promotion of free trade, through 
stimulating global market forces and the increased mobility of capital, goods and 
services.57 Neoliberalism advocates the liberalisation of trade to enable economic 
actors to trade freely in the global economy. In order to consolidate this agenda, 
states have “participated in the construction of a regime of rules and structures 
governing economic relations between states”.58 This regime includes international 
legal structures to provide greater security of market access to enable producers to 
easily enter product markets where they can operate competitively.59  At the apex of 
these international legal structures is the World Trade Organisation, which is a 
multilateral trade system whose overriding purpose is to “help trade flow as freely 
as possible… because this is important for economic development and well-being”.60 
 
One could argue that neoliberalism has been a key driver of the process of 
globalisation. For the purposes of this thesis, globalisation will be understood to 
refer an advanced state of cross-border economic integration or interdependence, 
characterized by trade liberalisation, the growth of foreign investment, cross-border 
financial flows, cross-border production, and the resulting market competition.61 
However, Heintz’s analysis shows that the relationship between neoliberalism and 
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globalisation is not simplistic or uni-directional. He argues that globalisation and 
neoliberalism are closely related and mutually reinforcing, thus acknowledging that 
the relationship is complex and multi-directional.62 According to Heintz “policies of 
liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization are often justified as necessary 
adjustments to the process of global integration. At the same time, deregulation and 
privatization frequently facilitates the integration of markets across national 
borders”.63 
 
The complex interplay between neoliberalism and globalisation has also 
manifested itself through the International Financial Institutions (IFI), namely the 
World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  These have played a 
pivotal role in advancing the neoliberal agenda. The IFI have directly imposed 
neoliberal policies on borrower states by making the provisions of loans and 
financial assistance dependent on adoption and maintenance of these policies.64  
 
The IFI have also indirectly influenced states’ policies “because of their 
surveillance and comparisons of different market economies and role as arbiters of 
'good governance' and best practice in respect of institutional or structural 
reforms”.65 Reports such as the World Bank’s annual Doing Business Reports – which 
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rank all countries according to the ease of doing business within their borders –   
have become influential in this regard. The Doing Business Reports aim to motivate 
reforms through country benchmarking; to enrich international initiatives on 
development effectiveness and to inform theory in regulatory economics by 
providing the empirical foundation for theoretical work.66 The Doing Business 
reports focus on various aspects of regulation including starting a business, 
employing workers, getting property, paying taxes, trading across borders and 
protecting investors. Rittich argues that these reports have become influential 
because of their quantity and the categorical terms in which they express their 
conclusions.67 
 
This section has briefly outlined neoliberalism’s fundamental tenets and 
described its relationship with globalisation. While neoliberalism’s general 
principles do not have a labour or employment label, it cannot be denied that they 
have real and far-reaching consequences for the labour market.68 However, this 
thesis focuses on neoliberalism’s specific principles regarding labour markets. It is 
to these principles that we now turn. 
 
3.2.2 Neoliberal principles on labour market regulation 
 
This section considers the neoliberal principles relating to labour regulation. It 
demonstrates that the common factor underlying these principles is the quest for 
labour market flexibility. The section focuses on the principles espoused by 
international institutions that have been influential in shaping domestic and 
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international economic policy in the last few decades. These relate to flexibility in 
wage setting, flexibility in the duration of employment and working time, flexibility 
in the regulation of dismissal and the promotion of active labour market policies. 
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s Jobs 
Study of 1994 documented and analysed the causes of rising unemployment in the 
OECD in the late 1980s and the early 1990s.69 The report also considered possible 
policy solutions to the problem of unemployment. The report found that one of the 
major causes of rising unemployment in OECD countries was their inability to 
rapidly adjust to changes in markets.70 This inability was largely attributed to 
rigidities in their economies, which were brought about by rigid labour legislation 
and social protection.71 This report used the successful economic performance of 
the US – having the most deregulated labour market, a factor that presumably 
contributed to relatively high levels of job growth – as a powerful example of the 
‘flexibility agenda’.72   
 
Stanford and Vosko have described the findings and recommendations made 
in this report as the first statement of a coherent policy agenda towards increasing 
labour market flexibility.73 Institutions such as the World Bank have also echoed 
these policy prescriptions in the Doing Business Reports and its Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA).74 They have also featured prominently in arenas 
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such as the World Economic Forum, where labour market flexibility is a key 
criterion in determining a country’s global competitiveness.75   
 
These institutions have recommended that states provide for wage flexibility 
by removing unnecessary restrictions and ensuring that wages reflect local 
conditions and individual skill levels and individual efforts.76 Thus, wage levels 
should be primarily set at the enterprise level as opposed to centrally through 
legislation and industry level collective agreements.77 These are believed to create 
distortions in the labour market78 and raise wages to artificially high levels, thus 
impeding efficiency and restricting worker and employer flexibility to adjust to 
shocks such as new technologies and privatisation.79 The WEF has argued that in 
addition for allowing for flexible setting of wages, efficient labour markets must 
“allow for wage fluctuations without much social disruption”.80  
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78 Sengenberger (note 48) 334. 
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The international institutions have also advocated for measures to increase 
temporal flexibility voluntarily sought by workers and employers through 
temporary and part-time work.81 Another dimension of temporal flexibility relates 
to reducing restrictions on maximum working hours, overtime and rest periods.82  
 
Probably the most controversial recommendation made by the international 
institutions relates to employment security provisions. They have argued that 
labour markets should be allowed to function freely to reduce unemployment and 
provide job opportunities for more people.83 According to the WEF, in order to be 
efficient, labour markets must have “the flexibility to shift workers from one 
economic activity rapidly and at low cost”.84 These are critical of labour regulations 
that raise the costs of and procedures for dismissing workers as they tend to lock 
protected workers into relatively poor job matches which make it difficult for them 
to obtain better positions.85 They argue that flexibility in hiring and firing would 
also ensure optimal job matching to secure the best worker for each job, thus raising 
productivity, efficiency and, ultimately, wages and output.86  
 
The neoliberal institutions claim that excessive dismissal regulations also 
make it difficult for employers to adjust their workforces in response to rapid 
technological and product market changes.87 They also argue that these regulations 
tend to discourage employers from employing workers, thereby reducing the re-
employment prospects of workers and increasing the chances of long-term 
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employment or patterns of cycling between unemployment and temporary jobs.88 
This could exacerbate problems of labour market insecurity and social exclusion.89 
Neoliberal institutions have also recommended that greater emphasis be placed on 
active labour market policies with a focus on education and training systems to 
boost the acquisition of skills and competencies.90 They advocate income security 
reform to reduce dependency on unemployment benefits and promote re-
integration into employment by making the payment of benefits conditional on 
active job search.91     
 
The World Bank has argued that excessive labour market regulations 
encourage informal enterprises and informal employment as employers seek to 
avoid the costs of compliance with regulations.92 It has argued that this in turn leads 
to social inequality, as labour regulations protect a few privileged outsiders while 
excluding the majority of workers and job seekers from protective labour and social 
protection.93 To demonstrate this, the Doing Business 2007 report shows that 
Malawi and Mozambique have strict regulations which apply to a very small 
minority of workers in the formal economy while the majority are excluded from 
protection.94  
 
Although the international institutions do not state this explicitly, underlying 
their reports is an assumption that a country’s degree of labour market flexibility 
has an impact on investor decisions. The inclusion of labour market regulation in 
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the assessment of “competitiveness” or the “ease of doing business” suggests that 
this is an important aspect considered by investors. This becomes more critical in a 
global economic environment where capital is scarce and mobile, leading to greater 
international competition to attract foreign direct investment (FDI).95  
 
While it is not necessary to undertake a detailed analysis of the accuracy of 
the neoliberal claims about labour regulation for the purposes of this thesis, a few 
remarks will be made here. One is that empirical studies undertaken to demonstrate 
the linkages between employment regulation and economic outcomes such as 
economic growth and investment, have yielded conflicting results96 which shed 
doubts on neoliberal claims.  Neoliberalism has failed to explain why Nordic 
countries whose economies are marked by inter alia high employment rates and 
world class competitiveness while their labour markets “are characterized by high 
rates of worker and employer organization and collective bargaining coverage, 
highly developed welfare states, high real wages and gender equality”.97 This 
suggests that the relationship between labour regulation and economic outcomes is 
more complex than proponents of neoliberalism have suggested.98  
 
A second remark is that neoliberal accounts of labour law neglect the 
important role that adequate labour protection plays in ensuring social justice and 
improving the living standards of workers and their families. These outcomes are 
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important aspects of the process of economic development, which should be 
understood to encompass more than employment levels, economic growth and 
investment levels. It is therefore submitted that a developmental trajectory that 
respects and promotes the rights and well-being of workers is more socially 
beneficial to one that relies on a race to the bottom. The arguments relating to 
labour law’s contribution to social justice and economic development were 
discussed in greater detail in chapter two.  
 
A final remark relates to an apparent shift in the World Bank’s approach to 
labour standards in its Doing Business Reports. In recent years, the World Bank 
appears to have shifted from rewarding countries for non-existent or inadequate 
regulation and negatively rating countries for labour regulations merely because 
they limit an employer's scope for decision-making, even if they seek to promote 
fundamental principles such as non-discrimination which the Doing Business reports 
endorse.99  
 
Since 2008, the World Bank has been changing its methodology to avoid 
rewarding flexibility that undermines a basic level of social protection.100 It has 
introduced new thresholds in line with ILO conventions and envisages adjusting the 
scoring system to ensure that it indicates excessive flexibility where countries do 
not regulate certain aspects of employment.101 While this is by no means a 
capitulation on the part of the World Bank, and while one may question its motives 
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behind this shift, these changes signify an acknowledgement of the dangers of 
excessive flexibility and the value of ensuring some minimum level of protection. 
 
While there may be some debate about neoliberalism’s impact on economic 
outcomes within a global context, there is some consensus about that it has driven a 
quest for labour market flexibility which have affected governments’ approaches to 
labour regulation and on employer’s practices.102 Stone makes a strong case for the 
“triple onslaught” of flexibilisation, globalisation and privatization on labour 
standards thus: 
 
The triple onslaught of flexibilization, which has rendered many of the old labour market 
skills and institutions obsolete, globalization, with its propensity for geographic dispersion, 
and privatization under neo-liberal ideology, with its repudiation of social legislation at the 
national level, all contribute to union decline and a diminishment of labour rights. 
Flexibilization increases employers’ incentive to avoid unions because they perceive unions 
as promoting rigidity, uniformity, job security protections, and narrow job definitions. 
Globalization increases employers’ opportunities to avoid unions and labour regulations in 
their quest for lower labour costs. In addition, global production chains, enhanced 
transportation and communication, and lower trade barriers give employers considerable 
leverage to avoid unions or limit their effectiveness. The development of transnational 
global governance institutions also undermines the political strength of unions at the 
national level. Privatization fosters policies that diminish legal protection for labour rights 
and collective bargaining, and contribute to rapidly growing income inequality.103 
 
What emerges from the above is that legal protection of workers and employment 
security has been reduced in two ways. The first is referred to as explicit 
disentitlement through legislative reforms, which have sought to make labour 
regulations more flexible.104 At the turn of the century, Standing argued that explicit 
disentitlement had primarily affected industrialized countries, because their 
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regulations and institutional safeguards were most developed.105 More recent 
reports indicate that high income countries have continued to make labour laws 
more flexible and that some middle and low income countries have followed this 
trend.106 Many scholars argue that greater economic integration may (at least in 
part) be driving a race to the bottom and weakening states as they seek to make 
their labour laws more acceptable to potential investors. 107 
 
Among these trends is the shift from pro-collective regulations towards pro-
individualistic labour regulations through policies eroding trade union influence 
and collective bargaining, primarily in the OECD.108 Governments have also 
broadened the scope for flexible contract arrangements with regard to working time 
and the duration of employment contracts.109 In addition, they have weakened 
and/or reduced the procedural and other restrictions on dismissal,110 thereby 
weakening employment protection.   
 
The second way in which worker protection and employment security have 
been reduced is through implicit disentitlement, which entails the shifting of 
workers into statuses and situations involving less protection, poor working 
conditions and a lack of employment security.111 Implicit disentitlement is a global 
phenomenon, and is evident in the move away from the use of standard, secure 
employment towards the use of temporary and part-time work, contracting out of 
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work, agency workers, homeworkers, teleworkers and concealed workers.112 This 
has taken place at firm level and is closely linked to explicit disentitlement at 
government level, as argued by Stanford and Vosko: 
 
The evolution of labour market policy at the governmental level has a natural analogue in 
the evolution of employment practices at the level of the firm. From the perspective of 
individual firms, ‘flexibility’ implies the rise of a new set of employment practices in which 
employers are able to alter their employment decisions more readily to accommodate 
fluctuations in demand, while avoiding responsibilities related to the provision of benefits 
and entitlements.113   
 
Implicit disentitlement is marked by an increase in working arrangements or forms 
of work that deviate from the standard employment relationship which are the main 
focus of this thesis. Having outlined the conditions under which these non-standard 
forms of work have re-emerged, it is necessary to consider their characteristics 
more closely in part 3.3 below.  
 
3.3 NON-STANDARD FORMS OF WORK 
 
The discussions in parts 3.1 and 3.2 alluded to forms of work that deviate from the 
standard employment relationship. These have been identified as part-time work, 
the use of independent contractors, temporary work, and part-time work, casual 
work, contracting out, subcontracting, seasonal work and the use of temporary 
employment agencies.114 A number of appellations have been ascribed to these 
forms of work to signify their deviation from the standard employment relationship, 
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including non-standard work, atypical, non-traditional, flexible, and contingent 
work.115 This thesis will refer to non-standard work as it speaks more directly to the 
deviation from the standard employment relationship. 
 
Different approaches have been adopted towards categorizing the various 
forms of non-standard work and defining each particular form of work. This thesis 
adopts an approach that describes the three processes that have driven the 
proliferation of these forms of work will be preferred. These processes are 
externalization through the commodification of the employment relationship, 
externalization through the use of intermediaries and the casualisation of work.  
 
These processes demonstrate how the work has come to deviate from the 
norm and fall outside the protective scope of labour legislation. Focusing on the 
processes driving change also enables one to identify the common features between 
some of the various forms of work. The key proponents of this approach include 
Theron, Godfrey, the Labour and Enterprise Policy Research Group and Le Roux and 
their work is extensively drawn upon.  
 
The first process driving change is casualisation, which has fuelled a move 
away from the norm that work is full-time and permanent or indefinite. There are 
several forms of casualisation. Thus, it may involve the employment of workers on a 
short-term or temporary basis through fixed –term as opposed to indefinite 
contracts.116 They may be seasonal workers who are engaged to work for a specific 
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season of the year, on fixed-term contracts.117 Workers may also be engaged on a 
part-time basis that is, working for fewer hours than those in the standard working 
week.118 Or they may be casual or contingent workers who are engaged occasionally 
when their services are required by the employer.119   
 
While the process of casualisation does not change the workers’ status as 
employees, it changes the composition or make-up of the workforce.120 In theory, 
casualised employees fall within the scope of labour law and are entitled to the 
rights therein as in most cases the law does not distinguish between part-time and 
full-time or permanent and temporary employees.121 However, casualisation has the 
effect of “diluting the employment relationship” by making the application or 
enforcement of the rights more difficult.122 One reason for this may be that some 
provisions which have been drafted in accordance with the full-time and permanent 
model of employment and do not fit readily with part-time, fixed-term and casual 
employment.123  
 
Broadly speaking, externalisation is a process of workplace restructuring 
where an employer benefits from work that is performed in terms of a commercial 
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contract as opposed to an employment contract.124 Externalisation enables an 
employer to use a commercial contract to essentially transfer the obligations and 
risks that are associated with the employment relationship to another party.125 
These risks are the risks of having to pay wages and benefits despite fluctuations in 
labour needs, the legal risks associated health and safety and product liability, as 
well as the risks of industrial action by workers.126 There are two types of 
externalization, which Le Roux has described as externalization through the 
commodification of the employment relationship, (externalization via 
commodification) and externalization through the use of intermediaries 
(externalization via intermediation).127  
 
Externalisation through commodification of the employment relationship 
involves an employer representing its relationship with a worker as a purely 
commercial agreement and thus converting an employee into an independent 
contractor or a self-employed worker.128 In some cases, the workers are encouraged 
to form their own company or closed corporation and are provided with the 
necessary tools of trade they need to operate.129 Despite changes in the method and 
manner of payment and provision of benefits, there is usually little substantive 
change in the day to day relationship between the employer and the worker.130 In 
most cases, the worker continues to have an asymmetrical relationship with and to 
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be economically dependent on the employer, and this relationship resembles an 
employment relationship.131 
 
These types of arrangements make it difficult to determine whether the 
relationship is an employment contract or a purely commercial arrangement, which 
has far-reaching consequences about whether the worker concerned is protected by 
labour legislation.132 Hyde argues that such situations arise because the law’s focus 
on the employment relationship as the criteria for protection invites employers and 
workers to treat the boundary strategically and structure their relationships in ways 
that avoid labour legislation.133  
 
The third process driving change is the externalization of employment via 
intermediation. This process has given rise to arrangements involving three or more 
parties, thus deviating from the assumption that employment is a bilateral 
relationship involving two parties. These arrangements come into being by virtue of 
a commercial contract in terms of which an employer (styled as the client or user) 
benefits from the labour of workers who are employed by a third party (the 
intermediary).134 They take on a diverse range of forms, including outsourcing, 
subcontracting, labour-only contracting, temporary employment services (also 
known as labour broking in South Africa) and franchising arrangements.135  
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The common denominator in these arrangements is that the intermediary 
undertakes the obligations of the employer of the workers producing the goods and 
providing the services. The employer usually exercises some control over the work 
performed by the workers and to a large extent dictates the duration and conditions 
of the workers’ employment.136 However, because it does not have a contractual 
relationship with the workers, it is absolved from the obligations related to 
employment.137 The commercial contract between the employer and the employer 
places “a legal distance between the user of the enterprise and the risks associated 
with the employment relationship”.138  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, forms of externalization by intermediation 
shall be classified in two broad categories, namely “job contracting” and the use of 
temporary employment agencies. In the case of contracting work out, commonly 
referred to as job contracting, the objective is to engage a person or persons to 
perform a specified piece of work within a specified time frame.139 The object of the 
transaction is the provision of goods and services and the fee charged is based on 
the performance or output. There are usually no negotiations regarding how many 
and what kind of workers the contractor must employ to assist in the completion of 
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the work.140 This is left to the discretion of the contractor who bears the 
responsibility for hiring and supervising the workers and completing the work.  
 
In the case of temporary employment services or labour broking – which is 
often erroneously, it is submitted, referred to as labour only subcontracting141 – the 
purpose of the transaction is to provide a certain number of workers possessing 
specified knowledge and skills to the core enterprise for a specified time period and 
for a fee per worker provided. In most cases, these workers are handed over to the 
client, who assigns work to and supervises the workers.142 Temporary employment 
agencies have a contractual relationship with the workers assigned to clients and 
take responsibility for fulfilling the employment obligations associated with the 
placements.143 
 
Thus far, the processes of casualisation, externalization via commodification 
and externalization via intermediation have been described. Before proceeding to 
the next section, it is necessary to make two key observations about these 
processes. The first is that despite the presentation of these processes as distinct 
and separate from each other, there is considerable overlap between them.144 In 
many cases, externalized arrangements are associated with casualisation of work.145  
For, instance, many temporary employment agencies and subcontractors provide 
                                                          
140 Ibid. 
141 See for example F Raday, “The Insider-Outsider Politics of Labor Only Contracting” (1998-9) 20 
Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal 413.  Although it may be difficult to draw the line, it is 
submitted that the true meaning of labour only contracting or labour only subcontracting is job 
contracting in cases where the contractor or subcontractor does not provide materials and major 
equipment and provides labour only.  
142 Moonilal (note 139) 26; Kalleberg (note 1) 346. 
143 Kalleberg (note 1) 346. 
144D  McCann (note 102) 5. 
145 A Buzuidenhout, S Godfrey, J Theron with M Modisha, “Non standard employment and its policy 
implications” Unpublished Research Report submitted to the Department of Labour, (2003),  48-9; 












employment on a fixed-term or casual basis.146 The implications of the overlapping 
processes will be considered in section 3.4 below. 
 
The second observation is that while these forms of work have recently 
received increasing attention, there is evidence that most of the forms of work 
discussed above have existed in some form or another over the past two 
centuries.147  Thus, as will be demonstrated more fully in respect of contracting 
work out in Chapter Four, the so-called “changing world of work” cannot be 
associated with the invention of entirely novel forms of work.  Rather, the term is 
more reflective of the resurgence, adaptation and proliferation of old forms of work 
under new conditions.  
 
The new conditions – which have been described in part 3.2 – include the 
ascendancy neo-liberal principles which have encouraged labour market flexibility 
to promote greater employment, promote firm efficiency, and thereby promote 
economic growth and prosperity.148 Neoliberalism has gained credence in the 
context of globalisation, technological changes and increased market competition 
between firms in domestic and international markets. 149 Under these conditions, 
firms have sought greater flexibility in their operations to enable them to compete 
more effectively in rapidly changing markets. Many firms have therefore adopted 
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the notion of a flexible workforce that is variable in size and can be reconfigured to 
rapidly respond to market changes.150   
 
This part has described the three processes driving the increase in non-
standard work, namely casualisation, externalisation by commodification and 
externalisation by intermediation. The following part considers the character of 
non-standard work and their implications for the workers involved.  
 
3.4 NON-STANDARD WORK AS PRECARIOUS WORK 
 
Non-standard work is termed as such because of its deviation from the standard 
employment relationship.151 The label “non-standard” is neutral and does not cast 
these forms of work in a necessarily positive or negative light. This part canvasses 
literature from both developing and developed countries to determine how non-
standard work has been characterised. It is acknowledged that some workers have 
positive experiences with non-standard work. However, it will be shown that for the 
majority engaged in non-standard forms of work, the work has negative 
consequences and can be characterized as precarious. It is the latter group of 
workers that form the focus of this thesis. 
 
A number of studies have been conducted to determine the implications of 
non-standard work for the workers involved and consequences for broader society. 
They have been carried out in different countries over different periods and 
covering differing forms of work and in different industries therefore the results 
have been varied. Some of them have involved subjective analysis of workers 
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perceptions while others have been objective analyses and yet others have sought to 
assess perceived outcomes in light of actual outcomes. Some have been economic 
analyses while others are sociological. All these factors have an impact on the 
conclusions drawn in the various studies. 
 
Most of the literature recognises that non-standard forms of work may 
provide some workers with flexibility, diversity, greater control over one’s work and 
independence and that these workers may engage in non-standard work as a matter 
of choice.152  Thus, it has been argued that casualised forms of work have enabled 
working people (and especially women) to balance their participation in the labour 
market with their childcare and other caring responsibilities.153 The literature has 
also recognised that for some workers, these non-standard forms of work may be 
well-paid and offer favourable working conditions.154 These workers are typically 
highly skilled or “knowledge workers” whose possession of much-needed skills have 
enabled them to change the power dynamics traditionally associated with the 
standard employment relationship and thereby supersede it.155  
 
The model of the knowledge worker at the high end of the labour market 
represents a small segment of workers performing non-standard work.156 For the 
majority of workers who fall at the lower end of the labour market, non-standard 
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work is better described as being precarious.157 Precarious is a complex and multi-
faceted phenomenon158 and will be defined in terms of five key criteria for the 
purposes of this thesis.  
 
Precarious work is characterized by job insecurity and instability159 which 
involve short-term jobs and/or a high risk of job loss.160 It is also associated with 
income insecurity, in the form of irregular, unpredictable and/or very low wages.161 
In addition, precarious work may involve unpredictability of lack of control over 
one’s working hours and the denial of entitlements such as paid annual and sick 
leave.162 Workers in precarious work have little or no access to social protection and 
benefits such as unemployment insurance, pension funds, or workers’ compensation 
schemes.163 Furthermore, precarious work presents little or no opportunities for 
training, and thus for career development or upward mobility.164  
 
Importantly, precarious work is marked by involuntariness and vulnerability 
on the part of the workers who perform it. Research from developed and developing 
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countries shows that vulnerable groups such as women,165 young people,166 migrant 
workers (both documented and undocumented) and historically marginalized racial 
and ethnic groups167 are disproportionately represented amongst those performing 
precarious work. Their vulnerability is exacerbated in societies in which low-skilled 
and unskilled workers are dispensable due to high levels of unemployment or 
underemployment.168 
 
It is suggested that precarious work is characterized by the absence of 
sufficient employment opportunities, inadequate social protection, the denial of 
rights at work and shortcomings in social dialogue. These are the key indicators of a 
decent work deficit, which is understood as the gap between the realities of the 
working conditions and the aspirations set out in the Decent Work Agenda outlined 
in chapter two.169 Thus, precarious work can be understood or expressed in terms of 
the decent work deficit. 
 
The above discussion demonstrates that non-standard workers whose work 
is precarious do not enjoy the benefit of labour law’s protection. Their work can 
therefore be described as informal work, which can be defined as work to which 
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labour law is not applied in law or enforced or complied with in practice.170 Thus, 
casualised workers may broadly qualify as employees but the law may impose 
qualification criteria that exclude casual, temporary and part-time workers. 
Alternatively, the law may include them but the workers may experience difficulties 
with enforcing the law. Those who are engaged as independent contractors in the 
context of externalization via commodification are unprotected due to the legislative 
exclusion of independent contractors from their ambit. In the case of externalization 
by via intermediation, workers may lack protection due to their inability to enforce 
their labour rights against the party that controls the conditions and duration of 
their employment.  
 
It is submitted that if precariousness arises in the context of one of these 
processes operating in isolation, precariousness is magnified where these processes 
intersect and overlap.171 Workers who are caught at the intersection between the 
different processes are therefore likely to be even less protected and more 
vulnerable.172 They are also at a disadvantage because of the complexity of 
identifying appropriate ways to regulate and protect them.173  
 
Precariousness is also entrenched and exacerbated by the fact that the 
workers under these arrangements are difficult to organize and are therefore 
unable to participate in collective action to safeguard their interests and improve 
their position. Lack of organisation may be a result of trade unions’ failure to adapt 
their organizing strategies to move beyond the paradigm of the standard 
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employment relationship. 174  Some trade unions have also been found to be 
indifferent175  and even hostile towards non-standard workers as they may view 
them as a threat to their protected status.176 Workers under precarious 
arrangements may also avoid trade unions out of fear of reprisal by employers who 
may be hostile towards them.177  Workers may also have doubts that they will 
benefit from union membership due to the precariousness or short-term nature of 
their work.178  
 
Thus far, the implications of precarious work have been considered only in 
relation to the workers and their immediate working conditions. The prevalence 
and proliferation of precarious work has wider socio-economic consequences for 
the labour market and broader society. First, it has fostered the stratification of the 
labour force, with non-standard workers experiencing the most precarious 
conditions at the lower levels of the hierarchy.179 Secondly, the over-representation 
of certain demographic groups amongst precarious workers means that the risks 
and disadvantages of this work are concentrated amongst these groups.180 This 
deepens social inequality along gender, age, ethnic and other lines, thus 
undermining social cohesion, and entrenching the social exclusion of these 
groups.181  
 
                                                          
174 P H Bamu, and S Godfrey, An analysis of collective bargaining arrangements in the construction 
industry (Cape Town: Labour Research Service, 2009) 19-23. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Klerck (note 162) 75-6. 
177 Benjamin (note 131) 75-92, 85-6; Mills (note 116)1220-1221; Kritzinger (note 161) 117-8. 
178 S Ndungu and J Theron, “What kind of jobs? Creating opportunities for decent work” Research 
report submitted to the International Labour Organisation by NALEDI and the Labour and 
Enterprise Policy Research Group (2008), 125. 
179 Kritzinger (note 161)110. 
180 Giesecke (note 116) 642. 












The discussion in this part has emphasized that the majority of non-standard 
workers experience precarious working conditions and do not enjoy the protection 
afforded by labour law. These workers experience decent work deficits as their 
reality falls short of the vision of the Decent Work Agenda. This is problematic 
because decent work is not intended to be for the benefit of a privileged few, but 
should cover all workers regardless of their status and where they work. Thus, this 
paper focuses on non-standard work to the extent that their work is precarious and 
falls short of the goals set out in the Decent Work Agenda. Its emphasis will 
therefore be on workers at the lower end of the labour market, that is unskilled and 




Chapter two discussed the purpose of labour law and the employment relationship 
to which it applies.  This chapter considered the conditions under which fewer 
workers are enjoying the protection and benefits that labour law offers and are 
working under precarious conditions. It argued that the quest for labour market 
flexibility has placed workers on the road to greater precariousness. 
 
This chapter began by outlining the standard employment relationship, 
characterised by a full-time, indefinite, bilateral relationship where the employee 
works on the premises of the employer. This is the model around which labour law 
was constructed in the post War period and which continues to underpin modern 
labour law.  The discussion pointed to the fact that other non-standard forms of 
work have historically preceded and existed alongside the standard employment 
relationship. More recently, however, the standard employment relationship seems 












proliferated as a result of the quest for labour market flexibility which has been 
fuelled by the ascendancy of the neoliberal agenda in an increasingly integrated 
world economy.  
 
It then proceeded with a discussion of the three processes that have been 
driving the greater use of non-standard forms of work, namely casualisation, 
externalization by commodification and externalization by intermediation. The final 
part of the chapter showed that most non-standard workers at the lower end of the 
labour market work under precarious conditions characterized by decent work 
deficits. They therefore constitute the modes of implicit disentitlement of workers 
which has been associated with the neoliberal agenda and gl balisation.  
 
An important issue highlighted in this chapter was the possible intersection 
of different processes driving non-standard work. It was suggested that workers 
caught at the intersection of these processes are amongst the most vulnerable and 
experience greater precariousness. These observations are critical to understanding 
contracting work out to self-employed workers, which is the main focus of this 
thesis. This practice involves the intersection of at least two processes, namely 
externalization via commodification and externalization via intermediation. Chapter 

















Chapter two set the context for this thesis by analysing the tension between the 
protective purpose of labour law and the drive for greater flexibility in employment 
relations and in labour regulation. Chapter three then discussed the broad changes 
taking place in the world of work within this backdrop.  It identified the three 
processes driving change, namely externalization by commodification of the 
employment relationship, externalization through the use of intermediaries, and 
casualisation of work. It pointed out that these processes do not necessarily take 
place in isolation, but often interact in complex ways.  
 
As highlighted in the conclusion of the latter chapter, the practice of 
contracting work out to self employed workers can be described as the point where 
externalisation via commodification intersects with externalisation via 
intermediation. This chapter narrows down the discussion to focus on this practice, 
which is the core subject of this thesis. This chapter aims to paint a concrete picture 
of the development of this practice in the South African context. It considers the 
factors that have brought workers like Taryn and Jabu to work under this practice. It 
also considers the circumstances under which workers like Taryn and Jabu labour 
under this practice and the consequences of the practice for them and the workers 













The discussion begins with a historical account of the practice in Britain 
where it first developed in the 18th century and was known as the gang labour or 
butty system. In South Africa, the practice first emerged on the mines in the late 19th 
century before it was abolished in 1922. The practice has emerged in a number of 
sectors since the 1990s. The discussion then focuses on the contemporary use of 
this practice by South African employers, drawing from empirical research in the 
clothing, construction, mining and transport sectors. The historical account and the 
empirical evidence are discussed in part 4.1 of this chapter.  
 
Part 4.2 of the chapter identifies the forces that are driving the proliferation 
of this practice in South Africa.  Many businesses have justified it on the grounds 
that it supports promotes small business development black economic 
empowerment (BEE) policies. The nature and import of these policies are discussed. 
This is followed by an analysis of contemporary discourse on the South African 
labour market regulation, which has been dominated by claims that the South 
African labour legislation is inflexible and hampers employment growth and global 
competitiveness. It is suggested tha , although highly questionable, these sentiments 
have driven employers to seek ways of avoiding the costs and risks imposed by 
labour legislation.  
 
Part 4.3 considers the consequences of the practice of contracting out as the 
point of intersection between the two forms of externalisation. It shows how 
externalisation by commodification has effectively excluded self-employed workers 
from the scope of labour protection by designating them as independent 
contractors. It considers how externalisation via intermediation designates the self-
employed worker as the employer of the workers he purports to employ despite the 












employment. These are externalized through intermediation, with the self-
employed worker being the intermediary.  
 
This part also argues that the externalisation of self-employed workers and 
their workers also gives rise to the casualisation of the labour of self-employed 
workers and their workers. This therefore adds an additional dimension to the 
practice under scrutiny. The combined effect of these processes is that self-
employed workers and their workers labour under precarious conditions and do 
not enjoy basic labour protections relating to regulation of working time, unfair 
dismissal, minimum wages and statutory social security benefits. One can therefore 
characterise the practice as part of a process leading to the informalisation of the 
work of self-employed workers and their workers. 
 
The key finding that will emerge from this chapter is that self-employed 
workers and their workers who labour under the practice under scrutiny are not 
protected by labour law. The discussion will demonstrate how the application of 
labour law is excluded and hampered in relation to self-employed workers like 
Taryn and Jabu and their workers. The analysis in this chapter will therefore 
provide a basis on which to consider the extent to which South African labour law 
has developed rules that recognise and regulate this multi-dimensional practice. The 
latter enquiry is undertaken in chapter five.  
 
4.1 THE PRACTICE OF CONTRACTING WORK OUT: THE 
EVIDENCE 
 
A number of changes in the South African labour market have been identified over 












increasingly contracting work out to people who were previously or would 
ordinarily have been their workers. The contracts are concluded on the basis that 
the worker is an independent contractor and not an employee of the firm. In many 
cases, the work contracted out exceeds the normal workload for a single worker, 
and the contracts are concluded on the express or tacit assumption that the self-
employed worker may employ other workers to assist him/her to complete the 
work undertaken.  
 
This part begins with a historical account of the emergence of the practice of 
contracting work out in Britain in section 4.1.1. This brief overview is significant as 
the practice has a long history in that country dating back to the 18th century.  It is 
suggested that it is no coincidence that the practice emerged on the (largely British-
owned ) mines in South Africa in the late 19th century. This appears to be the earliest 
incidence of the use of the practice in South Africa until its re-emergence in the 
1990s. These developments in South Africa are considered in section 4.1.2. Finally, 
section 4.1.3 draws out the key characteristics of the practice of contracting work 
and explains how it must be unders ood for the remainder of this chapter. 
 
4.1.1 Contracting work out to self-employed workers: a historical 
perspective from Britain 
 
This section considers the practice of contracting work out to self-employed 
workers in Britain, where historical accounts of the practice show that it began in 
the 18th century. This discussion focuses on the work of Holbrook-Jones, Friedman 
and Thompson and McHugh, who have written extensively about how the 
organization of work has evolved over time in Britain. Their work combines broad 












to the late 20th century. The following discussion paints a broad picture of some of 
the trends identified by these authors.  
 
Contracting work out to skilled workers was the norm prior to the 
development of the employment relationship and the industrial revolution.1 The 
latter brought about the change from the use of hand-held tools and the domestic 
industry to the mechanization of work and the development of the factory 
production system.2 However, these changes did not eradicate the practice of small-
scale contracting, which continued to play a role in various industries during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Writing about Britain’s industrial revolution, 
Friedman notes the following: 
 
Factories themselves were small by present standards, and the organization of work in 
many factories often contained vestiges of workshop practices from the Domestic Industry 
and Manufacture periods. In the metal industries around the Birmingham area in particular, 
even in large factories, rent for shop-room and payments for power and light were deducted 
from wages. Also the skilled worker in these factories, as in many other factories and 
workshops until late in the nineteenth century, was often an intermediate subcontractor 
and therefore an employer of labour. At blast-furnaces bridge-stockers and stock-takers, 
employed gangs to charge the furnace or control the casting. Butties contracted with 
management for working of a stall and employed their own assistants in coal-mines. 
Women workers in button factories employed girl assistants. The master –roller in rolling 
mills and the overhand brass foundries and chain factories were all paid by the piece and in 
turn employed others.3 
 
There were variations in the way contracting was carried out, depending on the 
nature of the sector or industry, the local practices in the different localities, and the 
amount of work that needed to be done. However, the basic structure was that a 
firm contracted with a skilled worker to do a certain amount of work for a fee and 
                                                          
1 A L  Friedman, Industry and Labour: Class Struggle at Work and Monopoly Capitalism (Hong Kong: 
MacMillan, 1977), 30-2; G Clark, “Industrial Law and the Labour-Only Sub-contract” 30 Modern Law 
Review (1967) 6, 7-9. 
2 Friedman (note 1) 30-31. 












the worker in turn employed and paid other workers to assist him or her with the 
work.4 In some cases, the contracting arrangements involved multiple layers of 
intermediaries between the firm and the worker-contractor carrying out the work. 
These intermediaries were either “foremen” or “piecemasters” who did not do the 
work themselves and subcontracted and/or supervised skilled and experienced 
workers.5  
 
Contracting work out was carried out either internally or externally. In the 
former case, the contractor was employed by the firm and was paid a wage by the 
firm in addition to the agreed price for the work.6 In some cases, these employee-
contractors took control of the work process and hired and supervised their own 
workers.7 However, in some industries such as engineering, the workers under the 
employee-contractor were also employed and paid by the firm.8 In this case, 
contracting was an internal management strategy to incentivize the existing 
workforce and ensure quality control through technical supervision.9  
 
External contracting involved a contractor who was not employed by the firm 
and presupposed an arrangement between two separate entities, albeit of different 
sizes. This took place in inter alia the textile industry which transformed from a 
domestic industry into “a complex combination of factories and outworkers” 
                                                          
4 R Mankelow and F Wilkinson, “Industrial relations in iron and steel, shipbuilding and the docks, 
1930 1960” in N Whiteside and R Salais (eds) Governance, Industry and Labour Markets in Britain 
and France: The modernising state in the mid-twentieth century (London: Routledge, 1998) 231-248 
233. 
5 M Holbrooke-Jones, Supremacy and Subordination of Labour: The Hierarchy of Work in the Early 
Labour Movement (London: Heinemann Educational Book, 1982), 125-6; Friedman (note 1) 62. 
6 Ibid at 64-65; P Thompson and D McHugh Work Organisations: A critical introduction (London: 
MacMillan, 1990) 53. 
7 Thompson and McHugh (note 6) 53. 
8 Holbrooke-Jones (note 5) 64-5; Friedman (note 1) 212-5. 












between the 1860s and 1880s.10 Friedman reports that during that period, many 
factories employed more outworkers than factory hands.11 Relations between 
factories and outworkers were the most common example of “co-operative 
relations” between firms of unequal size where the larger firm played a dominant 
role in determining when the relations started and ended.12 These relations 
between large and small firms could be characterized as relations between capital 
and labour, although the latter could not strictly be classified as wage-labour. 13  
 
There were a number of advantages of this practice for firms that contracted 
work out, whether it was internal or external contracting. One was that the system 
was performance-based and thus incentivized the contractors to work hard and to 
drive workers to work at a faster pace.14 Holbrook-Jones reports that piecemasters 
in the engineering industry in the late 19th century were believed to “flog the men to 
the highest pitch”.15   
 
Another advantage was that the practice enabled firms to shift part of the 
responsibility and risks associated with work to contractors, and enabled firms to 
easily meet changes in demand and cope during transitions in operations.16 The 
flexibility allowed firms to easily dispense with workers during period when they 
were no longer required.17 Contracting was also useful where management had 
                                                          
10 Friedman (note 1) 33. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid at 35. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Holbrooke-Jones (note 5) 64-6; Friedman (note 1) 62. 
15 Holbrooke-Jones (note 5) 66. 
16 Thompson and McHugh (note 6) 53; Friedman (note 1) 63. 












limited technical knowledge of the work process and thus saved firms the cost of 
employing qualified managers.18  
 
Historical accounts indicate that contracting arrangements were largely 
characterised as exploitative and that ordinary workers resented contractors. These 
sentiments seem to have motivated trade associations such as the Journeymen 
Steam Engine Makers to require piecemasters to equitably distribute the bonuses 
amongst all workers.19 These imposed sanctions including fines and expulsion 
against members who worked as piecemasters or contractors who did not share 
bonuses received.20 
 
The contracting system declined in most industries during the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries.21 It however continued well into the mid-20th century in a few 
industries such as iron and steel, shipbuilding and the docks.22 One reason for the 
decline of the system was that management’s realisation that it separated them 
from the activities of the workforce.23 Management also realised that the practice 
made it difficult for them to evaluate, control and adapt working practices and 
excluded management from the social reproduction of labour.24 In addition, 
“[t]echnical change reduced the importance of the skills and knowledge of the 
leading process workers and transformed labourers into machine operators, and 
                                                          
18 Mankelow and Wilkinson (note 4) 243; Thompson and McHugh (note 6) 53. 
19 Holbrooke-Jones (note 5) 65. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Thompson and McHugh Work Organisations (note 6) 58; Holbrooke-Jones (note 5) 66-7. 
22 These include the iron and steel, shipbuilding and the docks. See Mankelow and Wilkinson (note 
4) 243. 
23 Thompson and McHugh (note 6) 56. 












this... put an end to contracting”.25 Consequently, management began to abolish 
internal contracting to regain control of work operations.26 
 
The practice of contracting out re-emerged in the UK in the 1980s as part of 
the “flexibility offensive” which sought to avoid the rigidities and higher costs that 
were imposed by work rules and employment protection laws.27 In a bid to secure 
numerical flexibility of the workforce, to reduce labour costs, and counter the 
militancy of trade unions, firms have increasingly contracted work out to self-
employed workers or contractors.28 In some cases, firms turned former employees 
into self-employed workers and suppliers of services by replacing employment 
contracts with commercial contracts.29 The building industry is a well-known case 
of an industry where this has been taking place.30  
 
This section briefly considered the evolution of practice of contracting work 
out to workers who in turn employ other workers in Britain. Its rise in the 18th 
century was driven by employer’s desire to benefit from the knowledge of skilled 
workers and reduce labour and management costs while increasing productivity of 
workers. Its decline in the 19th century was associated with the increase in direct 
employment due to technical advancements and firms’ desire to exercise greater 
control of work processes. The late 20th century has seen the return of earlier 
                                                          
25 Ibid at 233. 
26 Thompson and McHugh (note 6) 56. 
27 Ibid. 
28 J Watson and G Sharp, “Barriers to skills development in a local construction labour market” 
(2007) 22(2) Local Economy 123 124.  
29 S P Pinch, C M Mason, S J G Witt “Labour flexibility and industrial restructuring in the UK 
‘Sunbelt’: The case of Southampton” (1989) 14(4) Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 418 424. 
30 Clark (note 1)10-11; G Winch, “The growth of self-employment in British construction” (1998)  
Construction Management and Economics 16 531; Watson and  Sharp (note 28) 124; Thompson and  
McHugh (note 6) 201; M Freedland, “Worker Protection” UK National Study for the ILO, (1999), 
accessed at www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/downloads/wpnr/uk.pdf   on 












contracting practices as a result of employers’ quest to increase workplace flexibility 
and reduce labour costs. The next section considers case studies of the development 
of the practice in the South African context. 
 
4.1.2 Contracting work out to self-employed workers in South Africa 
 
This section considers the practice of contracting out to self-employed workers in 
South Africa, beginning with its early emergence in the mines in the late 19th 
century. The case studies discussed in this section show that, with the exception of 
the mining sector, contracting work out to self-employed workers is a fairly recent 
development in the South African labour market and only emerged in the 1990s. 
The case studies examine the practice in the mining, construction, clothing sectors 
and in relation to truck drivers. 
 
The earliest incidence of contracting work out to self employed workers in 
South Africa’s appears to have been mining industry during the late 19th and early 
20th centuries.31 British firms owned and controlled the mines during this period.32 
It is therefore likely that the introduction of this practice was an extension of the 
long-established use of the practice on the mines in Britain.   
 
In South Africa, the practice was implemented along racial lines. White 
miners were engaged as subcontractors and in turn organized and supervised teams 
                                                          
31 A Buzuidenhout, “New Patterns of Exclusion in the South African Mining Industry” in K Bentley 
and A Habib (eds) Racial Redress and Citizenship in South Africa (Pretoria: HSRC Press, 2008) pp 
179-208), 187-9; B Kenny and A Buzuidenhout, “Contracting, Complexity and Control: An Overview 
of the Changing Nature of Subcontracting in the South African Mining Industry” (1999) The Journal 
of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 185 188.  
32 S Terreblanche A History of Inequality in South Africa 1652-2002 (Scottsville, University of Natal 












or “gangs” of African workers to do core mine work, often under exploitative 
conditions.33 Kenny and Buzuidenhout report that “the white ganger had to take 
responsibility for supervising work, paying wages to the gang members and even 
providing explosives needed to perform the work”.34 Mine managers abolished the 
practice in 1922 to reduce the number of white mine workers and cut labour costs 
during a profitability crisis in the gold industry.35  
 
After lying dormant for over 70 years, the practice of contracting work out to 
self-employed workers resurfaced in the mining industry in the 1990s.36 
Buzuidenhout reports that mines are increasingly subcontracting core mining tasks 
to subcontractors, many of which are micro enterprises established by miners who 
were previously their employees.37 These miners employ less than ten workers and 
can be divided into “legitimate start-up firms and fly-by-night opportunists”.38  In 
some cases, this practice has been used as part of mining companies’ 
“empowerment initiatives”, as described by a trade unionist: 
 
[s]everal black workers were given the opportunity to go for training as certified miners. 
When they came back to the mine, the management proposed that they do not simply join 
the ranks of the white miners but be employed on a totally different basis. Each miner 
would be given an area to mine, he would recruit his own workers and be paid a large lump 
sum for the work done.39 
 
                                                          
33 Kenny and Buzuidenhout (note 31) 188.  
34 Ibid at188. 
35 Ibid at188-9. 
36 Buzuidenhout (note 31)188-190. 
37 Ibid at 190. 
38 Ibid. 
39 National Union of Mineworkers “Contracting out”, 153, quoted in J Crush, T Ulicki, T Tseane and E 
Jansen van Vuuren, “Undermining Labour: The Rise of Sub-contracting in South African Gold Mines” 












The quote shows that re-emergence of this practice has to some extent had a racial 
dimension, albeit for different reasons to those behind initial emergence of the 
practice almost a century ago.  
 
The re-emergence of the practice in the mining sector coincided with its 
emergence in the construction and clothing sectors and in relation to truck drivers. 
Employers in the construction industry began to contract general functions out to 
self-employed workers in the 1990s.40 This marked a change the tradition in the 
construction industry whereby main contractors directly employed workers who 
carried out general functions such as bricklaying and plastering, and subcontracted 
specialist functions such as plumbing and electrical work to specialist 
subcontractors.41 Specialist subcontractors have always performed complex 
functions and provided their own labour, and all the necessary tools and materials 
to carry out the work undertaken.42   
 
Over the last three decades, there have been changes in the organisation of 
construction work, with main contractors have increasingly engaging artisans in 
general functions such as bricklayers, plasterers and carpenters on the basis that 
they are independent contractors.43 These so called independent contractors are 
commonly referred to as labour-only subcontractors (LOSCs) in the building 
                                                          
40 J Theron and S Godfrey, Protecting Workers at the Periphery (Cape Town: Institute of 
Development 
and Labour Law Monograph Series, 2000). 
41 Ibid; T Goldman, Organizing in the Informal\Economy: A Case Study of the Building Industry in 
South Africa ILO SEED Working Paper No,38 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2003) 12-13. 
42 Goldman (note 42) 12-13.  
43 A Buzuidenhout, S Godfrey, J Theron, with M Modisha, “Non standard employment and its policy 
implications” Unpublished Research Report submitted to the Department of Labour, (2003); J 
English, “An Assessment of Current Conditions in the Informal Construction Labour Sector and 
whether these Conditions Accommodate Training”, Unpublished M Phil Dissertation (University of 
Cape Town, 2002); P H Bamu and S Godfrey, Exploring Labour Broking in the Construction Industry, 












industry, as they provide labour only.44  Most of them do not have access to cash or 
credit required to purchase building materials.45  
 
Most LOSCs were previously employees in construction companies and the 
overwhelming majority are black (that is, African and coloured). 46 Most LOSCs have 
completed high school and many have completed some formal craft training. Most 
have received vocational training and are qualified artisans in their respective areas 
of work. They are given work on a project by project basis, and in many cases they 
work for one or a few construction companies. Some subcontractors have reported 
that they work exclusively for a firm that previously employed them on a permanent 
basis.  
 
Contracts are negotiated with LOSCs on the basis that the latter have 
sufficiently skilled and experienced personnel to produce work of the standard 
required by the specification. Labour only subcontractors usually employ a group of 
up to ten workers to assist them. Because they cannot guarantee work beyond each 
project, the workers are hired on a project by project basis. However, in most cases, 
they have a regular group of workers whom they call upon. These usually comprise 
                                                          
44 Theron and Godfrey (note 40). 
45 Western Cape Department of Human Settlements, “Emerging Contractors Concept Paper”, 
background document  for Emerging Contractors Workshop hosted by the Western Cape 
Department of Human Settlements in Cape Town, 23 April, 2010, 3, 5. 
46 Unless indicated otherwise information regarding labour only sub-contracting out in the 
construction industry was obtained from the following South African Research reports: Theron and 
Godfrey (note 40) Goldman (note 41) Buzuidenhout, S Godfrey, J Theron with M Modisha (note 43); 
J English, “An Assessment of Current Conditions in the Informal Construction Labour Sector and 
whether these Conditions Accommodate Training”, Unpublished M Phil Dissertation (University of 
Cape Town, 2002); S K Ndungu, J Theron, S Godfrey, S  Rakgosi and M Visser, “What Kind of Jobs: 
Creating Opportunities for Decent Work” (2008) Unpublished Report submitted to the 
International Labour Organisation; P H Bamu and S Godfrey, Exploring Labour Broking in the 
Construction Industry, (Cape Town, Labour Research Service, 2009); Western Cape Department of 
Human Settlements, “Emerging Contractors Concept Paper”, background document for Emerging 
Contractors Workshop hosted by the Western Cape Department of Human Settlements in Cape 












semi-skilled and unskilled workers, as most labour only subcontractors cannot 
afford to employ skilled artisans. In most cases the labour only subcontractor is 
usually the most skilled worker in the team and leads and supervises the team in the 
operations. 
 
Similar changes have taken place in the South African clothing industry. The 
trend has emerged against the backdrop of trade liberalisation in the South African 
economy in the 1990s, which led to the significant reduction of import tariffs for 
manufactured goods including clothing.47 The subsequent increase in cheap imports 
from low-wage paying economies has placed local manufacturers under significant 
pressure to reduce their production costs in order to remain competitive.48 
 
Consequently, many large formal factories have restructured their operations 
and retrenched substantial proportions of their workers to reduce the costs 
associated with standard employment.49  The work in these factories is shared 
between a smaller core workforce of direct employees and subcontractors, some of 
whom are former employees. Other formal factories have shut down their main 
operations, retrenched their workforces and styled themselves as ‘design houses’.  
These focus on designing garments and contract out all cutting, making and 
                                                          
47 S Godfrey, M Clarke, J Theron with J Greenburg On the Outskirts but Still in Fashion: Homeworking 
in the South African Clothing Industry: The challenge of organisation and regulation Monograph 
2/2005 (Cape Town, Institute of Development and Labour Law, 2005) 1, 6, 7. 
48 Godfrey, Clarke, Theron with Greenburg (note 47) 1, 6, 7. 
49 Information regarding the contracting work out in the clothing industry was obtained from the 
following South African case Studies: A Mosoetsa,  “The Consequences of South Africa’s Economic 
Transition: The Remnants of the Footwear Industry” in E Webster and K Von Holdt, Beyond the 
Apartheid Workplace: Studies in Transition (Pietermaritzburg: University of KZN Press, 2005) 317-
334; M Bennett Organizing in the Informal Economy: A Case Study of the Clothing Industry in South 
Africa ILO SEED Working Paper No.37 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2003); Godfrey, Clarke, 
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trimming functions to subcontractors who are experienced workers. Another 
development is the emergence of independent design houses that design garments 
and typically operate as intermediaries between clothing retailers and 
subcontractors who make the actual garments. 
 
The subcontractors’ operations are referred to as homework operations 
because subcontractors in the clothing industry typically operate from their own 
private homes. The home workers are paid a piece rate for each item produced. 
Some of these homeworking operations are more established cut, make and trim 
(CMT) operations that function like small factories and are fairly stable and 
sustainable. However, the majority are small scale survivalist operations that 
employ less than ten people and do not own their own machines.  Godfrey et al 
describe the typical survivalist home working operation thus: 
 
These tended to be small and most had been established within the five years preceding the 
interviews. Work was carried out in the living space of the home and family members were 
often involved in the work: daughters, sisters, unemployed boyfriends and husbands helped 
out with ironing, packaging and other tasks... In these operations there was barely a 
distinction between the ‘owner’ of the business and the homeworkers. The owner typically 
worked alongside other workers as a sewing machinist.50 
 
The owners of these operations cannot afford to buy fabric and other necessary 
materials and these are supplied by the party that contracts the work out to them.  
In the transport sector, long-distance haulage companies increasingly employ truck 
drivers on the basis that they are independent contractors. In some cases, they have 
persuaded their employees to sign contracts converting them into independent 
contractors. Most of these arrangements convert drivers into “owner-drivers”.51 
                                                          
50 Godfrey et al (note 47) 18.  
51 Unless otherwise indicated, information relating to contracting of work out to truck drivers is 
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Owner-driver schemes have also become popular with firms in various industries 
requiring in-house deliveries – such as food and beverage companies – many of 
which have retrenched their drivers and re-engaged them as independent 
contractors.52  
 
An owner-driver scheme involves a hire purchase agreement between the 
driver and the core enterprise for the purchase of the vehicle.  The driver then 
operates on his own account and can hire assistants to help him/her with the 
driving and with deliveries. The owner-driver is paid a fee per delivery, and monthly 
instalments for the truck are deducted from their total earnings for each month. 
Other arrangements allow for the owner driver to simply rent the vehicle from the 
core enterprise on the basis that they pay a fixed weekly or monthly rental for the 
use of the vehicle. The driver uses the remainder to pay for expenses such as fuel, 
wages for assistants, maintenance of the vehicle53 and keeps the remainder for him 
or herself.  
 
The above case studies point to the growing incidence of a practice whereby 
employers contract work out to workers on the basis that they are independent 
contractors who can employ their own workers to assist them. A few points 
emerging from these studies must be noted before proceeding. The first is that while 
the case studies focus on specific sectors where the practice is particularly 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Labour Law in an Era of Globalization: Transformative Practices and Possibilities (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000) 75-92; H Cheadle and M Clarke, “Country Study: South Africa” International 
Labour Office National Studies on Workers Needing Protection (2000) 35-6; S Mills, “The Situation 
of the Elusive Independent Contractor and Other Forms of Atypical Employment in South Africa: 
Balancing Equity and Flexibility”; Webster et al “Making Visible the Invisible: Confronting South 
Africa's Decent Work Deficit” (Sociology of Work Unit, University of Witwatersrand) Research 
commissioned by the Department of Labour (2008). 
52 Cheadle and Clarke (note 51) 35-6. 
53 There is variation as to whether the employer or the self-employed worker pays for the 












prevalent, the practice is not limited to these sectors and has broader application in 
the South African economy. These arrangements are also being used in the 
manufacture of other goods54 as well as by courier companies and by the cleaning 
departments of some hotels.55 
 
The second is that the above research reports are small-scale qualitative 
surveys that rely on the insights of key informants including workers, trade union 
and bargaining council representatives in the various sectors. While they indicate an 
increase in the prevalence of the practice, the reports do not quantify the extent to 
which enterprises are resorting to it. While Statistics South Africa’s Labour Force 
Surveys measure employment and self-employment; permanent and temporary 
employment; and full-time and part time work, they do not capture the dynamics 
that relate to contracting out to self-employed workers and are therefore unhelpful 
in this regard. There is therefore a need for large-scale and periodic surveys of the 
labour market to identify trends in the world of work and quantify the extent of 
different working arrangements over time. 
 
A third point relates to the difference in the evolution of contracting work out 
to self-employed workers in Britain and in South Africa. In the former, the earlier 
use of the practice spanned a longer period of time (from the 18th century to the 
early 20th century) and was more widespread as it was used in various sectors of the 
economy. By contrast, in South Africa, the earlier use of the practice spanned a 
shorter period (late 1890s to century to 1922) and appears to have been limited to 
the mining sector.  
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These differences may relate to the differing trajectories of industrialisation 
and economic development in Britain and South Africa. They may also relate to 
structural differences in the labour market and to the fact that in South Africa, the 
British and later the Afrikaners used different labour practices such as employment 
of workers on temporary contracts and through the use of labour agencies. Such 
practices may have enabled employers to secure cheap labour and the required 
levels of productivity such that there was no need to resort to contracting work out.  
 
4.1.3 Clarifying the scope of the practice 
 
Having presented the evidence of the practice of contracting work out to self-
employed workers, it is necessary to identify the key characteristics of the practice. 
Given the various possible permutations of externalisation of work, this section 
clarifies the scope of the practice and distinguishes it from situations that fall 
outside the scope of this thesis.  
 
First, this thesis covers contracting out of a piece of work, or job contracting, 
whose main objective is to engage a person or persons to perform a specified piece 
of work or deliver a specified result by a specified time. 56 The object of the 
transaction is the provision of goods and services and the fee charged is based on 
the performance or output. There is no agreement regarding the number and type of 
workers the contractor must employ to assist in the completion of the work57 as this 
is left to the discretion of the contractor who must hire and take responsibility for 
the workers. 
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This practice must be distinguished from the employment of workers through 
temporary employment agencies or labour brokers, where the purpose of the 
transaction is to provide a specified number and type of workers to an enterprise 
for a stated period. In most cases, these workers are handed over to the client, 
which assigns work to and supervises the workers.58 However, legislation and 
policies governing the use of temporary employment agencies are considered in 
later chapters. They are considered to the extent that their approaches to 
addressing externalisation by intermediation may provide inspiration in the 
development of strategies to address similar concerns with contracting work out to 
self-employed workers. 
 
Second, the practice covers scenarios where employers continually or 
regularly contract out work that falls within their main business activities and key 
ancillary activities.  This means that the practice focuses on the contracting out of 
which for which core enterprises would ordinarily employ workers directly. 
Determining an employer’s core and ancillary activities would depend on the nature 
of the business involved and would be determined on a case by case basis.  
 
A number of scenarios would therefore be excluded from the scope of the 
practice sought to be analysed. One would be where work is only contracted out 
occasionally or temporarily to meet unexpected demand, provided the regular 
permanent workforce could not reasonably cope with demand.59 Another relates to 
the contracting out of work or services that are specialised and involve the use of 
                                                          
58 Ibid at 26. 
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peculiar skills, expertise and equipment that are beyond the capacity of the normal 
workforce and are required occasionally or under exceptional circumstances.60  
 
Third, while the case studies point towards the tendency to contract work out 
to their former employees, the practice includes contracting work out to workers 
with whom the core enterprise did not have a prior employment relationship. There 
need not be a prior employment relationship between the parties, provided that the 
work falls under the scope of functions that the enterprise would ordinarily have 
employed workers to do on a continuous or regular basis. This would be the case 
where the core enterprise directly employs other workers or previously employed 
workers to do this kind of work that is contracted out. 
 
Fourth, while a direct contracting arrangement between the enterprise and 
the self-employed worker is envisaged, the practice may involve a number of 
intermediaries between these parties. Cases involving multiple intermediaries 
create difficulties as to when an enterprise should be held responsible for the 
actions of other entities or persons. It is submitted that the practice (at the very 
least) includes situations where an enterprise uses additional intermediaries to 
distance itself from the contract with the self-employed worker. 
 
 An example would be the creation of a “shell” or satellite enterprise which 
then contracts work out to self employed worker. This however raises questions as 
to whether the legal consequences should differ when the core enterprise 
deliberately attempts to distance itself from self-employed workers and when it 
genuinely has no knowledge and plays no part in the recruitment of the self-














employed workers. These dilemmas shall be considered in chapter seven of the 
thesis.  
 
To conclude, contracting work out to self-employed workers as envisaged in 
this thesis excludes the use of temporary employment services or labour brokers. 
Contracting work relates to work falling within the normal core and ancillary 
functions of the firm contracting out the work. It excludes cases where work is 
contracted out in exceptional and occasional circumstances. This practice includes 
contracting arrangements where there was no prior employment relationship 
between the core enterprise and the workers, provided that the work contracted 
comprises part of the core or ancillary functions of the enterprise. Finally, this thesis 
envisages that in some cases, contracting arrangements may involve the use of 
intermediaries between the core enterprise that contracts work out and the self-




This part has considered the evidence of the practice of contracting work out to self-
employed workers in Britain and in South Africa, where the practice has been on the 
rise in the past few decades. It has outlined the essential features and clarified the 
parameters of the practice. The next part considers the factors that led to the 
emergence of this practice and that have led to its increase in the South African 
context.  
 














This part seeks to explain what has motivated South African employers to make use 
of this practice in recent years.  It explains that businesses have justified contracting 
work out on  the “politically correct” grounds that it supports the small business 
development and black economic empowerment (BEE) policies. It is however 
argued that the true motivation behind the practice is employers’ desire to avoid 
their legal obligations in an environment where the neoliberal agenda prevails and 
where the labour legislation is believed to be too onerous on businesses.  
 
The research reports discussed in section 4.1.2 above indicate that some 
South African businesses have justified contracting work out to workers on the basis 
that it empowers workers by enabling them to become entrepreneurs and furthers 
the government’s policy to promote small businesses.61 The government has 
identified small business development as a key engine for economic growth and 
employment creation. To this end, it has enacted legislation specific to small 
businesses and also tried to ensure that broader legislation and policies are sensitive 
to small businesses’ needs and create a conducive environment for small business 
creation and development.62 Government has also established a number of agencies 
to provide training and financial support for small business.63  
 
In addition, enterprises that contract work out have argued that the practice 
promotes government’s policy to empower black people, by enabling workers 
                                                          
61 Skinner and Valodia (note 49) 11; Crush, Ulicki, Tseane and Jansen van Vuuren (note 39) 9-10; 
Godfrey and Theron (note 40) 27 Theron (note 54) 46-7; Mills (note 51) 1214. 
62 See the Small Business Development Act 102 of 1996, and see Department of Trade and Industry 
“Small and Medium Enterprise Programme” accessed from the DTI website 
http://www.dti.gov.za/offerings/offering.asp?offeringid=236 on 01/03/2010.  
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from previously disadvantaged groups to become entrepreneurs.64 The BEE policy 
aims to redress the consequences of Apartheid laws and policies, which excluded 
black people from participating meaningfully in the mainstream economy. These 
policies included a discriminatory education system, laws prohibiting black people 
from moving and trading in certain commercial areas designated for white people, 
and discriminatory policies governing access to finance for black entrepreneurs.  
 
South Africa’s BEE policy is mandated by the Constitution, which enshrines 
equality as one of its founding principles and one of the fundamental rights in the Bill 
of Rights. 65 More specifically, the equality provision states that “legislative and other 
measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken”.66 Until 2003, there was no 
coherent policy on BEE and the term was loosely used by government, labour and 
business but the concept had no concrete meaning or substance. The Broad Based 
Black Economic Empowerment Act (BBBEEA),67 which covers black economic 
empowerment in seven areas, namely ownership and management of enterprises, 
employment equity, skills development, preferential procurement, enterprise 
development and socio economic development.  
 
The aim of the BBBEEA is to encourage enterprises to promote black 
economic empowerment and to measure their progress in the seven elements 
outlined above. To this end, companies may have their BEE contributions assessed 
and certified by approved BEE accreditation agencies.  The primary lever to ensure 
                                                          
64 Mills (note 51)1213-4; Crush et al (note 39) 9-10; Godfrey and Theron (note 40) 27.The term 
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65 See the Preamble and section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
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compliance is section 10 of the Act. This provision requires state organs and public 
entities to consider firms’ BEE rating when making decisions about issuing of 
licenses, concessions, and when considering which firms to transact or partner with. 
A higher level of BEE compliance therefore  “enhances prospects of success in 
tenders for government patronage and in this way, the Act adopts a “carrot and stick 
approach” to ensuring compliance.68  
 
Firms that do not transact directly with the state are not beyond the reach of 
the BBBEEA. This is because companies that do transact with the state are under 
greater pressure to procure goods and services from BEE compliant firms. All firms 
are indirectly encouraged to comply as BEE compliance increases their chances of 
gaining contracts to supply firms that transact directly with the state.69 M’paradzi and 
Kalula therefore argue that “in the interests of survival and competitive advantage, all 
suppliers at different tiers of the value chain [are] pressured to become BEE-
compliant.”70  
 
 In the context of this broad framework, contracting work out to black self- 
employed workers could be couched as a BEE initiative in two ways. Firstly, a 
firm could argue that by encouraging ordinary workers to become entrepreneurs 
and providing them with support, they are contributing to the enterprise 
development element of the BEE policy. To this end, some firms have assisted their 
employees with the process of registering their businesses as close corporations,71 
                                                          
68 A M’paradzi and E Kalula Black Economic Empowerment in South Africa: A Critical Appraisal (Cape 
Town: Institute of Development and Labour Law, 2007) 14. 
69 Ibid at15. This is because firms that transact with the state are required to procure goods and 
services from BEE compliant firms.  
70 Ibid. 
71 A closed corporation is a corporate entity established in terms of South African corporate law 













facilitated business management courses and provided credit facilities to enable 
employee-turned entrepreneurs to purchase equipment required.72 
 
In the second case, contracting out to self-employed workers could be used to 
fulfil preferential procurement element of the BEE policy.  This element requires 
businesses to give preference to black owned enterprises when purchasing  goods 
and services. This has taken place in the construction industry, where contracting 
work to self employed workers or LOSCs has enabled main contractors to fulfil 
requirements that a certain percentage of work for a project is allocated to black-
owned enterprises.73  
 
It is suggested that employer assertions that they contract work out to self-
employed workers to advance small business development and BEE are 
questionable. It is suggested that the true agenda behind contracting work out by 
established enterprises is to contract out of employment obligations in respect of 
the workers concerned. The latter proposition becomes more credible when one 
examines contemporary South African discourse about the economy, the labour 
market and the role and impact of regulation, which has increasingly been 
influenced by neoliberal thinking.  
 
Post-apartheid South Africa boasts of a comprehensive labour law regime 
which guarantees and protects the rights of workers in relation to a number of 
issues. In the years following the enactment of the new regime, a number of 
commentators, international institutions, political parties and other groupings have 
argued that South African labour laws are inflexible. These critics argue that the 
                                                          
72 For example South African Breweries, as discussed in Webster et al “Making Visible the Invisible: 
Confronting South Africa's Decent Work Deficit” (Sociology of Work Unit, University of 
Witwatersrand) Research commissioned by the Department of Labour (2008) 32-3. 












provisions are too stringent for small and emerging enterprises to comply with and 
thereby hamper the growth of these enterprises.74  
 
They also argue that the strict labour laws and high labour costs have 
negatively affected South Africa’s competitiveness as an investment destination and 
led foreign investors to relocate to neighbouring countries with more investor-
friendly labour markets.75 This has happened in the clothing sector, where Chinese 
firms producing clothing for export to the United States have relocated their 
operations to Lesotho and Swaziland.76 These countries have less stringent labour 
laws and the overall cost of labour is cheaper than the cost in South Africa.77 
 
Critics of the labour regime have also argued that the labour laws discourage 
employers from employing workers and thus hinder job creation.78 One such critic 
has gone as far as to argue that labour laws deny unemployed South Africans the 
right to work: 
Between our catastrophic levels of unemployment and the prospect of an economy with full 
employment stands the impenetrable barrier of our labour laws. These wicked laws are not 
                                                          
74 A Kenny, “ ‘Wicked’ labour laws deny basic human right to work” Business Day 19 April 2011; 
Democratic  Alliance “Helping Small Business: Skills Development and Employment” Discussion 
Document (2006) accessed at 
http://www.da.org.za/docs/590/Small%20business%20%20skills%20and%20employment_docu
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75 See for example the Democratic Alliance, “Textile Sector Crisis: The DA’s 8 Step Solution” 
(undated), 
accessed from http://www.da.org.za/docs/591/textilesectorcrisis_document.pdf    on 12/03/2011, 
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76 S Godfrey, “What is the current state of the collective bargaining system”, presentation at the 
Labour and Enterprise Policy Research Group Workshop on Labour at the cross-roads: labour and 
the workplace, held in Cape Town on 4-5 July 2011.  
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only throwing millions of our people into the dustbin of joblessness, not only crippling our 
economy, not only the cause of hideous poverty and humiliation, not only a primary reason 
for SA being about the most unequal society on the planet, but they are a violation of human 
rights. Our labour laws deny South Africans a fundamental human right: the right to work.79 
(emphasis added) 
 
Two of the most widely criticised aspects of South African labour law relate to the 
setting of minimum wages and conditions of employment and the rules governing 
the dismissal of workers.  
 
South African labour law has two mechanisms for the central determination 
of minimum wages and working conditions. The provisions of the Labour Relations 
Act encourage and promote centralised collective bargaining at sector level and this 
has provided a framework for many sectors to set terms and conditions at this 
level.80 It also makes provision for the extension of terms and conditions of 
employment to non-parties to collective agreements provided the parties to the 
agreement represent the majority of employers and workers in the sector.81  In 
addition, the Minister of Labour is empowered to publish sectoral determinations 
setting minimum wages and conditions of employment for unorganised sectors 
where little collective bargaining takes place.82 There are 15 sectoral determinations 
covering, amongst others, hospitality, domestic workers, agriculture and civil 
engineering.  
 
A strong critic of these mechanisms is the official opposition party, which 
argues that centralised wage setting through sectoral collective bargaining and 
sectoral determinations protect a privileged minority of workers to the detriment of 
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job creation.83 The Democratic Alliance and other critics invoke South Africa’s poor 
performance in world rankings on the flexibility of wage determination in support 
of their claims.84 For instance, the WEF Global Competitiveness Index ranked South 
Africa 131st out of 139 countries in 2010.85  
 
Turning to dismissals, the LRA provides that a dismissal must be for a valid 
reason (misconduct, incapacity or operational requirements) and must be in terms 
of a fair procedure.86 The Act requires employers to consult with employees or their 
representatives before dismissing workers on the basis of operational 
requirements.87 In addition, the Code of Good Practice on Dismissal requires firms 
to first try to resolve misconduct and capacity issues and to ensure procedural 
fairness.88  
 
The remedy for an unfair dismissal may be reinstatement, re-employment or 
compensation for up to 12 months or up to 24 month’s pay, depending on the 
grounds of unfairness.89 These provisions have been criticised for imposing onerous 
restrictions and costs on employers seeking to dismiss workers.90  In 2010 the WEF 
ranked South Africa 135th out of 139 countries in terms of ease of dismissals.91  
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85 World Economic Forum, Global Competitive Report 2010-11 (Switzerland: World Economic 
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The claims about the inflexibility of South Africa’s labour laws have been 
challenged on various grounds, some of which are briefly discussed here. One 
relates to the limited coverage of the collective bargaining system, which is 
estimated to cover only a third of formal workers, with only five per cent of formal 
workers being covered by extensions.92 In addition, the regulatory system 
incorporates several mechanisms for flexibility, for example the exemption 
procedure from collective agreements and special provisions for small businesses in 
the collective bargaining system.93  
 
Another challenge is based on recent reports which sh w that South Africa’s 
labour law provisions – especially those governing unfair dismissal – are not out of 
kilter with those of other jurisdictions.94 One example is an OECD economic 
assessment of South Africa which compares its employment protection legislation 
(EPL) to that of other countries.95 The report shows that “[o]verall, EPL in South 
Africa appears to be relatively flexible, with respect both to the average of OECD 
countries and to those other non-OECD member economies (Brazil, Chile, China and 
India) for which the indicator has been calculated.”96   
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An exhaustive analysis of this debate is beyond the scope of this paper.  
However, the above shows that the claims that South Africa’s labour law regulations 
are excessively onerous on employers are questionable and may be exaggerated. 
What is more disconcerting about these perceptions about the labour regulatory 
system (and more relevant to this thesis) is the apparent link between these 
perceptions and the increase in employment practices that undermine labour rights.  
 
Although it is difficult to conclusively establish a causal link, there are 
indications that employer perceptions about the cost and burdens of compliance 
with post-1994 labour legislation may be driving the growth of less secure working 
arrangements. This includes the engagement of consultants who have enabled 
employers to “convert” their employees into independent contractors to escape the 
so called hassles of employment legislation.97 There are also suggestions that more 
employers have increasingly engaged workers through external contractors that 
assume the employer obligations relating to those workers.98 
 
Moreover, research into the growth of temporary employment services 
(TESs) in South Africa shows that while they were operating in South Africa before 
1995, the number of firms has grown exponentially since the enactment of new 
labour99 legislation in the country.100 This suggests that the demand for TESs has 
been driven by employers’ desire to use their services to avoid the obligations 
                                                          
97 P Benjamin, “Informal Work and Labour Rights in South Africa” paper presented to the 
International Industrial Relations Association 5th African Regional Congress , Cape Town, March 
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imposed by labour legislation.101 Some TESs have capitalised on perceptions about 
onerous labour legislation and used their ability to assume this burden as a selling 
point. The remarks on the website of one such firm starkly illustrate this. 
Box 1: Temporary employment services as a means of achieving flexibility102 
 
“In today’s environment, the current labour concerns include increasingly complex labour 
legislation; increased employer liabilities; fixed staff costs and low production; increased payroll 
costs and tax complexities; additional costs to cover absenteeism and holiday expenditure and 
increased time and costs in providing the training.” 
 
“We handle all employees’ pay calculations, wages, all statutory obligations and attend to pay 
queries, thereby relieving our clients of this time consuming hassle.” 
 
“Our clients do not have to carry the threat or cost associated with permanently employing staff; 
risks associated with unfair dismissal or any other labour disputes as a consequence of labour 
legislation.” 
 
“Companies no longer have to deal with CCMA disputes, awards, unfair dismissals, union meetings 
or demands.”   
 
While the above quotations relate to the use of TESs or labour brokers, it highlights 
employer perceptions about the rigidity of South African labour laws. More 
importantly, it signifies their desire and willingness to enter into arrangements that 
allow them to benefit from the labour of workers while avoiding the employment 
obligations relating to them.  
 
*** 
                                                          
101 Ibid. 
102 All the quotations were accessed from “About Umkhonto”, Umkhonto Labour Holdings website, 













In this part, it has been argued that contrary to employer assertions about small 
business promotion and black economic empowerment, the primary reason for the 
increase in contract in contracting work out to self-employed workers is the desire 
to avoid employer obligations imposed by labour law. This finding is significant 
because, as will be shown in section 4.3 below, there is a close relationship between 
the true motivation behind the practice and the consequences for the workers 
involved.  
 
4.3 CONTRACTING WORK OUT: THE POINT OF INTERSECTION 
 
This part considers how the practice of contracting work out to self-employed 
workers enables core enterprises to avoid the labour and social security obligations 
that would be associated with the employment of self-employed workers and their 
workers. It argues that this is primarily achieved through combination of the two 
processes, externalization by commodification of the employment relationship in 
the case of self employed workers and externalization through intermediation in the 
case of the workers of self employed workers. It argues that contracting work out to 
self-employed workers represents the point of intersection of these two processes.  
 
It is also argued that in most cases, the externalisation of self-employed 
workers and their workers also enables core enterprises to structure the duration of 
the contracting arrangements in their favour. They may do so through a series of 
short-term contracts without long-term guarantees of work. They may also do so by 
contracting work out to them on an ad hoc and uncertain basis. These strategies 
amount to casualisation and therefore introduce a third dimension intersecting with 













This part is divided into four sections, the first dealing with the 
externalisation of self-employed workers by commodification and the second 
considering the externalisation of their workers by intermediation. These sections 
consider the following questions in respect of the relevant workers: What are the 
consequences of externalisation for self-employed workers and their workers? Why 
have self-employed workers and their workers continued to engage in these 
arrangements? The third section considers how casualisation features within these 
arrangements and introduces another dimension to the problem. The fourth section 
shows that in addition to being conceptualised in terms of externalisation and 
casualisation, the practice under scrutiny can also be understood in terms of vertical 
disintegration and informalisation. 
 
While the discussion relies primarily on research conducted in South Africa, 
this part incorporates literature from other jurisdictions in order to shed more light 
on the phenomenon discussed. In this regard, the work of Fudge, Collins, Epstein 
and Monat, and Davies and Freedland is drawn upon. The work of Castells and 
Portes on subcontracting in South America dating back to 1989 is also highly 
instructive in this regard.  
 
The comparative literature is not intended to provide a mechanical 
comparison between the position in South Africa and these jurisdictions. Instead, 
the purpose of including the comparative literature is to draw from the 
conceptualisation of the practice and articulation of the challenges it poses. This is 
because the practice of contracting work out to self-employed workers has not (in 
the author’s view) been widely subjected to rigorous and sustained analysis in 













4.3.1 The self-employed worker: externalisation via commodification  
 
The purpose of contracting work out is to designate the self-employed worker as an 
independent contractor. The case studies showed that some employers go as far as to 
assist former employees to register corporate entities in order to give the practice 
some legitimacy. The practice purports to turn an ordinary worker into an 
independent contractor. This process has been described as externalization via the 
commodification of the employment relationship. It has the effect of excluding the 
self-employed worker from the protection of labour law which regulates matters such 
as collective bargaining, wage setting, hours of work, paid holidays, sick leave, unfair 
dismissals and unfair labour practices. 
 
In the context of contracting work out, there are two dimensions that may 
support a conclusion that a worker to whom work is contracted out is an 
independent contractor. The first is that some of these contracting arrangements do 
not require self-employed worker to work exclusively for one firm. This is 
important because in terms of South African law a more exclusive arrangement 
points towards the existence of an employment relationship.103 Thus, a contracting 
arrangement that does not prohibit the self-employed worker from serving other 
clients points towards a conclusion that the self-employed worker is an independent 
contractor.    
 
The second and more complex dimension arises where the contract between 
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the self employed worker and the firm expressly allows for or anticipates that a self 
employed worker will employ assistants to help him/her to complete the work.104 
This is because employment is generally regarded as a personal relationship. This 
implies that if a worker employs other workers to substitute or supplement her/his 
labour, she is regarded as an employer. It would therefore seem to be an anomaly to 
extend employee protection to a person who is an employer105 and who could 
potentially make a profit out of the labour of other workers.106  This reasoning is 
captured by Carlson: 
 
Perhaps the most likely sign that a worker is not an employee is that he is in fact an 
employer. An employer ordinarily hires an employee to perform his ork personally, and the 
employee lacks the freedom to hire his own substitute not selected by the employer. A person 
who is free to hire other and to delegate all or part of his duties, and who does not thereby 
breach his contract with the employer, looks much more like an independent business 
person. In this situation, the employer exercises much less control over the work (he cannot 
even determine who performs the work) and the contractor bears more of the risk in the 
form of labor costs. The contractor also has the opportunity to expand his business and 
profits by hiring others so that he can perform more than one job at a time. Such a person is 
more likely, though not necessarily, an independent contractor.107 
 
This was the conclusion reached by the Labour Appeal Court in Sanlam Life 
Insurance Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others.108 The 
Court had to consider the status of a financial advisor whose contract allowed her to 
register as a VAT vendor and to employ and remunerate other persons to assist her. 
The Court found that these factors were not found in typical employment contracts 
and found that she was entitled to act independently and held that she was an 
independent contractor. 
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A similar conclusion was reached in the UK in Mirror Newspaper Group Ltd v 
Gunning109 where an applicant for the position of newspaper wholesaler was 
excluded from the protection of the sex discrimination legislation because the work 
did not have to be done by her personally, as the latter was allowed to engage others 
to do the work. The Court held that the respondent was to be treated as an 
intermediary employer, who was outside the protection offered to workers in 
employment, even where the latter was understood in the widest sense. 
 
The problem with this reasoning is that the self-employed worker is regarded 
as an employer, thus obfuscating the fact that s/he may be in a situation of a worker 
or similar situation that requires that labour law be some extent applicable, either 
directly or by analogy.110 This results in the self-employed worker “being treated as a 
person not requiring protection as a worker when that may not be appropriate”.111 
Davies and Freedland argue that similar reasoning also arises where the worker 
enters into work arrangements through the medium of a small company or firm.112 
 
The above signals a possible disjuncture between the assumption that a self-
employed worker is an independent contractor and the reality that s/he may more 
closely resemble an employee. Truly independent contractors own the tools and 
other means of production, are able to provide the materials required to complete 
the work.113 By contrast, self-employed workers usually lack the entrepreneurial 
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skills and financial resources necessary to own the means of production and operate 
a more viable business.114 To the extent that they can be said to establish and 
operate a business, the role of self-employed workers is largely restricted to the 
supply of labour.  
 
Independent contractors are also considered to be in a position to determine 
how work is to be done and therefore can operate independently.115 They are often 
in a weaker bargaining position when negotiating the terms of a contract with an 
established firm.116 In the South African context, the asymmetry of power is 
exacerbated by the acute shortage of jobs and the stiff competition between self-
employed workers aiming to secure contracts. The power dynamics between the 
parties is reflected in the remarks of the owner of a home working operation:  
[e]veryone is so desperate for work, even when you don’t make money from the contract 
you still have to take it. Do you know how many ‘factories’ there are like this one? ... 
Someone will take the contract so you have to for the money they give.117  
 
In light of these asymmetries of power, one could argue that contracting work out to 
self-employed workers is better described as contracting between capital and 
labour as opposed to ordinary commercial contracting between capital and 
capital.118  
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There can be no doubt that the designation of self-employed workers as 
independent contractors is advantageous for core enterprises. It enables them to 
limit their obligations to the self-employed workers to the payment of the agreed 
service fees. These service fees may either be based on a rate per unit output or a 
flat rate for the job. There is no provision for minimum wages, paid leave, or 
contributions to social security funds under such arrangements. By commodifying 
what could be regarded as an employment relationship, employers simultaneously 
externalise self-employed workers and the responsibilities that would otherwise 
attach to an employment relationship. Consequently, employers deny self-employed 
workers rights to collective bargaining, minimum wages, leave and working hour 
protection, training opportunities and health and safety protection and 
compensation schemes provided for in legislation.    
 
One could speculate as to why self-employed workers enter arrangements 
despite the fact that they may disadvantage them in terms of labour and social 
protection. One possibility is that self-employed workers have welcomed such 
initiatives because of the appeal of the enhanced prestige and status of an 
entrepreneur and employer, as opposed to being a mere worker.119 The prospect of 
establishing and operating a viable profit-generating enterprise may be an 
attraction for some self-employed workers.120  
 
While these “pull factors” may apply to some workers, the more likely 
possibility is that self-employed workers enter these arrangements as a result of 
“push factors”. Many self-employed workers have entered these arrangements in 
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response to pressure from employers to convert their status, or because they have 
become unemployed after retrenchment and have no viable alternatives.121  
 
This section has outlined the implications of contracting work out to self-
employed workers for the latter and indicated that the practice effects the denial of 
their labour rights. As will be shown in the next section, the designation of the self-
employed worker as an independent contractor has profound implications for the 
position of workers that the self-employed workers engages to assist him/her.  
These implications arise at the point where externalisation via commodification 
intersects with externalisation via intermediation.  
 
4.3.2 The workers of self-employed workers: externalisation by 
intermediation 
 
Contracting work out to self-employed workers creates significant challenges for the 
workers that are employed by the self-employed workers. The challenges arise from 
the fact that these workers effectively work for the core enterprise but are not 
considered its employees as they do not have a direct contractual relationship with 
it.122 This is illustrated in a trade unionist’s remarks about an “empowerment 
initiative” in a mining company: “Each miner would be given an area to mine, he 
would recruit his own workers and be paid a large lump sum for the work done. The 
workers would not be mine employees but employees of the miner.”123  
 
The mine management’s reasoning regarding responsibility for the workers 
reflects the general legal approach which attributes employer liability to the person 
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or entity that is party to the employment contract.124 In other words, “the law does 
not usually hold one employing entity (the core employer) responsible for the 
actions and the contractual relations of another (the subcontractor)”.125  Collins has 
referred to this conundrum as the capital boundary problem.126 The application of 
this contractual approach enables businesses to strategically organize their 
activities in order to benefit from the labour of workers while shifting the employer 
obligations onto the party that contracts with the workers.127 
 
In the context of the practice under scrutiny, the contractual approach 
enables a core enterprise to place a “legal distance” 128  between itself and the 
employment risks and obligations associated with directly employing them. 
Notionally, the workers of the self-employed worker have an employer with whom 
they can bargain on terms and conditions of employment and against whom they 
can exercise their legal rights. However, the relationship between the self-employed 
worker and her/his workers is structurally subservient to the contractual 
relationship between the self-employed worker and the core enterprise.129 This 
means that the self-employed worker’s ability to pay the workers is constrained by 
the terms of her/his commercial contract with the core enterprise.130  
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The terms of this commercial contract are unlikely to be less favourable for 
the self-employed worker given her/his weaker bargaining position as discussed in 
section 4.3.1 above. The self-employed worker’s weaker bargaining position is 
exacerbated by the pressure on the self-employed worker to lower her/his contract 
fees to outbid potential competitors and ensure repeat business with the core 
enterprise.131  A trade unionist highlights the impact of this asymmetrical 
relationship on he workers of the self-employed worker as follows:  “You have the 
emerging employer and the big giant that squeezes him. Out of the little from the big 
employer, the small employer still needs to share that with the workers.”132 It is 
therefore impossible to speak of meaningful collective bargaining between the self-
employed worker and the workers s/he employs.133  
 
Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that the self-employed worker is in a 
position to provide favourable working conditions for her/his workers. The wages 
of these workers are likely to be lower and less secure than those of workers 
employed directly by more established enterprises.134 Research on the clothing 
sector has highlighted the problem of low and insecure pay and linked it to working 
hours and the deadlines set by the core enterprise.135 Van der Westhuizen describes 
the challenges experienced by those owning and working in home working 
operations: 
 
lead times and the size of production runs have a direct impact on the length of the working 
day.  They also affect the amount of money paid for the orders, as well as whether payment 
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is actually made. These are the primary mechanisms of control through which the levels of 
payments are driven downwards while productivity is driven upwards. [Make and Trim] 
workers desperate for income agree to orders with deadlines beyond their capacity. At the 
same time, they are reluctant to increase the number of workers, as that decreases the 
already meagre earnings per person.136  
 
Most self-employed workers do not have the financial capacity to honour statutory 
obligations relating to paid leave, sick leave and overtime pay.137 Contributions to 
statutory funds including unemployment insurance or other social security benefits 
are also likely to be beyond their reach.138 A self-employed worker may further be 
hard-pressed to provide health and safety protection and pay contributions towards 
statutory compensation schemes. This poses severe risks to the workers of self-
employed workers in an environment where core enterprises reportedly contract 
out the most dangerous aspects of work, for example in the mining industry.139   
 
Another challenge is that these workers of the self-employed worker are 
unlikely to have access to meaningful training programmes to enable them to 
develop and enhance their skills.140 This is because despite benefiting from their 
labour, the core enterprise does not consider the workers of self-employed as their 
employees and would be unwilling to invest in them. Secondly, a self-employed 
worker is unlikely to be registered as an employer with the Skills Development 
Fund in terms of the Skills Development Act or to afford to pay for other meaningful 
training programmes. Godfrey et al suggest that where the self-employed worker is 
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able to provide training, it is likely to comprise on-the-job training primarily aimed 
at increasing output in the short-term.141 
 
Moreover, the self-employed worker is unable to provide security of 
employment because her/his ability to do so depends on the continuation of a 
contract between him and the core enterprise, over which s/he has little control.142 
While self-employed workers have long-standing relationships with their workers, 
the employment relationships more closely resemble a series of temporary or 
project-to-project contracts rather than permanent employment.143  Where 
employment is terminated due to the unavailability of work, there is no provision 
for severance pay or unemployment benefits as the self-employed worker cannot 
afford these.144 Effectively, the employment of these workers is casualised and 
precarious.  
 
The above highlights the potential for significant disparities between the 
working conditions of self-employed workers’ workers and those of workers that 
the core enterprise directly employs to do the same work.145 The workers who are 
directly employed are more likely to enjoy better-paying, more secure employment 
with social security benefits.146 Thus, contracting arrangements lead to the 
segmentation of the workforce, with workers under these arrangements forming an 
underclass of vulnerable and under-protected workers.147 The disparity in working 
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conditions can be a cause of mutual resentment between the externalized workers 
and the directly employed workers.148  
 
Moreover, fragmentation between contract workers and regular employees 
and the vulnerability of the former undermines the power of organized labour and 
collective action.149 The case studies highlight the difficulty of organizing amongst 
these workers,150 many of whom are vulnerable due to the precariousness of their 
jobs and their low wages.151 Workers under these arrangements are reluctant to join 
trade unions as they are afraid of being victimized or dismissed by their employers, 
who tend to be hostile towards trade unions.152  The proliferation of contracting 
practices also presents a conflict between the aims of extending support to all 
vulnerable workers and protecting the privileged position of those in standard 
employment. Unions are faced with the dilemma that organising workers of self-
employed workers may amount to “legitimis[ing]  employment practices that 
undermine the right to reasonable labour practices”.153  
 
One could argue that workers in South Africa accept work under these 
inferior conditions and are reluctant to enforce their rights because of the high 
levels of poverty and unemployment prevail in the country. One homeworker states 
that “[t]he money is terrible. If I could get another job I would. But tell me where 
there’s a job. I don’t see any.”154 This reality is underscored by the owner of a 
homework operation: 
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None of us had this work before, including all the girls working here. This money is better 
than nothing. Why must I pay those extras? You don’t need to ask them to work overtime. 
You must just say ‘you must work OT [overtime] today’.155 
 
The above demonstrates that given the South African labour market conditions, 
many workers believe that a poorly paying and precarious job is better than no job 
at all. 
 
4.3.3 Casualisation of work: an added dimension 
 
Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 above explain how core enterprises externalise self-
employed workers and their workers by entering into commercial contracts with 
self-employed workers. Essentially, they demonstrate that the practice of 
contracting work out to self-employed workers is primarily constituted by the 
intersection between externalisation via commodification and externalisation via 
intermediation. This brief section argues that the externalisation of these workers 
allows for employers to introduce a third process –   casualisation – that in turn 
intersects with the two processes of externalisation. 
 
By externalising self-employed workers and their workers, core enterprises 
are able to bypass the law regulating maximum working hours, rest periods, 
overtime, weekend and leave. They are also able to avoid claims brought on the 
grounds that they created a legitimate expectation of the renewal of contracts or 
continued employment. Having dispensed with the obligations to dismiss workers 
for a fair reason and according to a fair procedure, core enterprises can summarily 
terminate the commercial contract with the self-employed worker.  
 
                                                          












Consequently, core enterprises are able to engage and dispense with workers 
as they see fit without regard for the consequences for workers. As was highlighted 
in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 above, both self-employed workers and their workers 
experience uncertainty and insecurity about their work. Godfrey et al describe the 
challenges faced by workers in home working operations as follows: 
... these operations often had an irregular supply of work, which meant that workers had 
erratic work schedules (working short-time during quiet months or occasionally not 
working at all for some weeks). They were however, expected to always be available for 
work if contracts came in. This made it difficult for workers to take on other work, let alone 
plan family activities very far in advance.156 
 
The above quotation indicates that there are two dimensions to the insecurity and 
uncertainty. The first relates to work schedules and hours of work, while the second 
relates to the continuity of work after each project or “job”. Both are determined by 
the core enterprise, with the self-employed worker and her/his workers having 
little or no say.  
 
What emerges from the discussion is that the externalisation achieved by the 
contracting out of work enables core enterprises to casualise work and make it 
more precarious for the workers involved. The practice provides core enterprises 
with flexible responses to the seasonal or cyclical nature of demand.157 The two 
processes of externalisation therefore intersect with casualisation so as to shift the 
costs and risks of precarious work onto self employed workers and their workers.158 
Given the exclusion of social security benefits from these arrangements, these 
workers are left to bear the social costs that come with having less work or no work 
at all.159 
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4.3.4  A different perspective: vertical disintegration and informalisation 
 
Thus far, the practice of contracting work out to self-employed workers has been 
conceptualised in terms of externalisation via commodification, externalisation via 
intermediation and casualisation. These processes are driving the shift from 
standard to non-standard forms of work.  In this section it is argued that the practice 
can also be understood in terms of two other processes, namely vertical 
disintegration (also known as decentralisation) and informalisation.  
 
[t]here are actually two processes at work: the decentralization of large corporations into 
semiautonomous units and the informalization of as many of these units as possible, so that 
to the benefits of flexibility are added the advantages of unregulated activities in a regulated 
environment.160 
 
These processes relate to the structure of firms and the structure of firm relations 
within an economy and are closely related. Contracting work out to self-employed 
workers involves the disintegration of core enterprises into semi-autonomous units 
composed of self-employed workers and their workers. In addition, it involves the 
informalization of the work of self-employed workers and their workers. The two 
processes are described in turn below. 
 
The first process of vertical disintegration does not break the organisation 
into “discrete atoms”, but into a looser and more multi-polar structure161 made up of 
“semi-autonomous units”.162 The “semiautonomous units” are so called because they 
are not fully integrated into the core enterprise and purport to employ their own 
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labour, but are subject to its power and control.163 The core enterprise may exercise 
control indirectly through quality standards and performance rules164 or by virtue 
of intellectual property rights over the goods produced or sold or the services 
provided.165 Casale has described the relationships between core enterprises and 
these units as “hierarchical market relationships”.166 He argues that a big firm can 
use these types of relationships to “afford itself a level of hierarchy similar to the 
one exerted towards an internalized production stage, without the need to arrange 
an internal organization and the attendant costs”.167  
 
The objective and result of the second process – informalization –  is that 
work done by the self-employed worker and her/his workers falls under the realm 
of the informal economy. The informal economy can understood to comprise 
enterprises that are not regulated and employment that is not regulated.168 The 
concept of the informal economy has been much contested since its “discovery” in 
Africa in the 1970s. It was initially conceived of as comprising small, unregistered 
and marginal enterprises in developing countries.169 The concept has subsequently 
been developed and expanded as a multi-dimensional phenomenon that 
encompasses a range of economic activities, covers heterogeneous employment 
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relationships and cuts across formal and informal enterprises in both developed and 
developing economies.170    
 
A number of theories explain the existence of the different dimensions of the 
informal economy. For the purposes of this discussion, it is sufficient to distinguish 
between “informalisation from below” which is not the present focus, and 
“informalisation from above” which is closely related to contracting practices. 171 
“Informalisation from below” relates to informal activity initiated and organised at 
the household level as a means of survival and includes activities such as street 
trading.172  
 
On the other hand, “informalisation from above” relates to informal activity 
that is structurally driven by and linked to formal enterprises seeking to minimise 
employment-related costs.173 Labour practices such as contracting work out by core 
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firms have their centre of gravity in the formal economy, with the core enterprises 
taking the leading role in generating informality and poor working conditions.174 
Theron argues that such practices have enabled core enterprises to “informalise the 
formal workplace”.175 
 
The concept of informalisation from above is based on the structural account 
of the informal economy. The structuralist school relates to the segment of the 
informal economy that comprises subordinated economic units or micro firms and 
workers that serve to reduce input and labour costs, and thereby increase the 
competitiveness of large capitalist firms.176 Its proponents argue that the activities 
in the informal economy are inextricably linked and subordinated to the formal 
economy.177 They argue that these asymmetrical relationships between these 
informal activities and formal firms are an enduring feature of capitalist 
development.178  
 
This section argued that while contracting work out to self-employed workers 
can be understood in terms of externalisation and casualisation, it can also be 
understood in terms of vertical disintegration and informalisation. Through this 
practice, firms have changed from vertical integration to hierarchical relationships 
with operations owned by self-employed workers. These relationships are 
designated as commercial or market relationships but in reality allow core 
enterprises to exercise the control that they would exercise in terms of employment 
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relationships. The asymmetrical relationships enable the core enterprises to 
simultaneously evade employer obligations and drive down labour costs associated 




This chapter discussed the practice of contracting work out to self-employed 
workers on the basis that they are independent contractors. These self-employed 
workers in turn employ other workers to assist them. It began by tracing the origins 
of contracting out to self-employed workers which is reported to have begun across 
a number of sectors in Britain in the 18th century. One could argue that the earlier 
appearance of this practice on South African mines was the result of colonisation by 
the British in the 19th century. However, it is unclear why it does not seem to have 
pervaded other sectors during this early period. 
  
 The discussion of the case studies revealed that the practice emerged in 
various sectors the 1990s and has been increasingly used by employers. It was 
noted that employers have couched these practices as initiatives aimed at 
empowering workers promoting small enterprise development in a society where 
black economic empowerment has become imperative. However, in light of 
contemporary South African debates about labour markets and labour regulation, it 
was suggested that the practice appears to be fuelled by an aversion to the labour 
regime and a desire to evade the obligations it imposes on employers.  
 
This hypothesis was borne out in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, which illustrated 
that the practice is underpinned by the processes of externalisation via 












practice of contracting work out to self-employed works represents the point where 
these two processes intersect to purportedly create an entity comprising the self-
employed worker and her/his workers.  The discussion showed that to the extent 
that this practice has led to the creation of separate enterprises, they have not 
furthered government’s developmental agenda, but have been used as a vehicle to 
enable core enterprises to dispense with the employer liabilities that would 
otherwise be associated with directly employing the workers falling under them.  
 
It was argued that the externalisation of self-employed workers and their 
workers enable core enterprises to casualise their work, thus making their work 
insecure and unpredictable. The ultimate consequence of the combined effect of 
these processes is that self-employed workers and their workers work under 
precarious conditions and are denied the protection of labour law. The practice was 
also characterised as involving the inter-related processes of vertical disintegration 
and informalisation. 
 
This chapter has focused on examining the empirical evidence of the practice 
of contracting work out to self-employed workers in South Africa and its 
implications for the workers involved. It has demonstrated the challenges that the 
intersection of the different processes constituting the practice present problems 
for the effective application to the workers involved. The issues raised in this 
chapter provide a compelling case for a closer analysis of the extent to which South 
African law recognises these issues and regulates them. This analysis is undertaken 















CHAPTER 5: DOES SOUTH AFRICAN LAW RECOGNISE AND 
REGULATE THE PRACTICE? 
 
Chapter four of this work described the practice of contracting work out to self-
employed workers in the South African context. It revealed that while the practice is 
primarily constituted by the intersection of externalization via commodification and 
externalization via intermediation, it gives rise to and intersects with casualisation. 
The discussion also conceptualized the practice in terms of vertical disintegration of 
firms and the informalisation of the work of self employed workers and their 
workers.  
 
The key finding of chapter four was that self-employed workers and their 
workers labour under insecure and precarious conditions that fall short of the 
labour standards. The non-protection of these workers points to the possibility that 
South African labour law does not adequately recognise the practice under scrutiny. 
It could also indicate that if South African labour law recognises the practice, it has 
failed to effectively regulate it. This chapter therefore analyses South African labour 
law to determine the extent to which it recognises and regulates the situation of 
people like Taryn and Jabu and their workers.  
 
The point of departure in this discussion is that the practice under scrutiny is 
one of several arrangements that present several challenges to conventional labour 
law. It will be argued that the practice undermines three key assumptions 
underlying the convention legal framework based on the standard employment 
relationship. In addition, the practice highlights the need for labour law to develop 
legal approaches that recognise and address the multi-dimensional nature of most 












that the practice presents for conventional labour law are discussed in part 5.1 of 
this chapter.  
 
The main part of this chapter focuses on South African labour law in 
particular. Although South African law has developed strategies to regulate a 
number of non-standard employment practices, it has not developed specific rules 
to regulate the practice under scrutiny.  The discussion therefore canvasses the 
body of legal rules that have been developed to regulate non-standard employment 
practices to assess their relevance and applicability to the practice under scrutiny. 
Part 5.2 considers the legal rules that regulate externalisation via commodification 
and may be applicable to the self-employed workers like Jabu and Taryn. Part 5.3 
considers the legal rules that regulate externalisation via intermediation and may be 
applicable to the workers of Jabu and Taryn. 
 
The final part of this chapter looks outside state-centred law to determine 
whether there are non-state rules or practices that regulate the practice under 
scrutiny. The discussion draws on some examples of strategies initiated by trade 
unions, employers and bargaining councils to ensure fair working conditions for 
self-employed workers and/or their workers. The lessons learned from these 
strategies and their implications for state regulation of the practice are considered.  
 
5.1 WHAT CHALLENGES DOES THE PRACTICE POSE FOR 
LABOUR LAW? 
 
This part outlines the shortcomings of conventional labour law which continues to 
presuppose the standard employment relationship as the paradigm of employment. 












framework in light of the realities presented by the practice under scrutiny. Much 
reliance is placed on the work of Fudge, Freedland and Davies and Freedland that 
challenges the conventional framework. On the other hand, labour practices such as 
the one under scrutiny challenge labour law to move beyond one-dimensional 
solutions to increasingly multi-dimensional employment practices.  
 
5.1.1 Challenging three assumptions underlying conventional labour law 
 
The proliferation of increasingly multilateral and complex employment practices 
has undermined conventional labour law’s conceptualization of the parties in the 
employment relationship and the organisation of work.1 Three key assumptions will 
be discussed here. The first is the assumption that the employer is a unitary and 
bounded entity.2 The second is the assumption that the employment relationship is 
a bilateral and personal relationship.3 The third is the assumption that the binary 
divide between employment and self-employment is the keystone for determining 
inclusion in and exclusion from labour law’s protection.4  
 
                                                          
1 M Freedland The Personal Employment Contract (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 36, 
40; J Fudge “The Legal Boundaries of the Employer, Precarious Workers and Labour Protection” in 
G Davidov and B Langille (eds) Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law: Goal and Means in the 
Regulation of Work (Oregon: Hart 2006)295-315 295. 
2 P Davies and M Freedland “The complexities of the employing enterprise” in G Davidov and B 
Langille (eds) Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law: Goal and Means in the Regulation of Work 
(Oregon: Hart 2006) 273-293 274-6; J Fudge “Fragmenting work and fragmenting organisations: 
the contract of employment and the scope of labour regulation” 44 Osgoode Hall Law Journal (2006) 
609 618 622.  
3 P Davies and M Freedland “Labour markets, welfare and the personal scope of employment law” 
21 
Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal (1999-2000) 231 244; Freedland (note 1) 36-40; Fudge 
(note 1) 295 -315 298-300. 












The conceptualization of the employer as a single and unitary entity can be 
traced back to the “period during which employment relations could convincingly 
be analysed as being between an individual [human] master and an individual 
servant”. 5 With the rise of corporate legal personality, labour law equated the 
limited liability company for the purposes of corporate governance to the human 
employer for the purposes of labour protection.6 This approach was reinforced 
during a period when productive relations were controlled and directed within a 
single capital entity, the vertically integrated firm.7   
 
However, with the development of new organisational forms combined with 
pre-Fordist arrangements such as contracting, subcontracting and the use of 
employment agencies, the firm’s corporate structure has ceased to mirror its 
identity as an employer.8  With the rise of vertical disintegration, and flexible and 
corporate networks, the boundaries of the firm have become blurred, making it 
difficult to distinguish between the firm and the market.9 It is therefore more 
appropriate to conceptualise the employer not as a single and bounded entity, but as 
a multi-polar or multi-nuclear organisation.10  
 
In the context of the practice under scrutiny, it is difficult to draw the line 
between BBB on the one hand and Jabu’s firm on the other. One could question 
whether Jabu’s firm is independent or is a nucleus within the “large, loose multi-
nuclear” structure that now characterizes firms like BBB. In order to answer these 
questions in light of these contemporary realities, labour law needs to move beyond 
                                                          
5 Freedland (note 1)36. 
6 Davies and Freedland (note 2) 273-293 274-6; Freedland (note 1)36; Fudge (note 1) 298-301; 
Fudge (note 4) 609 622. 
7 Fudge (note 1) 295, 300-1. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 












the traditional unitary conception towards a more expansive approach to 
conceptualizing the employer.  
 
Closely related to the unitary concept of the employer is the assumption that 
employment is a bilateral and personal relationship. This assumption also has its 
roots in the master-servant relationship and was sustained by the vertically 
integrated firm and the standard employment relationship.11 Conventional labour 
law, with its assumption of a bilateral relationship and its preoccupation with 
corporate personality and privity of contract, allocates employer risks and 
responsibilities to the party with whom the workers have a contract.12 
 
However, this model is overly simplistic and has failed to accommodate and 
account for the organizational realities of multilateral employment relationships 
involving employment agencies, contractors and subcontractors.13 Under these 
arrangements, the functions of an employer are distributed between different 
employing entities.14 For example, Taryn may employ and remunerate the workers 
in her home working operation, while the core enterprise uses the worker’s services 
and (often indirectly) manages the process of work.  
 
The increasingly multilateral nature of employment relationships and the 
distribution of employer functions amongst a number of employing entities raise 
questions about how best to allocate the risks and responsibilities associated with 
                                                          
11 Fudge (note 1) 300-1. 
12 Fudge (note 2) 609 636; Fudge (note 1) 310. 
13 Freedland (note 1)40-1.  
14 Freedland (note 1) 40. He identifies four “main functions which are comprised in the notion of 
acting as an employer… (1) engaging workers for employment and terminating their employment; 
(2) remunerating workers and providing them with other benefits of employment; (3) managing 
the employment relation and the process of work; (iv) using the worker’s services in a process of 












employment.15 The conventional approach of attributing employer liability enables 
firms to strategically structure their organizational relations to shift the risks and 
responsibilities of employment onto less stable firms, with the most vulnerable 
workers ultimately bearing the risks.16 This was demonstrated in the analysis of the 
case studies in chapter four. Labour law is therefore challenged to transcend this 
narrow and formalistic approach to the attribution of liability and develop a 
conceptual framework that allows for “a holistic view of multilateral relationships” 
to ensure the fairer allocation of rights and responsibilities.17  
 
The third assumption that the practice under scrutiny undermines is that the 
binary divide between employee and independent contractor is the keystone for 
determining the scope of labour law. As was indicated in chapter two, the adoption 
of this binary divide was the outcome of policy choices in the context of particular 
socio-economic circumstances. Brooks has argued that the binary divide has 
become entrenched due to “legislative habit” rather than “careful consideration”.18 
The realities of the world of work have made it necessary to reconsider the choice of 
the employment relationship as the gateway to labour law.  Amongst these realities 
is the tendency for employers to use the current boundaries strategically and enter 
into work arrangements that exclude their employer obligations.19 This was 
highlighted in chapter four where core enterprises label workers as independent 
contractors in order to exclude the application of labour law.  
                                                          
15 P Davies and M Freedland “Labour markets, welfare and the personal scope of employment law” 
21 Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal (1999-2000) 231 244. 
16 Fudge (note 1) 301-2. 
17 Davies and Freedland (note 15) 231 244. 
18 R R Carlson “Why the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought to Stop 
Trying” 22 Berkley Journal of Employment and Labour Law (2001) 295 at 368. 
19 A Hyde “What is Labour Law?” in G Davidov and B Langille(eds) Boundaries and Frontiers of 
Labour 
Law: Goal and Means in the Regulation of Work (Oregon: Hart 2006) 37- 61 48; Fudge, J “New Wine 
Into old bottles?: Updating legal forms to reflect changing employment forms” 33 University of 













Another reality is that self-employment does not necessarily translate into 
economic independence and autonomy. Fudge highlights the diversity of the 
circumstances of the self-employed and argues that self-employment should be 
regarded in terms of a continuum rather than a homogenous category.20 At the high 
end are the self-employed who have “the autonomy … to realize their potential and 
align rewards with efforts”.21 At the low end are workers who, like Taryn and Jabu, 
“more closely resemble employees than they do entrepreneurs” but are excluded 
from labour protection because they are classified as independent contractors.22 
 
There are no hard and fast solutions to the challenges presented by the choice 
of the employment relationship as the gateway to labour protection. One strategy 
has been to develop an intermediate category of workers or dependent contractors 
who are entitled to limited labour protection. This strategy has been implemented 
in jurisdictions such as the UK and in Ontario in Canada and was discussed 
extensively in chapter two. While this strategy allows for greater inclusion, it creates 
additional difficulties in drawing the lines between the different categories of 
workers.23   
 
A second strategy is to develop a broader occupational category that looks 
beyond traditional employment as the gateway to labour protection. Supiot’s 
account has been the most influential in this regard. He points out the need to seek 
new institutional ways of protecting workers and to develop a new employment 
status “based on a comprehensive approach to work, capable of reconciling the need 
                                                          
20 Fudge (note 2) 609 621. 
21 Ibid. 
22 J Fudge E Tucker and L Vosko “Employee or Independent Charting the Legal Significance of the 
Distinction in Canada” 10 Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal 193 229. 












for freedom and the need for security”.24 On this view, labour law should broaden its 
scope to include not only paid work, but non-marketable forms of work such as 
voluntary training and unpaid domestic work. In this way, the notion of work or 
labour force membership, as opposed to paid employment, can be used as a basis for 
occupational status.  
 
Supiot argues that the concept of labour force membership would provide an 
occupational status covering people throughout their transitions between the 
various forms of work they might perform throughout their lives.25 He proposes a 
system in which social rights (that is, labour and social security rights) fall within 
four concentric circles.26 The first would be universal social rights applicable 
irrespective of any kind of work, for instance, health care insurance. The second 
would cover those doing unpaid work such as voluntary training and unpaid care 
work, who would be provided with retirement benefits and accident cover. The 
third circle would cover the common law of occupational activity concerning health 
and safety law. The final circle would cover paid employment in situations of 
subordination and would provide specific rights for this category.  
 
A third strategy that could be envisaged is to focus on the purpose of each 
piece of labour legislation and identify the factors that would entitle workers to 
benefit from the legislation.27 This would require the legislature to determine the 
circumstances which workers should be covered by labour legislation, irrespective 
                                                          
24 European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Industrial Relations and Social 
Affairs Transformation of Labour and the Future of Labour Law in Europe (Luxembourg, EC 
Commission, 1999) [“The Supiot Report”] 21-2. 
25 A Supiot et al, Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2001) 55.  
26 The Supiot Report (note 24) 21-2. 
27 A Brooks “Myth and Muddle – An Examination of Contracts for the Performance of Work” 11 












of their employment status.28 Such an approach would allow for a more targeted 
approach to labour protection and to ensure the protection of the intended 
beneficiaries.29 However, it would lead to a multiplicity of definitional criteria for 
each piece of legislation. 
 
The above discussion is by no means an exhaustive account of the approaches 
to addressing the binary divide and the approaches discussed above are not without 
their difficulties. Nevertheless, it highlights the need for labour law to move beyond 
the notion that the binary divide is “an inevitable feature of a natural legal order”.30 
It also sheds light on the possibilities for the broader application of labour law once 
freed from the employee-independent contractor straitjacket. A broader approach 
would place less emphasis on legal status and focus more on the actual 
circumstances to ensure that workers who depend on their labour for a living were 
protected.31  
 
However, the above strategies do not necessarily adopt a blanket approach to 
labour protection. They recognise that in some cases it may be appropriate to limit 
the availability of certain rights to certain workers and that this would mean that 
different eligibility requirements would apply to different rights. In addition, a 
differentiated approach would have to be adopted to ensure that the mechanisms 
for the implementation of the rights of workers were tailored to suit the different 
arrangements and circumstances under which they worked.32 
 
                                                          
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Fudge (note 2) 609 647. 
31 Fudge et al (note 22) 193 229. 












To summarise the discussion in this section, the practice of contracting work 
out to self-employed workers is one amongst many practices that has brought 
labour law’s underlying assumptions into question. The discussion focuses on three 
assumptions, namely the unitary analysis of the employer, the characterization of 
employment as a bilateral and personal relationship, and the focus on the binary 
divide as the gateway to labour law. It was argued that in order to come to terms 
with the challenges presented by these various forms of work, labour law will have 
to develop new conceptual tools that are aligned with the new realities. The analysis 
of South African labour law in sections 5.2 and 5.3 will consider the extent to which 
the legal approaches discussed represent a shift beyond the traditional assumptions 
discussed above.  
 
5.1.2 Addressing multi-dimensional working arrangements 
 
The above section critiqued the assumptions underlying conventional labour law 
based on the traditional employment relationship and recommended how labour 
law can address the challenges posed by new employment relations. This section 
focuses on labour law’s responses to non-standard labour arrangements. It pays 
particular attention to the challenges presented by the multi-dimensional nature of 
these non-standard labour arrangements such as the practice under scrutiny.  
 
Most jurisdictions have developed legal rules in response to the increase in 
non-standard forms of work. To a large extent these developments have been 
brought about through legislation and have been introduced on an ad hoc basis. 
Thus, in response to externalization via commodification, legal systems have 
developed better tests to distinguish between employer and employee, introduced 












workers or dependent contractors. Legal rules have been developed to address the 
allocation of responsibility for employer obligations in situations involving the use 
of employment agencies or outsourcing. In some jurisdictions, legal rules have been 
developed to that casualised workers, and particularly those working on temporary 
contracts, are not prejudiced by virtue of the nature of the employment contracts.  
 
Underlying these legal solutions is an assumption that the processes giving 
rise to non-standard work arrangements can be easily compartmentalized and 
addressed in isolation. However, the practice of contracting work out to self-
employed workers demonstrates that some of these arrangements do not come in 
neat little boxes labelled “externalization via commodification”, “externalization via 
intermediation” and “casualisation”. The situation involving TJ Fashions, Taryn and 
her workers can more accurately be described as a complex package incorporating 
all three processes. The multi-dimensional nature of this practice undoubtedly 
presents challenges for legal regulation.  
 
As was indicated in the introduction, South African labour law does not 
present a comprehensive solution to the practice under scrutiny. The assessment of 
the body of South African labour law’s responses will highlight their predominantly 
one-dimensional nature as they focus on one dimension of the practice. The 
discussion in parts 5.2 and 5.3 will highlight the inadequacies of merely adopting 
these existing legal rules to address the practice under scrutiny. A possible multi-















The discussion in sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 has highlighted the challenges that the 
practice of contracting work out to self employed workers presents for labour law. 
Both are the challenges that modern labour law must confront and address if it is to 
effectively address the practice under scrutiny. South African law’s responses to 
non-standard employment relationships in parts 5.2 and 5.3 below will be assessed 
in light of the extent to which they confront and address these challenges. In order 
to make this assessment, four key questions will be considered: 
 
 Do the legal rules move beyond the conceptualisation of the employer as a 
unitary and bounded entity to embrace the notion of the employer as a multi-
polar entity? 
 Do the legal rules move beyond the conceptualisation of the employment 
relationship as a bilateral and personal relationship to recognise the growing 
multilaterality of employment relationships? 
 Do the legal rules transcend the binary divide to consider the protection of 
workers in a broad sense? 
 Do the legal rules recognise and address the multi-dimensional nature of the 
practice of contracting work out to self-employed workers? 
 
5.2 LEGAL REGULATION OF EXTERNALISATION BY 
COMMODIFICATION 
 
The outcome of externalization by commodification of the employment relationship 
makes it difficult to determine whether a person is an employee or an independent 
contractor. It highlights the complexities that have arisen in a context where the 
binary divide has been maintained between employees who are entitled to labour 












In the particular context of the practice under scrutiny, there is a question as to 
whether a worker who employs other workers should be entitled to protection.  
 
This part considers two broad approaches that South African law has 
developed to ensure that workers deserving of protection are brought within its 
scope. The first approach expands the concept of an employee and adopts strategies 
to ensure that more workers are recognised as employees. Essentially, this 
approach aims to shift the boundary between employees and independent 
contractors to enlarge the scope of the former.  This approach is discussed in section 
5.2.1 
 
The second approach emphasises the need to look beyond employment as the 
primary gateway to labour protection and suggests the need for a broader 
conception of work to cover a wider range of workers needing protection. In the 
South African context, there has been debate as to how the concept of a worker 
envisaged by section 23 of the Constitution, could play a role. This is discussed in 
section 5.2.2. Section 5.2.3 consolidates the discussion and analyses the significance 
of these two approaches in the context of contracting work out to self-employed 
workers. 
 
5.2.1 Expanding the concept of the employee 
 
As mentioned earlier, the first approach maintains the binary distinction between 
employees who are entitled to protection and independent contractors who are 
excluded from labour protection. It expands the protective scope of labour law by 
adopting strategies to ensure that more workers fall within the protected category 












approach. The first strategy is to develop the test and widen the criteria that may be 
considered to determine whether or not a person is an employee. The second 
approach is to allow for certain categories of workers to be deemed to be 
employees. These developments are discussed in turn below. 
 
Strategy 1: Developing the test and expanding the criteria for identifying an 
employee 
 
Three South African institutions have played a role in developing the test for 
distinguishing between employees and independent contractors and expanding the 
concept of an employee. The first is the judiciary which has developed a number of 
principles during the course of deciding matters brought before it. The second is the 
legislature, which has done so primarily through the presumption of employment. 
The third is the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), 
which drafted a Code of Good Practice on who is an employee in pursuance of a 
mandate from Parliament. While these developments have to some extent been 
discussed in chapter two, they are expanded upon and consolidated in this section 
in order to draw out the implications for the practice under scrutiny. 
 
The Appellate Division’s decision in Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd 
v MacDonald33 marked the beginning of an era when the employer’s right to control 
the work to be done and the manner in which it was to be done was essential to 
determining the existence of an employment relationship. This meant that in the 
absence of the right to control the work and manner in which work was to be done, 
there could be no finding that there was an employment relationship. This 
continued to be the position for 45 years. 
                                                          













The subsequent decisions of the Appellate Division in Ongevallekomissari v 
Onderlinge Versekerings Genootskap AVBOB34 and Smit v Workmen’s Compensation 
Commissioner35 adopted the broader “dominant impression” test. In the latter 
decision, the Court held that the principle laid down in Colonial Mutual Life 
Assurance had to be qualified.36 The Court held that while the right of control was an 
important factor indicating the existence of an employment relationship, it was not 
the sole factor, and had to be considered in light of the totality of circumstances 
gleaned from the contract as a whole.37 The additional factors that the Court 
referred to were the object of the contract, whether the worker was required to 
render the services personally, the impact of the death of the worker on the 
relationship, and the conditions under which the contract could be terminated.38 
 
The implication of adoption of the dominant impression test is that it is in 
principle possible to find that an employment relationship exists in the absence of 
the employer’s right of control. Arguably, the adoption of a wider test for identifying 
an employee has widened the scope the concept and thus increased the number of 
workers falling under this category. The dominant impression test has subsequently 
been applied by the courts to determine whether a person is an employee for the 
purposes of determining whether labour legislation applies.39  
 
The courts have also widened the concept of employment by moving beyond 
a purely contractual approach to a more substantive approach to determining the 
                                                          
34 1976 (4) SA 446 (A). 
35 1979 (A) SA 51 (A). 
36 Note 33 at 62 D. 
37 Note 35 at 62 D-G. 
38 Note 35 at 61 A-H. For a more expansive list of the factors, see chapter two, section 2.2.2. 
39 See for example Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd v Niselow (1996) 17 ILJ 673 (LAC), SABC v 












nature of the relationship between the parties.  In Smit, the Appellate Division held 
that the determination was to be made on the basis of a “true construction” of the 
terms of the contract between the parties.40 The Court disregarded oral evidence 
adduced by the appellant to show that the relationship was one of employment. The 
Court’s reasoning on this point appears to have been that because the evidence 
adduced in court was not corroborated by the provisions of the contract, it was 
irrelevant.41  This indicated the Court’s belief that the contract was the exclusive 
source of evidence necessary to determine the nature of the relationship. 
 
Over the years, the Courts have relaxed their stance and moved towards 
considering facts and circumstances outside of the contract. They have moved 
beyond relying on the form contract and considered the realities of the relationships 
they give rise to. This approach was discussed in Mandla v LAD Brokers,42 where the 
Labour Court held: 
 
…although the legal relationship must be gathered primarily from a construction of the 
contract between the parties, the label that is used to describe a relationship may be of no 
assistance if it is done to disguise the real relationship. One must also be wary to accept 
such labels at face value because the description of a person as an independent contractor 
takes him or her outside the ambit of the LRA and the protections provided thereby (in 
terms of the exclusionary provisions of s 198(3) of the LRA - quoted above). After all, the 
LRA concretizes important constitutional rights such as the fundamental right to fair labour 
practices. Moreover, the real relationship must be gathered from the contract as a whole 
and the realities of the relationship created thereby.43 
 
                                                          
40 Note 35 at 64 B.  
41 See for example note 35 at 67 A, where the Court found: “Jochelson who was general manager 
and actuary of the company at the time of the accident gave evidence on behalf of the appellant. He 
testified inter alia that the appellant had to get permission from the company to go on holiday. It 
was a matter of arrangement which had to be fitted in for the good management of the company. It 
was a form of general control by the company over all of its agents. I must point out that exhs ‘A’ 
and ‘B’ make no mention of holidays or the taking of leave by agents.”  
42 (2000) 21 ILJ 1807. 












Several subsequent court decisions have adopted a similar approach and placed 
substance over form in determining the nature of the relationship and have 
highlighted the need to ensure that workers are not unfairly deprived of their labour 
rights.44 On this approach, the Courts have reached conclusions that contradict the 
express terms of the contract of the parties. 
 
The above shows that the courts have broadened the concept of an employee 
by discarding the narrow control test and by placing emphasis on the substance of 
the relationship between the parties as opposed to the formal terms of the contract. 
During the course of developing the tests to distinguishing between employees and 
independent contractors, the courts have considered two questions that could 
possibly relate to the practice of contracting work out to self-employed workers. 
One relates to whether a worker can be found to be an employee if s/he contracts 
with an employer through the medium of a corporate entity that s/he owns. Another 
relates to whether a worker can be found to be an employee if s/he employs 
workers to assist her/him. 
 
The Labour Appeal Court had to decide on the first question in the case of 
Denel v Gerber.45 In this case, the company D had contracted with another company, 
B for the provision of services which would be provided by B’s owner, G. The Court 
had to decide whether G was an employee of D and could claim unfair dismissal 
protection in the LRA. The Court held that the fact that G owned the company which 
was obligated to provide the services to D did not preclude her from being found to 
be an employee of the company entitled to receive the services.46 It concluded that 
                                                          
44 Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber (2005) 26 ILJ 1256 (LAC), Hydraulic Engineering Repair Services v 
Ntshona & others (2008) 29 ILJ 163 (LC), National Education Health & Allied Workers Union v 
Ramodise & others (2010) 31 ILJ 695 (LC). 
45 Denel (note 44).  












the fact that the services were to be provided through a corporate entity did not 
preclude a finding that an employment relationship existed between G and D.47 It 
held that this principle gave effect to the realities of the relationship between the 
parties. 
 
There appears to be a dearth of case law directly addressing the second 
question and the only decision that seems to have revolved around it is Sanlam Life 
Insurance Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others,48 
where the Labour Appeal Court had to consider the status of a financial advisor 
whose contract allowed her to register as a VAT vendor and to employ and 
remunerate other persons to assist her. The financial advisor in question had not 
neither registered for VAT nor employed any workers to assist her. The Court found 
that these provisions were not found in typical employment contract and that she 
was an independent contractor. 
   
In addition to the courts, the South African legislature has also played a role 
in expanding the concept of the employee in line with the first strategy. In 2002, the 
Labour Relations Act and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act were amended to 
create a presumption of employment if certain factors were found to be present. The 
Explanatory Memorandum to the BCEA Amendment Bill highlighted that the 
purpose of these provisions was to address the proliferation of vulnerable workers 
and to ensure that they fell within the scope of labour and social protection.49 The 
Memorandum stressed that was necessary in light of the Constitutional guarantee of 
the right to fair labour practices for ‘every worker’ as opposed to ‘every employee’.  
 
                                                          
47 Ibid. 
48 (2009) 30 ILJ 2903 (LAC). 
49 Explanatory Memorandum to the BCEA Amendment Bill, accessed from 












The Memorandum stated that the presumption was introduced to address 
three shortcomings relating to the law governing who is an employee. 50 First, the 
law had failed to identify the characteristics of an employee or establish a test to 
determine who is an employee, leaving these to the Courts’ discretion. Second, the 
dominant impression test applied by the courts did not provide clear guidance for 
employers and employees. Another shortcoming identified in the Memorandum was 
the Court’s formalistic approach to distinguishing between employee and 
independent contractor as opposed to a more purposive approach focusing on 
whether the worker should be protected by labour legislation. 
 
The 2002 amendments to the Labour Relations Act and the Basic Conditions 
of Employment Act create a rebuttable presumption of employment, “regardless of 
the form of the contract”, if one or more of certain listed factors are proved. 51   Proof 
of any one or more of seven factors listed below can trigger the presumption that a 
worker is an employee. Once one or more of these factors are proven and the 
presumption is triggered, the onus rests on the employer to present evidence to 
rebut the presumption. The factors are as follows:52 
 
(a) the manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction of another 
person; 
(b) the person’s hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another person; 
(c) in the case of a person who works for an organisation, the person forms part of that 
organisation; 
(d) the person has worked for that other person for an average of at least 40 hours per 
month over the last three months; 
(e) the person is economically dependent on the other person for whom he or she works or 
renders services; 
(f) the person is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the other person; or  
(g) the person only works for or renders services to one person. 
 
                                                          
50 Ibid. 
51 Section 200A of the Labour Relations Act and section 83A of the Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act.  












While it aims to bring about a new regime for determining the existence of an 
employment relationship, the presumption does not wholly substitute court 
decisions on the matter and the latter continue to be relevant. The provisions 
creating the presumption expressly exclude workers who earn above a certain 
income threshold from its benefit.53 In such cases, the decision maker must rely on 
binding court decisions to determine whether the person is an employee.54 In 
addition, binding court decisions are relevant in cases where an applicant 
establishes a factor that triggers the presumption and the employer leads evidence 
to rebut the presumption.55 In such cases, the court decisions are relevant. 
 
In addition to creating the presumption of employment, section 200A of the 
LRA mandated the National Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) to issue a 
Code of Good Practice setting out guidelines determining whether persons are 
employees.56 In pursuance of this mandate, NEDLAC published the Code of Good 
Practice: Who is an Employee in 2006.57 While any decision-maker determining a 
worker’s employment status must consider the provisions of the Code is not a 
substitute for binding court decisions.58 It is therefore a “soft law” instrument.  
 
The Code’s primary purpose is to inter alia “promote clarity and certainty as 
to who is an employee” and to “ensure that a proper distinction is maintained 
                                                          
53 Section 200A (2) LRA. The threshold amount is periodically determined by Minister of Labour in 
terms of section 6(3) of the BCEA. Benjamin argues that the rationale for this is to exclude skilled 
and professional workers who presumably have the bargaining power and would not be in need of 
labour protection. P Benjamin “Who needs labour law? Defining the scope of legal protection” in J 
Conaghan, R Fischl and K Klare  (eds) Labour Law in an Era of Globalization: Transformative 
Practices and Possibilities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 75-92, 92. 
54 Item 22(a) of the Code of Good Practice: Who is an Employee Government Gazette No 29445, 
General Notice 1774 of 2006 issued 1 December 2006. 
55 Note 54 at item 22(b). 
56 Section 200A of the LRA.  
57 Note 54.  












between employment relationships which are regulated by labour legislation and 
independent contracting”.59 It primarily applies to the key labour statutes, namely 
the LRA, the BCEA, the EEA and the SDA. It also applies to other legislation that falls 
under the mandate of the Ministry of Labour, namely Unemployment Insurance Act 
(UIA), the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Disability Act (COIDA), and 
the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA).60 
 
Importantly, the Code presupposes that employees are in a weaker 
bargaining position and aims to ensure that they receive the protection of labour 
law and are not deprived thereof by contracting arrangements.61 The Code also aims 
to assist those charged with applying and interpreting labour law to understand and 
interpret the various employment relationships in the labour market including 
disguised and ambiguous employment relationships, atypical employment and 
triangular employment relationships.62   
 
Part 2 of the Code repeats the effect of the presumption of employment in the 
LRA and BCEA.63 Part 3 reiterates the centrality of the dominant impression test in 
determining whether a worker is an employee.64 It sets out the key factors 
distinguishing between employees and independent contractors as originally 
                                                          
59 Note 54 at items 2(a) and (c).  
60 Acts 63 of 2001, 130 of 1993 and 85 of 1993 respectively. The definitions of an employee in these 
statutes are different from that contained in the LRA, BCEA, EEA and SDA.  Nevertheless, this part 
provides that any person tasked with the interpretation and application of these definitions must 
consider the provisions in Parts 2 and 3 of the Code. 
61 Note 54 at item 2(d). 
62 Note 54 at item 2 (e).  
63 Note 54 at items 12 to 20.  












discussed in the Smit decision.65 It outlines other relevant factors, namely the form 
of remuneration, place of work and the provision of training.66  
 
The Code consolidates the principles of interpretation which should inform 
the determination of a worker’s employment status.67 These relate to constitutional 
interpretation, the importance of international law, the interpretation clauses of the 
various labour statutes, and the promotion of constitutional rights, especially the 
right to fair labour practices guaranteed in section 23.68 Importantly, it emphasises 
the importance of placing substance over form, and the need to look beyond the 
contractual provisions to determine the realities of the relationship between the 
parties.69 
 
Importantly, the Code recognises and attempts to address two key features 
that may arise in relation to the contracting out of work to self-employed workers. 
Firstly, it recognises that in some cases workers provide services through legal 
entities such as companies and closed corporations. The Code provides that such 
arrangements do not preclude a person from being held to be an employee if the 
realities of the relationship point towards such a finding.70 It however reaffirms the 
principle that a worker in this situation who uses the legal entity to gain tax 
advantages may be denied the relief provided by labour law on the basis of the 
“clean hands” principle.71 
 
                                                          
65 Note 54 at item 32.  
66 Note 54 at items 42 to 50.  
67 Note 54 at part 5. 
68 Note 54 at items 59 to 68.  
69 Note 54 at items  28 to 31.  
70 Note 54 at item 31. 












Secondly, the Code of Good Practice on Who is an Employee recognises that 
some workers other workers and therefore play a dual worker-employer role. It 
recognises that this is common in some sectors where subcontractors are required 
to recruit workers to assist them. The Code states that although a worker’s 
entitlement to hire workers is an indication of an independent contracting 
relationship, this does not preclude a finding that such a worker is an employee.72  
 
Item 37 of the Code suggests that in such situations, the relationship between 
the employer and the subcontractor and the relationship between the subcontractor 
and her/his workers must be examined to determine if an employment relationship 
exists. It provides that “[d]epending upon an examination of all the factors, 
including, for instance, the extent of control exercised by the [core enterprise], it is 
feasible that both the sub-contractor and the workers that he or she has engaged 
may be employees of the [core enterprise]”.73 To the extent that it allows for a 
finding that the worker of a self-employed worker is an employee of the core 
enterprise, this provision could potentially establish an employment relationship 
between parties who have not concluded a contract of employment. This is a 
departure from the conventional approach that only recognises such a relationship 
where the parties have contracted with each other.  
 
The question whether a contractor who employs workers can also be found 
to be an employee of the person that buys her/his goods and services has also been 
considered in the Indian context. Sankaran considers a case involving a salt worker 
in Gujarat, Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd v State of Saurashtra,74 where the 
court found that “the fact that the person in question was allotted a plot of land to 
                                                          
72 Note 54 at item 37.  
73 Note 54 at item 37.  












make salt by working himself together with workers employed by him would not 
take away from his workman (employee) status”.75 According to Sankaran, the 
decision seems to have been based on the fact that the contractor was bound to 
render personal services in terms of the agreement.76 She argues that it is possible 
for such a person to be found to be an employee if all the characteristics of an 
employment relationship are present.77  
 
As indicated above, the only decision which appears to have considered this 
was Sanlam Life Insurance Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration 
& others.78 The Court held that the contractual provision that allowed the worker to 
employ assistants was not typically found in employment contracts. The decision 
did not take account of the provisions of the Code of Good Practice on who is an 
employee.  
 
Strategy 2: Deeming specific workers as employees 
 
The second strategy falling under the first approach is to provide for the deeming of 
certain categories of workers to be employees. Legislation may confer the authority 
to deem on a legislative, executive or judicial office bearer or institution. In South 
Africa, section 83 of the BCEA empowers the Minister of Labour to publish a notice 
deeming any category of workers to be employees. Persons so deemed to be 
employees will be treated as employees for the purposes of the BCEA, any other 
legislation or a sectoral determination. The nature of the provision suggests that it 
                                                          
75 K Sankaran, “Protecting the worker in the informal economy: the role of labour law” in Davidov 
and Langille, 205-220 212. 
76 Sankaran (note 75) 205-220 212-3. 
77 Ibid. 












was to bring workers that would not otherwise be found to be employees within the 
protective scope of labour law. 
 
South Africa has not implemented its deeming provisions. It would therefore 
be useful to consider how it has been applied in other jurisdictions. The operation of 
deeming provisions in Australia was discussed in chapter two. It will be recalled 
from the discussion therein that there are two approaches to deeming workers as 
employees. The first is to allow for the designated authority to make a 
determination on an ad hoc basis with the guidance of a number of listed factors. 
The second is to provide for a predetermined list of occupational categories of 
workers who would be deemed as employees.  
 
 The question then becomes which of these approaches would be best to 
ensure the labour protection of self employed workers in a South African context. It 
is suggested that it would be more useful for the Minister of Labour to make 
determinations that certain categories of workers be deemed to be employees. 
These determinations could be made on the basis of sound empirical evidence of 
their need for protection. This would provide certainty and clarity and eliminate the 
need to litigate to determine if legislation was applicable. It would be worthwhile to 
constantly review the Ministerial determination and make necessary adjustments to 




This section has discussed the first approach to addressing the problems with the 
binary divide which arise when work is externalised by commodification. The first 












between employees and independent contractors to broaden the category of 
employees who are protected by labour legislation.  This has been done by 
developing the test to expand the criteria for identifying an employee by the courts 
and legislature.  
 
Another strategy has been to allow for the deeming of certain workers as 
employees, which is yet to be implemented in South Africa. The extent to which 
these approaches can be applied to the practice under scrutiny was discussed. The 
next section considers the second approach, which relates to abandoning the binary 
divide and developing a more expansive concept of a worker. 
 
5.2.2 Beyond the employment contract: the concept of the worker 
 
The second broad approach that could be used to externalisation by 
commodification seeks to transcend status as the criterion for eligibility for labour 
protection. Rather than seeking to redraw the lines between employees and 
independent contractors and other categories in between, it looks beyond the 
contract of employment as the focal point for the delivery of labour protection. This 
section considers how this approach could be operationalised in the South African 
context.   
 
Section 23 of the South African Constitution guarantees a number of labour 
rights, the most pertinent to this discussion being found in the first two subsections. 
Section 23(1) provides that “everyone has the right to fair labour practices”. Section 
23(2) provides that “every worker” has the right to form and join a trade union and 
to participate in trade union activities. The fact that the provisions make no 












intended to cast the net of beneficiaries more widely than this narrow category. It is 
therefore necessary to consider how the courts and commentators have interpreted 
these provisions.  
 
The meaning of a “worker” in section 23(2) was first considered by the 
Constitutional Court in South African National Defence Union v Ministry of Defence 
and Another (“the SANDU decision”).79 The Court had to determine the 
constitutionality of section 126B (1) of the Defence Act80 which prohibited members 
of the defence force from forming and joining trade unions. The SANDU argued that 
it violated the constitutional right of every worker to form and join a trade union.81  
 
In considering the meaning of a “worker”, the Court found that section 23 
used the word in the context of employers and employment and that in ordinary 
terms, this implied a contract of employment to provide services for an employer. 
Members of the defence force did not enter into contracts of employment, but rather 
‘enrolled’ in the permanent force. On the face of it, this would mean that they would 
not be entitled to the rights enshrined in section 23.  
 
However, the Court interpreted “worker” widely to include members of the 
defence force even though their relationship was unusual and not identical to an 
ordinary employment relationship. The court further found that a generous 
interpretation of the right was appropriate. Although members of the permanent 
force were not employees in the strict sense of the word, their enrolment conditions 
were in many respects similar to those of employees under a contract of 
                                                          
79 (1999) 20 ILJ 2265 (CC).  
80 Act 44 of 1957.  












employment.82 The Court found that members of the permanent force were workers 
for the purposes of section 23(2) and accordingly held that their right to form and 
join trade unions was infringed by section 126B(1).  
 
Examining the evolution of the role of the contract of employment and its role 
in light of the changes presented by the new world of work, Le Roux develops the 
approach adopted in the SANDU decision.83 She concludes that the focal point for the 
application of labour protection should be the section 23(1) right of every worker to 
fair labour practices.84 Le Roux argues that the omission of the word “employee”, 
signals the need for a wide interpretation of the concept of a worker that looks 
beyond the prerequisite of a valid contract of employment. Such an approach would 
prevent the marginalisation of workers in need of protection to ensure that they 
have the benefit of the right to fair labour practices.  
 
Considering the definition of a “worker”, Le Roux notes the difficulty of 
defining a contract of employment or an employment relationship. She recommends 
that a worker be defined by personal service and one other factor (mentioned in the 
presumption of employment provisions) which need not be economic dependency. 
                                                          
82 The Court however acknowledged the importance of discipline and obedience in the defence 
force. It held that the requirement of strict discipline would not necessarily be undermined by 
holding that members of the permanent force constituted workers for the purpose of section 23(2), 
because in appropriate circumstances rights could be  limited. Any such limitation of members’ 
rights would have to meet the requirements of the limitations clause in section 36 of the 
Constitution.  
83 Unless indicated otherwise, the discussion relating to Le Roux’s development of the concept of a 
worker draws from R Le Roux “The Regulation of Work: Whither the Contract of Employment? An 
Analysis of the Suitability of the Contract of Employment to Regulate the Different Forms of Labour 
Market Participation by Individual Workers” Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Cape 
Town, 2008 202-231.  
84 Her argument goes beyond the section 23(2) right to form and join trade unions, which was the 
focus of the SANDU decision. Her discussion centres on section 23(1), which more broadly 
guarantees everyone’s right to fair labour practices. Although section 23(1) refers to “everyone” as 
opposed to “every worker”, she bases the subsection as the basis for the development of the 












She concedes that this approach would result in a wide entitlement to the right to 
fair labour practice which may include some independent contractors. She argues 
that a narrow interpretation be given to the concept of an independent contractor to 
minimise the number of persons who may be excluded from the scope of the 
constitutional worker. She defines independence to mean the ability to discount the 
risks associated with working and the ability to operate independently outside the 
employer’s organisation. 
 
Le Roux  then contends that at the very least, section 23 underwrites the 
rights contained in the Labour Relations Act, Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
and the Employment Equity Act, all of which were enacted to give effect to the 
section 23 right. She qualifies this broad approach with the caveat that it does not 
require that all workers so recognised would be entitled to all the rights provided 
for in the legislation. The nature and purpose of specific legislation would justify the 
carving out of limitations applicable to that specific legislation. The exclusion of 
certain categories of workers would have to be justified in terms of section 36 of the 
Constitution, which lays down the circumstances under which limitations on 
constitutional rights are permissible. She refers to this as “a diverse approach, 
allowing different workers the benefit of different labour practices”.85  
  
Having considered Le Roux’s interpretation of a worker in terms of the right 
to fair labour practices in section 23(1), one must consider whether the courts have 
developed this broader concept of a worker post SANDU. Three decisions have 
incorporated section 23 into their reasoning in decisions determining whether the 
applicant was entitled to labour rights provided in legislation.  
 
                                                          












In Wyeth SA (Pty) Ltd v Manqele, 86 the Labour Appeal Court had to determine 
whether a person who has signed a contract of employment but has not started 
working can invoke unfair dismissal law if the contract of employment is unfairly 
terminated in the interim. It held that such a person is an employee and can have 
recourse to labour protection. It concluded that this interpretation of the definition 
of an employee was in line with section 3(b) of the LRA which required it to 
interpret the LRA’s provisions in accordance with the Constitution to give full effect 
to the LRA’s purpose to protect, promote and fulfil the right to fair labour practices 
in section 23 of the Constitution.87 
 
Discovery Health Limited v CCMA & Others88 involved a foreign national 
(Lanzetta) who was not authorised to work in South Africa who had entered into an 
employment contract and was seeking to enforce labour protection.89 The Labour 
Court concluded that to find that such a contract of employment was invalid would 
defeat the primary purpose of section 23(1). The Court accordingly held that the 
contract between the parties was valid, that Lanzetta was an employee as defined in 
the LRA and that the CCMA therefore had jurisdiction to determine an unfair 
dismissal dispute referred to it. The Labour Court also found, obiter  that even if the 
contract were found to be invalid, Lanzetta was nevertheless an employee as 
defined by section 213 of the LRA because that definition did not depend on the 
existence a valid and enforceable contract of employment.   
 
                                                          
86 Wyeth SA (Pty) Ltd v Manqele  & Others (2005) 26 ILJ 749 (LAC), see also Jack v Director-General 
Department of Environmental Affairs [2003] 1 BLLR 28 (LC). 
87 Wyeth (note 86) at para [42]. 
88 [2008] 7 BLLR 633 (LC).  
89 The Court considered the consequences of section 38(1) of the Immigration Act which prohibits 













The legal question in “Kylie” v CCMA & Others90 was whether a sex worker was 
entitled to rely on the LRA’s unfair dismissal’s provisions.91 The Labour Appeal 
Court found that the illegality of sex work did not preclude sex workers from being 
beneficiaries of the section 23 right to fair labour practices which was granted to 
“everyone”.92 It held that the law was not wholly inflexible in the application of the 
principle outlined by the court a quo, and that in limited circumstances. Having 
found that there illegality of the contact did not preclude the existence of an 
employment relationship which brought the appellant within the scope of the LRA, 
the purpose of the LRA and the vulnerability of sex workers, the Court held that: 
 
In the circumstances, where a sex worker forms part of a vulnerable class by the nature of 
the work that she performs and the position that she holds and she is subject to potential 
exploitation, abuse and assaults on her dignity, there is, on the basis of the finding in this 
judgment, no principled reason by which she should not be entitled to some constitutional 
protection designed to protect her dignity and which protection by extension has now been 
operationalised in the LRA.93 
 
                                                          
90 [2010] 7 BLLR 705 (LAC). 
91 Sex work is prohibited in terms of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 and as a result an 
employment to engage in sex work is void in terms of the common law. This case involved an 
appeal against the decision of the Labour Court in “Kylie v Conciliation for Commission, Mediation 
and Arbitration & Others” (2008) 29 ILJ 1918 (LC). The court a quo (the Labour Court) had held that 
a sex worker’s relationship with a brothel owner constituted an employment relationship despite 
the lack of a valid employment contract between them. The Court held that the enforceability of a 
sex worker’s unfair dismissal claim did not depend on whether the definition of an employee 
encompassed those without a valid contract, but whether public policy allowed courts and tribunals 
to encourage illegal conduct in the context of statutory and constitutional rights. The Court held 
that the principle that the courts should not sanction illegal actions applied to statutory rights and 
rendered a sex worker’s claim to the statutory right to fair dismissal in the LRA unenforceable. It 
held that the scope of section 23 labour rights did not include sex workers and brothel keepers as 
bearers of those rights and that if the contrary were found to be the case, the Sexual Offences Act 
justifiably limited the scope of section 23 in excluding sex workers and brothel keepers as rights 
holders. 
92 “Kylie” (note 90).  












The Court stated that its finding did not necessarily mean that sex workers would be 
entitled to the full range of LRA remedies as some (for example, an order of 
reinstatement) would be inappropriate in light of the illegality of the work. 
 
This brief survey of the case law shows that the Courts have not used section 
23(1) to develop the broader constitutional concept of a worker that transcends the 
traditional preoccupation with the employee. Rather, the courts have used section 
23(1) to overcome hurdles that would have disqualified the respective workers 
from qualifying as employees in the traditional sense. 
 
In the first two decisions, the Court referred to the fact that the right to fair 
labour practices accrues to “everyone” to find that a valid contract of employment 
existed and on this basis found that the respective applicants were employee. In 
“Kylie”, the Court ruled that the lack of a valid contract of employment did not 
disqualify the appellant from being an employee, although her entitlement to the 
statutory remedies was limited. The Court in Kylie therefore went a step further 
than the Court in Wyeth and Discovery Health. However, it did not go as far as to 
endorse the concept of a worker as the beneficiary of the rights independently of the 
notion of an employee. 
 
What are the implications of these developments for the practice of 
contracting work out to self-employed workers? It is submitted that the 
development of the broad concept of a worker as envisaged by Le Roux has the 
potential to address the dilemmas of determining whether a self employed worker 
is an employee or an independent contractor. As workers they would be entitled to 
fair labour practices, and consequently, to at least some of the protection offered by 












workers employ others to assist them, and thus only partially meet the requirement 
of personal service.  
 
However, the reality is that the court’s application of section 23(1) has thus 
far been a far cry from the development of the worker as envisaged by Le Roux. The 
discussion in this section shows that the courts continue to use it primarily in 
relation of the employee. Thus, the viability of protecting the self employed worker 
on the basis of this expansive concept of a worker is presently very limited. 
 
5.2.3 Analysis of the legal approaches 
 
Externalisation by commodification is one of the two main processes underlying the 
practice of contracting work out to self-employed workers. The main consequence 
of this is that self-employed workers are designated as independent contractors and 
are therefore excluded from labour protection. Thus far, this part has considered 
two broad approaches adopted in South Africa that could be applied to addressing 
the challenges that externalisation via commodification poses.  
 
The discussion showed that South African labour law has a fairly complex 
framework comprising a number of legal strategies and principles that could be 
used to address externalisation by commodification. The strategies have been 
adopted at different points in time by different institutions and overlap with and in 
some cases contradict each other. This section analyses the extent to which these 
principles could lead to the protection of self-employed workers within the broader 
framework of the key challenges that the practice presents for labour law. These 













Of the four key questions raised is the extent to which the legal principles 
transcend the binary divide and the preoccupation with employment status and move 
towards a broader conception of a worker. This will be discussed first because of its 
pertinence to the two broad approaches outlined above. The second approach which 
relates to the section 23(1) right to fair labour practices as developed by Le Roux, 
provides a promising and doctrinally appealing avenue for a broader concept of a 
worker which transcends the binary divide.  
 
This would be one potential avenue to ensure that self-employed workers 
were protected in terms of labour law. However, this potential is far from being 
realised because with the exception of the SANDU decision – where the Court could 
not use the concept of an employee in relation to the defence force – the courts have 
shied away from the development of a more expansive concept of a worker that 
moves beyond the notion of the employee. The other decisions that have specifically 
referred to the right of “everyone” to fair labour practices have merely used this 
broadly granted right to broaden the concept of the employee to ensure the 
protection of the individuals seeking relief. This has been necessary in light of the 
fact that the protection offered by labour legislation continues to be restricted to 
employees. The consequence is that instead of using section 23(1) to develop a 
wider concept of a worker, the courts have largely used it to entrench the centrality 
of employment status to determining labour law’s scope.   
 
The approach adopted by the courts in post-SANDU decisions is more akin to 
first approach focuses on the shifting the boundary binary divide and thereby 
expand the concept of the employee. This approach entrenches the importance of 
legal status and reinforces the preoccupation with employee as the main beneficiary 












is more developed in the South African legal system and could be used to ensure 
that the self-employed worker was protected in terms of labour law.  
 
The discussion in section 5.2.1 highlighted a number of avenues by which a 
self-employed worker could be brought under the banner of an employee. One such 
approach could involve the deeming of certain workers as employees by the 
Minister in terms of section 83 of the BCEA.  This has not yet been implemented in 
South Africa. Nevertheless, the Australian approach indicates how the strategy could 
be used to protect the very type of workers – home workers, building labour only 
subcontractors, owner -drivers – who constitute the bulk of self-employed workers 
in South Africa.  
 
The primary avenue for determining employee status is through the courts 
which are charged with the application of labour law. The importance of giving 
effect to substance over form has been emphasised by the courts and has been re-
affirmed in the provisions creating the presumption of employment as well as the 
Code. In terms of the decision in Denel v Gerber and the Code, a worker who 
contracts with an employer through the medium of a legal entity is not precluded 
from being found to be an employee of the employer. This principle could be applied 
to self-employed workers whose services are contracted through companies or 
close corporations that they are linked to. The Code also provides that a worker who 
employs other workers is not precluded from being found to be an employee on this 
basis. However, the Labour Appeal Court in Sanlam appears to have reached a 
conclusion that contradicts this principle. 
 
This brings us to the second of the four key questions, namely, whether the 












nature of the practice of contracting work out to self-employed workers. That is, to 
what extent does the law recognise the fact that the practice is constituted by the 
externalisation via commodification and externalisation via intermediation?  
 
The discussion in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 showed that the Code recognises 
both these dimensions and seeks to ensure that the self-employed worker’s position 
as both a worker and an employee does not preclude him from being found to be an 
employee. It goes further to provide that the workers of the self-employed worker 
can also be recognised as employees of the core enterprise if the latter exercises a 
high degree of control over them. In doing so, it attempts to ensure that neither self-
employed workers nor their workers are denied labour protection because of their 
position under such contracting practices. This position is at odds with the 
conclusion reached in the Sanlam decision which (in effect) held that a person who 
is allowed to employ other people is typically an independent contractor.  
 
The second question discussed above is related, but not identical to the third 
question, which relates to whether the relevant South African principles move beyond 
conceptualising the employment relationship as bilateral and personal, but recognise 
that they are increasingly multilateral.  Again, it is only the Code which recognises 
the possibility that some contracting arrangements may involve more than two 
parties. Its solution is to designate the core enterprise the employer of both the self-
employed worker and her/his workers should the circumstances indicate that core 
enterprise exercises a high degree of control over the workers. The Code does not 
spell out the consequences where the circumstances do not justify the designation 













 The final question is whether the relevant South African principles move 
beyond the conceptualisation of the employer as a unitary and bounded entity and 
acknowledge the increasing multi-polarity of the nature of employers.  This shift does 
not appear to be evident within the context of the legal approaches discussed above. 
The main focus of these approaches appears to be the definition of the employee or 
the worker and no attention seems to be paid as to how the employer is 
conceptualised and understood. It therefore appears that the assumption that the 




To conclude, this part has outlined the South African approaches to redefining the 
scope of labour law. The first approach is the expansion of the concept of the 
employee through various strategies which have involved the courts, the legislature 
and NEDLAC. The second approach related to looking beyond employment to a 
broader concept of a worker in terms of section 23 of the Constitution. The aim of 
the exercise was to determine the extent to which the broad approaches and the 
specific strategies and legal principles could be used to address externalisation by 
commodification within the context of the practice under scrutiny.  
 
The legal principles were analysed to determine the extent to which they 
address the challenges that the practice of contracting work out to self-employers 
poses to labour law. The discussion showed that South African labour law has 
recognised and to some extent tried to address the challenges posed to labour law 
with respect to looking beyond the binary divide and employee status, recognising 












of these contracting arrangements. However, the strategies and principles discussed 
did not indicate a shift in the conceptualisation of the employer.  
 
The next part of this chapter will consider the South African legal approaches 
to addressing the externalisation via intermediation, which is the second dimension 
involved in contracting work out.  
 
5.3 LEGAL REGULATION OF EXTERNALISATION BY 
INTERMEDIATION 
 
This part considers the approaches that South African labour law has developed to 
protect workers in multilateral employment relationships resulting from 
externalisation by intermediation. The first approach involves the attribution of 
joint and several liability to core enterprises engaging workers through temporary 
employment services (TESs, also referred to as labour brokers in South Africa). The 
second is the judicial doctrine of piercing the corporate veil in arrangements 
involving TESs and contractors. The final approach regulates the employment 
consequences flowing from the transfer of a business as a going concern from one 
employer to another.  
 
The three approaches are considered in sections 5.3.1, 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 
respectively. Each section considers the application relevant legal approach in the 
context of the situation that it was developed to regulate. It then briefly outlines 
how it could be applied to the practice of contracting work out to self-employed 
workers. The final section compares and contrasts the objectives and consequences 












approaches recognise and address the challenges to labour law as identified in part 
5.1.  
 
5.3.1 Joint and several liability for temporary employment services 
 
South African labour legislation recognizes that a labour broker or temporary 
employment service is the employer of the workers that it supplies to its clients.94 
Section 198 of the LRA defines a temporary employment service any person who 
provides its clients with workers on a temporary basis for reward and undertakes to 
remunerate the workers. Section 198 further provides that the TES (as opposed to 
the client) is the employer of a person whose services are provided to a client by a 
TES (provided the worker is not an independent contractor). 
 
Despite the designation of the TES as the employer, the client also has some 
obligations in respect of the employees of the TES. Section 198 of the LRA holds the 
TES and the client liable if the TES contravenes a collective agreement that regulates 
terms and conditions of employment; a binding award that regulates terms and 
conditions of employment; the BCEA or a wage determination. These terms and 
conditions mentioned typically regulate working hours and overtime, annual leave, 
sick leave, family responsibility leave, maternity leave, notice periods for 
termination of employment and retrenchment provisions. Notably, the client is not 
held jointly and severally liable in terms of the unfair dismissal and unfair labour 
practice provisions in the LRA.  
 
Section 57 of the Employment Equity Act provides that the TES and the client 
are jointly and severally liable if the TES commits an act of unfair discrimination on 
                                                          












the express or implied instructions of a client. This implies that joint and several 
liability can only be imposed if the party invoking the provision can prove that the 
client expressly or impliedly instructed the TES to commit an act of unfair 
discrimination. This makes the provision more onerous than section 198, which 
merely requires proof of a contravention of the applicable law. Section 57 further 
provides that for the purposes of Chapter III of the Act (relating to affirmative action 
measures), a person provided to a client by a TES is deemed to be the employee of 
the client if the person’s employment with the client is for an indefinite period or for 
three months or longer. 
 
The application of the joint and several liability provisions in the LRA and the 
EEA is limited to employment arrangements involving TESs to the exclusion of the 
practice of contracting work out to self-employed workers. Nevertheless, the 
principle of joint and several liability could potentially be applied to the practice 
under scrutiny. This would ensure that the core enterprise was held to be jointly 
and severally liable for the self employed worker’s contravention of binding law, 
judgments, awards and collective agreements. As will be shown in section 5.3.2 
below, the doctrine of joint and several liability is embedded in South Africa’s 
common law.  It is one of several remedies at the courts’ disposal when piercing the 
corporate veil in multilateral work arrangements.  
 
5.3.2 Piercing the corporate veil 
 
It is generally accepted that corporate entities such as companies have a separate 
legal personality and are separate from their owners.95 This entails that acts of a 
corporate entity are only attributable to the corporate entity and cannot be 
                                                          












attributed to their shareholders or members. However, there are circumstances 
under which it may be necessary to disregard the separate legal existence of the 
corporate entity and hold other persons – usually its owners – responsible for acts 
purportedly done by the corporate entity.96 A decision to disregard the separate 
corporate existence of a corporate entity is referred to as piercing the corporate veil.  
 
This section briefly surveys key decisions where the courts have applied of 
the doctrine to employment relationships. It begins by identifying the circumstances 
in which piercing the corporate veil is justified in the employment context. It then 
considers the consequences of the application of the doctrine to the employment 
context, that is, how shareholders or other third parties have been held responsible 
for the employer actions of corporate entities. This analysis is undertaken with a 
view to determining the extent to which it is applicable to externalisation by 
intermediation, and more specifically, to contracting work out to self-employed 
workers. 
 
The law determining when it is justifiable to pierce the corporate veil is not 
finally settled. There is little controversy that the courts may pierce the corporate 
veil in instances where juristic personality is used improperly or fraudulently.97 The 
early decisions of the Industrial Court held that the corporate veil would be pierced 
where it was necessary to “defeat an unconscionable attempt by an employer to 
thwart an applicant’s legitimate claim”.98 There is less clarity on whether courts may 
pierce the corporate veil in the absence of fraud. In some decisions, the courts have 
                                                          
96 Esterhuizen v Million-Air Services CC (in liquidation) & Others (2007) 28 ILJ 1251 (LC).  
97 Group 6 Security Services (Pty) Ltd & another v Moletsane NO & others (2005) 26 ILJ 1693 (LC) 
Para 53, Esterhuizen (note 96), Gaymans v Ben Ngomeni t/a Working World, Pretoria [2000] 9 BLLR 
1047 (LC) para 7.  












adopted a broader approach and have pierced the corporate veil in order to give 
proper effect to substance over form in employment relationships.99  
 
When will the courts find that an employer improperly or fraudulently used 
juristic personality to deny an applicant’s legitimate claim? One example is where a 
corporate entity that has become liable to its employees (or foresees this 
possibility), goes into liquidation and resurrects itself as a different entity carrying 
on the same business. The newly constituted entity then denies liability on the basis 
that it is a separate entity from the original entity. This was the case in Esterhuizen v 
Million-Air Services CC (in liquidation) & Others,100 where the manager of the 
employer close corporation had liquidated it to avoid paying the applicant the 
compensation awarded in a constructive dismissal claim. The later incorporated 
another close corporation (CC) which carried on the same business as the original 
entity.  
 
The Labour Court held that the liquidation and incorporation had been 
carried out in a deliberate attempt to avoid compensating the applicant and held 
that the second CC was the same business as the first CC.101 It found that the 
manager was the puppet-master who had had absolute control over both CCs and 
was the common denominator behind the entire sequence of events.102 It held that 
both the second CC and the manager were jointly and severally liable for the 
payment of the award.103 
                                                          
99 Hotel Liquor Catering Commercial & Allied Workers Union & others v Glamorock North (Pty) Ltd & 
Its Trading Divisions or Branches (1999) 20 ILJ 2372 (LC) Kruger v Jigsaw Holdings Ltd & 
others (2006) 27 ILJ 1161 (LC). 
100 Esterhuizen v Million-Air services (note 96). 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 See also Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union v Lane NO as Trustee of Cape Pallet CC 













Another example of fraud or improper use of juristic personality is where a 
corporate entity transfers its employees to a different entity and denies liability for 
its employment obligations on the grounds that it is no longer their employer and 
that the new employer is not bound by the obligations. In Airlink Pilots Association 
SA v SA Airlines (Pty) Ltd & Another,104 the employer transferred some of its pilots to 
its subsidiary company and argued that the subsidiary was not bound by the 
relevant collective agreement and the seniority system. The Court found that the 
transfer of the pilots was a stratagem to avoid the obligations in terms of the 
collective agreement and pierced the corporate veil. In Dyokhwe and Adecco 
Recruitment Services (Pty) Ltd & Another,105 the arbitrator found that the employer’s 
transfer of some of its employers to a temporary employment agency was an 
attempt to avoid its obligations in terms of the Labour Relations Act. It found that 
this warranted the piercing of the corporate veil.  
 
The above shows that policy considerations require the piercing of the 
corporate veil to protect workers against unscrupulous employers who use 
corporate personalities to avoid their legal obligations.106 As indicated, there are 
some decisions which have held that fraud is not a prerequisite for piercing the 
corporate veil.107 These have involved cases of associated entities, where the 
employees were formally employed by a subsidiary entity, but were in substance 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
CC and the Virtually simultaneous creation of the second respondent was a deceptive device to get 
rid of the part time work force while avoiding the consequences of retrenchment. The Court found 
that the circumstances justified the piercing of the corporate veil.  
104 (2001) 22 ILJ 1359 (LC). 
105 (2009) 30 ILJ 2989 (CCMA). 
106 Buffalo Signs Co Ltd & Others v De Castro & Another (1999) 20 ILJ 1501 (LAC). 












controlled by the holding company.108 The courts’ objective in piercing the veil in 
these instances has been to give effect to substance over form.109 
 
The courts have considered a range of factors in determining which entity 
controls the relevant employees. These include the day-to-day administration of 
businesses; the marketing practices of the entities; employment relations and 
practices.110 They have also considered which entity pays the workers and 
negotiates with them about matters of mutual interest, and which entity initiates 
and executes appointments and dismissals of workers.111 The Courts have 
considered these factors with a view to determining which entity was “the directing 
and controlling mind” of the corporate entities or behind the specific 
transactions.112  
 
Having considered the circumstances under which the courts are willing to 
pierce the corporate veil, we turn to the consequences it has for parties in an 
employment context. A number of measures have been adopted by the courts to 
give effect to substance over form, and to protect workers against the use of 
corporate personality to their prejudice. These measures depend on the 
circumstances of each case and the relief sought by the applicants. In some instances 
the court has pierced the corporate veil to hold that the “directing and controlling 
mind” behind the nominal employer is the true employer of the workers for all 
intents and purposes.113 In other cases, the court has held that the nominal 
                                                          
108 Note 99. 
109 Hotel Liquor (note 99)at para 31. 
110 Note 99. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Hotel Liquor (note 99) at para 31.  












employer and its owners (whether natural or juristic persons) are the co-employers 
of the workers or are one and the same entity employing the workers.114 
 
  In other decisions, the courts have held the associated entity or shareholder 
jointly liable with the nominal employer for the employment obligations in 
dispute.115 Another approach has been to set aside actions done in abuse of 
corporate personality. This approach was adopted in Dyokhwe and Adecco 
Recruitment Services (Pty) Ltd & Another,116 where a company purportedly 
retrenched a worker and re-engaged him on a fixed term basis through a TES. The 
CCMA found that the arrangement was a stratagem to enable the company to evade 
its employment liabilities and found that the company had remained the true 
employer of the worker.117 The courts have set aside corporate legal personality to 
the extent necessary to address the employment related matters brought before 
them.  
 
The above discussion shows that doctrine has mainly been applied in relation 
to associated entities and between corporate entities and shareholders.  However, 
the recent award in Dyokhwe shows that the need to give effect to substance instead 
of form may require the application of the doctrine beyond relations between 
associated companies and between corporate entities and their shareholders. The 
application of the doctrine in the context of TES arrangements implies that it could, 
by analogy, be applied where work is contracted out to a self-employed worker.  
 
                                                          
114 Kruger (note 99); Footwear Trading CC v Mdlalose (2005) 26 ILJ 443 (LAC). 
115 See Wooll  (note 98) where the Court noted that the member of the CC was attempting to evade 
the employer obligations and ordered that he be joined in the proceedings in his personal capacity. 













The doctrine allows for some flexibility in terms of the remedy that may be 
granted to ensure the protection of workers and this would depend on the 
circumstances of each case. The corporate veil could be pierced to set aside a 
transaction to contract work out from a core enterprise to a business118 operated by 
a self-employed worker where it is clear that the employer’s aim was to avoid its 
employer obligations. In such cases, it would be found that the original employer 
(the core enterprise) remains the true employer.  
 
Even in the absence of fraud, the doctrine could be applied to hold that the 
core enterprise is the true employer of the workers of self-employed workers where 
it exercises substantial control over them. In addition, it could be applied to find that 
the core enterprise and the self employed worker are joint employers of the 
workers. Finally, it could be applied to hold the core enterprise jointly and severally 
liable with the self-employed worker for employer obligations in cases where it 
exercises ultimate control over the workers of a self-employed worker with whom it 
has contracted.  
 
5.3.3 Business transfer provisions 
 
Provisions relating to transfers of business operations cover the transfer of workers 
from one employer (the transferor of the business) to the new employer (the 
transferee). They are designed to ensure that workers are protected during the 
transition from one employer to the other in the context of a transfer of a business. 
The provisions cover situations where an employer outsources or contracts work 
out to a service provider or intermediary and could potentially apply to contracting 
                                                          
118 It is submitted that the business need not necessarily be registered as a separate corporate 












work out to self-employed workers. In South Africa, section 197 of the Labour 
Relations Act governs the consequences for employees in such cases. Before 
discussing the effect of the provision, it is necessary to consider the parameters 
within which it applies.  
 
Section 197 relates to the transfer of a business. It defines a business as 
including “the whole or part of any business, trade or undertaking or service”.119 It 
defines a transfer as “the transfer of a business by one employer (‘the old employer’) 
to another employer (‘the new employer’) as a going concern”.  With respect to a 
business, the Labour Court has held that it constitutes a discrete economic entity, 
comprising “an organised grouping of persons and assets facilitating the exercise of 
an economic activity which pursues an economic objective”.120  
 
The courts have identified the components of a business to include tangible 
and intangible assets, workers, goodwill and operational resources.121 In Schatz v 
Elliot International (Pty) Ltd & Another, the court emphasised the need to determine 
the extent to which the components “are sufficiently and coherently structured for 
there to be an identifiable economic entity capable of being transferred”.122 The 
Constitutional Court has held that the question whether a business has been 
transferred as a going concern must be determined objectively in light of the 
circumstances of each case, having regard to the substance and not the form of the 
transaction.123  The court has stressed the need to determine whether or not the 
same business is carried on by the new employer.124  
                                                          
119 Section 197(1) (a) of the LRA. 
120 Schatz v Elliot International (Pty) Ltd & Another (2008) 29 (ILJ) 2286 (LC) at para [39].  
121 NEHAWU v University of Cape Town & Others (2003) 24 ILJ 95 (CC); Schatz (note 120). 
122 Note 120 at para [40]. 














Section 197 provides that certain consequences flow from the transfer of a 
business as a going concern. The consequences listed in section 197(2) apply unless 
the parties conclude an agreement to the contrary.125 Section 197(2)(a) provides 
that the new employer automatically substitutes the old employer in respect of the 
employment contracts with the latter’s existing employees.126 In addition, the new 
employer assumes the position of the old employer in respect of anything done by 
or in relation to the latter before the transfer including dismissal, unfair labour 
practices and acts of unfair discrimination 127  
 
Section 197(2)(d) ensures the continuity of existing employment relationship 
(and continuity of the employee’s period of service) after the transfer takes place. 
Importantly, the new employer must employ the employees on terms and 
conditions that are on the whole no less favourable than those on which they were 
employed by the old employer.128 The new employer is also bound by arbitration 
awards and collective agreements that were binding on the old employer prior to 
the transfer.129 Furthermore, the LRA provides that a dismissal is automatically 
unfair if the reason for it is a transfer of a business as a going concern as 
contemplated in section 197.130 The latter provision seeks to ensure that the 
                                                          
125 An agreement contemplated in section 197(2) must comply with the requirements of section 
197(6), that is, it must be in writing and must be concluded between the old and/or new employer 
and a workplace forum, trade union or any other party that the employer would have to consult in 
respect of a collective agreement.  
126 Section 197(2) (b) of the LRA. 
127 Section 197(2) (c ) of the LRA.  
128 Section 197(3) of the LRA. 
129 Section 197(5) of the LRA. 
130 Section 187(1) (g) of the LRA. An automatically unfair dismissal attracts a maximum 
compensation of 24 months’ pay, whereas a dismissal that is otherwise unfair attracts a maximum 
of 12 months’ pay as 
compensation. Despite section 187(1)(g), dismissals in the context of transfers may be justified if 
the employer can prove that the dismissals are based on its operational requirements. In such a 












security of employment of employees who are transferred to the new employer by 
virtue of section 197. 
 
Although section 197 substitutes the old employer with the new employer 
after the transfer, it envisages the liability of the old employer for obligations arising 
prior to the transfer. Thus, section 197(9) provides that the old and new employers 
are jointly and severally liable for any claim concerning a term and condition of 
employment that arose before the transfer. The old employer’s liability also arises in 
the event that the new employer dismisses the transferred employees within 12 
months of the transfer.131 In such cases, the old employer is jointly and severally 
liable with the new employer for any leave, severance or other pay that accrued to 
the employee as at date of transfer.132  
 
Having considered the conditions for the application of section 197 and its 
application, it is necessary to consider whether the provision applies to the practice 
of contracting work out to self employed workers. In principle, there is a need to 
ensure the preservation of the terms and conditions of employment of workers who 
are transferred to self-employed workers and to attribute some liability to the core 
enterprise, albeit for a limited period. It is however unclear the practice would 
qualify as the transfer of a business as a going concern.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
be complied with in operational requirements dismissals. Section 197 makes certain provisions for 
operational requirements dismissals in the context of transfers: In terms of section 197(7), the old 
and new employer must jointly determine the leave accrued to the employees, the severance pay 
that would have been payable to the employees in the event of retrenchment and any other accrued 
payments that are unpaid. The old and employer must reach an agreement about which employer 
(s) will be liable for the payments and what provision must made should they become payable. In 
addition, section 197(8) provides that for 12 months after the transfer takes place, the old 
employer is jointly and severally liable with the new employer to any employee who becomes 
entitled to these payments. 
131 Section 197(7) read with section 197(8) of the LRA. 












This is because the courts’ enumeration of the components of a business 
discussed above seems to set a high threshold by focusing on the essence of the 
business being transferred.  Using this instrumental approach,133 contracting work 
out to self employed workers would amount to the transfer of a function or service 
and the necessary workers and assets required to perform it. It is unlikely that a 
core enterprise would transfer its goodwill and intangible assets such as intellectual 
property rights to the self-employed worker. Arguably, this would result in the 
performance of the same function in different hands, but not of the same business in 
different hands, thus excluding section 197.  
 
  However, the Constitutional Court in NEHAWU v UCT and the Labour Appeal 
Court have held that the transfer of services such as gardening, security and cleaning 
constitute services as contemplated within the definition of a business in section 
197.134 In SA Municipal Workers’ Union & Others v Rand Airport Management Co (Pty) 
Ltd135 the Court adopted the ordinary meaning of the word “service” and found that 
the transfer of airport cleaning and security services fell under section 197:  
 
The provision of a facility to meet the needs or for the use of a person or a person’s interest 
or advantage, assistance or benefit provided to someone by a person or thing; an act of 
helping or benefiting another; an instance of beneficial, useful or friendly actions; the action 
of serving, helping or benefiting another; behaviour conducive to the welfare or advantage of 
another; friendly or professional assistance.136 
 
The application of this broad definition to a service would mean that the transfer of 
a set of tasks would trigger the application of section 197. It is submitted that on the 
                                                          
133 Fudge (note 1) 309. 
134 See NEHAWU v UCT and SA Municipal Workers’ Union & Others v Rand Airport Management Co 
(Pty) Ltd (2005) 26 ILJ 67 (LAC). It will be recalled that section 197(1) (a) defines a business to 
include “the whole or part of any business, trade, undertaking or service”. 
135 (2005) 26 ILJ 67 (LAC). 












basis of this functional approach,137 the contracting out of work to self-employed 
workers could amount to the transfer of a business for the purposes of section 197. 
 
5.3.4  Analysis of the legal approaches 
 
The preceding sections have considered three South African legal approaches that 
may regulate externalisation by intermediation, namely joint and several liability, 
judicial piercing of the corporate veil, business transfer provisions. While none of 
these approaches has been applied to the practice under scrutiny, there is room to 
argue that they may be adapted to regulate contracting arrangements. The extent to 
which the legal approaches are applicable to the practice under scrutiny varies and 
is discussed below. 
 
The primary goal of the first and second approaches is to ensure that the core 
enterprise is held liable for the labour rights of the workers involved. It is submitted 
that the second approach is more appropriate for addressing the practice under 
scrutiny. The joint and several liability provisions are restrictive because their 
extension to the contracting arrangements would necessitate legislative 
amendments, while the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is a judicial remedy 
that could  more readily be extended to the practice under scrutiny under 
appropriate circumstances.  
 
In addition, judicial piercing of the corporate veil can also be applied to a 
broader range of obligations than the joint and several liability provisions which 
currently do not cover unfair dismissals and retrenchments. Moreover, the judicial 
piercing of the corporate veil is more flexible than the joint and several liability 
                                                          












provisions as it allows for a broader range of remedies depending on the 
circumstances of each case. This better enables the courts to ensure that workers 
are not deprived of their rights and that effect is given to the realities of the 
relationships. Given the limitations of the joint and several liability provisions, they 
will not be discussed separately and this section will concentrate on the second and 
third approaches. 
 
The third approach aims to guarantee the substantive working conditions and 
employment security of the workers who are transferred to a new employer to 
ensure that their terms and conditions of employment are not downgraded. It places 
responsibility for the continuity of the existing terms and conditions on the new 
employer. It also seeks to ensure that employers do not undertake business 
transfers to evade existing obligations in terms of arbitration awards and collective 
agreements. Given the Labour Appeal Court’s broad definition of a service, it seems 
likely that the contracting out of work to self-employed workers could qualify as a 
transfer of a business in terms of section 197.  
 
We now turn to discuss the extent to which the second and third approaches 
address the challenges to labour law outlined in part 5.1. These are discussed in 
order of their relevance to the approaches discussed.  
 
The first question is whether the legal approaches discussed above move 
beyond the conceptualisation of the employer as a unitary and bounded entity and 
recognise the increasingly multi-polar nature of the employer. The business transfer 
provisions seem to continue to preserve the traditional notion of the employer, as 
they envisage to separate and readily identifiable employers, namely the old 












transferee. They therefore envisage that the transfer shifts the employer obligations 
from the old employer to the new employer. The only departure from the strict 
unitary conception within these provisions lies in the provision for joint and several 
liability of the old employer for employer obligations that arose prior to the transfer.  
 
The application of the corporate veil doctrine in labour matters has shown a 
more significant departure from the notion of the employer as a single and bounded 
entity. In applying this doctrine, the courts have recognised joint and several 
liability for employer obligations in situations where it may be appropriate. The 
courts have also gone a step further and recognised the possibility that two separate 
entities may be co-employers or may constitute a joint employer in respect of the 
same workers. These developments indicate that a recognition of the complex web 
of relationships that may arise in relation to a particular group of workers and the 
need to move past the tendency to equate a single corporate entity with the 
employer for the purposes of attributing employer liability.  
 
Closely related to the question of the conceptualisation of the employer is the 
question whether the legal principles discussed move beyond the conceptualisation of 
the employment relationship as a bilateral and personal contract and recognise and 
address multilaterally complex relationships? The transfer provisions recognise the 
fact that there are more than two parties involved in transfers, namely the old 
employer, the new employer and the workers. However, the provisions seem to 
conceptualise the business transfer less as a composite relationship than as two 
separate bilateral relationships. They envisage that the bilateral relationship 
between the old employer and the new employer is extinguished upon transfer and 













While the business transfer provisions do allow for the joint and several 
liability of the old employer for obligations existing prior to the transfer, they do not 
envisage the old employer’s joint and several liability for employment obligations 
arising after the transfer. This may be appropriate in cases where the new employer 
ceases to have any influence over transferred business or the transferred workers 
the after the transfer.  An example would be an “out and out” sale of a business from 
one employer to another where the new employer operates independently of the 
new employer. 
 
However, the court’s application of section 197 shows that it extends beyond 
these types of transfers to cover situations where the old employer contracts 
services out to contractors and continues to benefit from the labour of the workers 
after the transfer. In these cases, the transfer does not represent a clean break 
between the old employer and the workers and there may be a need to place some 
liability on the old employer to ensure the preservation of the workers’ terms and 
conditions of employment under the new employer. Thus section 197’s allocation of 
the post-transfer obligations on the basis of a purely bilateral relationship between 
the workers and the new employer fails to recognise the continued influence of the 
workers and the need for the re-allocation of responsibilities in contracting 
arrangements.  
 
The corporate veil doctrine recognises the need to look beyond the bilateral 
relationships and to draw in other parties that may not have a direct contractual 
relationship with the workers but nevertheless exercise some control over them. 
The courts are therefore willing to allocate responsibility on the basis of a 
multilateral conception of employment. Consequently, the courts have ordered joint 












entities are co-employers or constitute a single employer for the purposes of labour 
law.  
 
The third question is whether the legal approaches recognise and address the 
multilaterally complex nature of the practice under scrutiny. That is, do they 
recognise that some work arrangements are constituted by the intersection of 
externalisation via commodification and externalisation via intermediation?  
 
The transfer provisions do not recognise either of these processes as such, 
because they merely envisage that workers are transferred from the old employer 
to the new employer and assume that the post-transfer empl yment relationship 
comprises a bilateral relationship between an independent employer who should be 
able to provide for the continuation of existing terms and conditions of employment. 
They do not recognise that the new employer may be a self-employed worker who is 
arguably not an independent entrepreneur and would not be able to viably 
guarantee the continuity of the same terms of employment. In addition, the 
allocation of the post-transfer employment obligations squarely on the new 
employer’s shoulders does not recognise that some business transfers may be used 
by employers seeking to place a legal distance between themselves and their 
workers in order to evade employer obligations.  
 
At face value, the corporate veil doctrine only applies to address 
externalisation via intermediation only. This could be applied to pierce through the 
veil that the self-employed worker’s enterprise posits between a core enterprise 
and the workers of the self-employed workers in order to render the former liable 
for the labour rights of the latter. The core enterprise could be held liable either as a 












as a co-employer with the self-employed worker, or as a joint employer with the 
self-employed worker. 
  
It is submitted that the application of the corporate veil doctrine could also be 
extended to extend labour protection to the self-employed worker. This would 
require the piercing of the veil that the self-employed worker’s enterprise posits 
between the core enterprise and the self-employed worker to recognise an 
employment relationship between these parties. This would be the case if the 
relationship between the self-employed worker and the core enterprise resembled 
an employment relationship in all other respects.  
 
Piercing the corporate veil between the core enterprise and the self-
employed worker would accord with item 37 of the Code which provides that 
persons that provide personal services through the corporate entities are not 
precluded from employee status. It would also be in line with the corporate veil 
doctrine’s grounding in the principle of accounting for the realities of the 
relationships between parties and the imperative to give effect to substance over 
form. Accordingly, the corporate veil doctrine has the potential to address both the 
dimensions that constitute the practice of contracting work out to self-employed 
workers. 
 
Finally, it remains to consider whether the legal principles look beyond the 
binary divide between employment and self-employment as the determinant of the 
scope of labour law. It is submitted that both these approaches are firmly based on 
the assumption that the employee status is the gateway to labour law’s protection. 
The approaches do not envisage a broader conception of a worker to whom labour 













This section has considered the relevance of the business transfer provisions 
and the corporate veil doctrine to the practice under scrutiny. It also considered the 
extent to which these approaches address the challenges to labour law outlined in 
section 5.1. On the whole, the discussion showed that the corporate veil doctrine has 
greater potential to be adapted to address the practice of self-employed workers. In 
addition, the corporate veil doctrine goes further than the business transfer 
provisions in addressing the challenges that the practice poses to labour law in 
relation to the conceptualisation of the employer, the conceptualisation of the 
employment relationship and recognising and addressing the multi-dimensional 
nature of the practice. It however remains rooted in the assumption that employee 
status is essential for labour protection.  
 
5.4 NON-STATE REGULATION OF THE PRACTICE 
 
Thus far this discussion has considered the actual and potential role of the law in 
regulating the practice under scrutiny to ensure that self-employed workers and 
their workers are covered by labour law. To this end, parts 5.2 and 5.3 considered 
“hard law” as decreed by the legislature and developed by the courts as well as soft 
law in the form of NEDLAC’s Code of Good Practice on Who is an Employee. As such, 
the discussion has focused on state regulation developed by state institutions that 
have authority over the persons (both natural and legal) whose actions they seek to 
govern. 
 
This part seeks to explore the actual role of non-state institutions and role 
players in governing the practice under scrutiny. The discussion considers 












unions and bargaining councils at the coal face to govern the practice under 
scrutiny. This is important in light of the reality that states no longer enjoy a 
monopoly on governance or regulation as an increasing range of actors and forms of 
power are active in the management of social systems.138 The growing part played 
by non-state regulation has implications for the role that law, and labour law in 
particular, plays in governing work arrangements. 
 
 The following sections discuss the strategies developed by trade unions, 
employers’ organisations and bargaining councils in sectors where the practice is 
prevalent. They also consider measures taken by employers who contract work out 
to self-employed workers.  
 
5.4.1 Organising labour only sub-contractors (LOSCs) in the building 
industry139 
 
The South African Sub-Contractors’ Association (SASCA) was established in 2001 to 
represent the interests of LOSCs in the Western Cape building industry. It 
establishment was sparked by a crisis in the building industry as a result of the 
decline during the late 1990s.  During that period, many employers (including large 
contractors) in the building industry had persuaded building artisans to work as 
LOSCs rather than employees.   
 
The emergence of these artisans as entrepreneurs and employers had 
significant consequences for labour relations in the building industry. Firstly, it 
                                                          
138 From B Kempa and C Shearing, “Changes in Governance” Akron Law Review 41(1) 2008 1 3. 
139 This discussion on the South African Sub-Contractors’ Association draws heavily from the 
following research report: P H Bamu and S Godfrey An analysis of collective bargaining 












eroded a significant component of trade union membership as the artisans had 
ceased to be employees. Secondly, the LOSCs had very little bargaining power when 
negotiating rates with big employers and could not pay their workers in compliance 
with the minimum standards set by the Western Cape Building Industry Bargaining 
Council (the BIBC). The majority of the workers employed by LOSCs were not trade 
union members. Consequently, trade union membership was on the decline and the 
union’s representivity in the BIBC had been eroded significantly.  
 
These conditions created an impetus to establish an organisation to represent 
the interests of LOSCs in the Western Cape building industry. The establishment of 
the organisation was initiated by the director of one of the building trade unions. An 
application was submitted to the Department of Labour in September 2000 and the 
organisation was registered as an employers’ organisation in June 2001. At the time, 
it had 31 founding members. A chairperson, vice-chairperson were elected and a 
secretary, marketing manager and two directors were appointed. 
 
One of the main objectives was to provide LOSCs with a voice to 
counterbalance the dominance of the Master Builders’ Association (MBA) in the 
bargaining council.140 It was hoped that an association would establish standard 
rates for specific work to prevent undercutting amongst LOSCs and establish a 
uniform level for bargaining with main contractors. Another objective was to set 
                                                          
140 Regional Master Builders’ Associations were established in the early 1900s and have historically 
represented white contractors in the building industry. There are presently six provincial 
associations, namely Gauteng, the Western Cape, the Northern Cape, the Free State, Eastern Cape 
and KwaZulu Natal. There are also two regional associations, one in the North Boland and the other 
in the West Boland. They all fall under a national umbrella association, the Master Builders South 
Africa (MBSA), which plays a coordinating role while the member associations retain their 
autonomy to develop their own policies regarding issues such as collective bargaining. Master 
Builders’ Associations are largely perceived to represent elite large and medium sized contracting 













measures in place to prevent the underpayment of workers employed by LOSCs. The 
union hoped that strengthening LOSC operations would enable them to pay workers 
according to bargaining council rates. This would boost trade union membership.  
 
LOSCs operating in the Western Cape were invited to join SASCA subject to a 
fairly simple application process. LOSCs did not have to be registered as corporate 
but had to be registered as employers with the bargaining council, the 
(Unemployment Insurance Fund) UIF and in terms of the Compensation for 
Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act (COIDA). SASCA provided information and 
assistance to prospective members who were not duly registered. As a result, no 
application for registration with the association was rejected. Applicants had to 
provide a list of projects undertaken within the past year and references who could 
attest to the standard of work and compliance with regulations.  
 
Members were expected to pay annual subscription fees. The membership 
benefits that were envisaged were training and skills development, particularly in 
entrepreneurship and business management, as well as advice on tender processes. 
They would also receive information and assistance with insurance, industrial 
relations and occupational health and safety matters. They would also have the 
opportunity to advertise in a directory of subcontractors and be informed of 
industry developments through newsletters and bulletins. It was also hoped that 
displaying the SASCA logo would be a good marketing tool for members.  
 
By 2003, SASCA claimed to have a membership of between 300 and 400 
LOSCs, with the overwhelming majority of them being black and coloured. Of these, 
only 23 were registered with the BIBC. In addition, SASCA was allocated one of the 












voice they probably did not have significant influence in the bargaining council. 
Relations with the MBA seemed to be generally hostile. However, some established 
contractors were co-operative and supportive of the organisation as they felt there 
was a need for it.  
 
The Department of Labour deregistered SASCA as an employer organisation 
in 2006 on the grounds that it was no longer performing its functions as an 
employer organisation. The failure of SASCA was largely due to financial problems. 
Most of the members were ‘small fish’, who operated from their homes and lacked 
business acumen and managerial skills and were unable to handle their finances and 
pay their member subscriptions. At the time of deregistration, the association had 
55 members.  
 
5.4.2 The role of bargaining councils 
 
This section considers the role of bargaining councils in regulating the practice of 
contracting work out of self-employed workers. It focuses on the measures taken by 
the Western Cape Building Industry Bargaining Council as well as the National 
Bargaining Council for the Road Freight and Logistics Industry (NBCRFLI).  
 
Section 5.4.1 discussed the efforts to organise LOSCs in the Western Cape’s 
BIBC and SASCA’s representation in the BIBC during the period of its existence. In 
about 2000, the BIBC embarked on its own initiatives to regulate LOSCs in the 
region. These initiatives ran parallel to the SASCA initiative and have continued to 













It is important to note that a collective agreement concluded in a bargaining 
councils ordinarily binding on are parties to the agreements.141 In terms of the LRA, 
the parties of a bargaining council agreement can request that it be extended to non-
parties to the agreement.142 The Minister of Labour may extend an agreement 
provided the employer organisations and trade unions that are party to the 
agreement represent the majority of employers and employees falling within the 
scope of the bargaining council.143 The Western Cape BIBC has a long history of 
extending its collective agreements to non-parties, making them binding on all 
employers and employees falling within its scope.   
 
For many years, the collective agreements for the regi nal BIBC have 
expressly provided that they apply to LOSCs operating in the region.144 LOSCs are 
therefore bound by the collective agreement and are required to register with the 
Council.145 The collective agreement seeks to encourage registration and compliance 
by prohibiting employers from subcontracting work to subcontractors that are 
unregistered with the Council and/or non-compliant with the collective 
agreement.146  
 
In addition, it holds employers that subcontract work jointly and severally 
liable for a subcontractor’s contravention of the terms of the collective agreement in 
respect of its workers.147 This provision applies irrespective of whether the 
subcontractor was registered and in good standing with the Council. It was 
                                                          
141 Section 31 of the LRA. 
142 Section 32 of the LRA. Extensions are granted by the Minister of Labour.  
143 Section 32(3) of the LRA.  
144 Clause 1(2)(b) of the Building Industry Bargaining Council (Cape of Good Hope) Collective 
Agreement Government Gazette 33874 (17 December 2010).  
145 Note 144 at clause 6. 
146 Note 144 at clause 6A (3).  The BIBC maintains and periodically publishes a register of 
employers who are in good standing and those who are not in good standing with the council.  












introduced to encourage contractors who contract work out to take active measures 
to secure the compliance of their subcontractors (including LOSCs).  
 
The BIBC has also introduced a range of support services to incentivise 
employers to register and comply with the collective agreement. These include 
training on labour legislation, payroll facilities and access to a training programme 
on contracting.148 These services provided to firms that are registered with the 
council and are in good standing with the BIBC. They are provided free of charge or 
for a nominal fee and are primarily aimed at small and micro firms (including 
LOSCs) that need support and would otherwise not be able to afford it.149 The BIBC 
has also requested that government institutions make access to emerging contractor 
development programmes conditional upon registration and good standing with the 
council.150  
 
The NBCFRLI has adopted a different approach in relation to owner-drivers 
in the industry. The collective agreement requires employers including owner-
drivers to comply with minimum conditions of employment in relation to their 
employees. Its collective agreement defines an owner-driver as “an employer who is 
the owner or part-owner or leaseholder or renter of one or more motor vehicles 
used in transporting goods for hire or reward and who himself drives any such 
motor vehicle” (emphasis added).151  
 
                                                          
148 Note 144 at clause 6(8); S Godfrey, J Theron and M Visser, The State of Collective Bargaining 
(Cape Town: Development Policy Research Unit, 2007) 22-3. 
149 Godfrey et al (note 148) 22-3.  
150 Ibid. 
151 Clause 2 of the National Bargaining Council for the Road Freight and Logistics Industry Collective 












The collective agreement exempts owner-drivers who possess only one 
vehicle and are the permanent drivers thereof, as well as their employees from 
almost all of its provisions.152 Presumably, this is a concession is aimed at relieving 
nascent entrepreneurs of the financial burdens associated with compliance to give 
them a space within which they can establish themselves and  grow. Other 
bargaining councils have adopted a similar approach on a similar basis.153 The 
collective agreement however requires these owner-drivers to furnish the council 
with their personal and business details and to comply with the minimum standards 
relating to working hours.154 
 
5.4.3 “From driver to entrepreneur”: providing business support to owner-
drivers 
 
The owner-driver scheme is probably one of the most successful programmes that 
have been used to externalise the labour of self-employed workers and their 
workers in South Africa. Much of their success appears to lie in their strong 
emphasis on black economic empowerment and their reliance on success stories of 
ordinary drivers who have become prosperous entrepreneurs. This is illustrated in 
the extract below: 
 
From chauffeur to truck driver, to transport company owner with an annual turnover of 
more than R2-million, Ben Mvemve is living testimony to how hard work and perseverance, 
coupled with good entrepreneurial skills can pay off. Mvemve is an owner-driver contracted 
to the South African Breweries Ltd (SAB) in Durban and operates three vehicles with a staff 
of 12 people, delivering to a variety of outlets within an 80km radius of the city.155 
                                                          
152 Note 151 at clause 1(3). 
153 S Godfrey, J Maree, D du Toit and J Theron Collective Bargaining in South Africa: Past, Present and 
Future? (Cape Town: Juta, 2010) 121-3.  
154 Note 151 at clauses 3 and 5(4). 
155 “Owner-driver programme a winning recipe” accessed from the BizCommunity website at 













Firms implementing owner-driver schemes not only use these heart-warming 
stories to capture the imagination of drivers to inspire them to seize the opportunity 
to take control of their own destinies. They also provide structured support 
programmes to enable drivers to progress from being employees to employers and 
owners of their own vehicles. The owner-driver schemes are divided into a number 
of clearly defined stages.  
 
Typically, the owner-driver support programmes have three main 
components. First, financial support is essential to facilitate the purchase of the 
vehicle that sets the driver’s transition from an employee to an owner into motion. 
The core enterprise usually undertakes to ‘sponsor’ or underwrite the loan 
agreement with a financial institution with whom it has a relationship.156 Several of 
South Africa’s large financial institutions have developed specific loan products to 
finance vehicle purchases for owner-driver schemes.157  
  
Second, the owner-drivers are provided with business management training 
in a number of areas, including financial planning, accounts, communication, 
problem-solving and customer service.158 The owner-drivers may undergo intensive 
training during the early phases of the scheme and this is usually combined with 
intermittent training periods over a longer period of time. In many cases, owner-
                                                          
156  See Standard Bank, “Owner Driver Scheme, accessed from 
http://www.standardbank.co.za/portal/site/standardbank/menuitem.de435aa54d374eb6fcb6956
65c9006a0/?vgnxtoid=4fc508f82045b210VgnVCM100000c509600aRCRD on 1/04/2011. 
157 An example is Standard Bank, which operates a comprehensive “Owner Driver Scheme” package 
which includes a vehicle maintenance fund, insurance and contract evaluation services. See 
Standard Bank (note 156).  
158 See Cargo Carriers “Owner Driver Programme” accessed from 
http://www.cargocarriers.co.za/owner_drivers.asp on 15/05/2011; E Webster, A Benya, X Dilata, C 
Joynt, K Ngoepe, M Tsoeu  “Making Visible the Invisible: Confronting South Africa's Decent Work 
Deficit” (Sociology of Work Unit, University of Witwatersrand) Research commissioned by the 












drivers are assigned to a mentor or business advisor whom they can consult for 
advice on specific business issues.159  
 
Third, owner-drivers receive training on a number of employment related 
matters to enable them to effectively perform their new role as employers.160 The 
training is aimed at providing them with an understanding of industrial relations 
and the relevant labour legislation. Thus, the firms play a facilitative role by 
equipping owner-drivers with the necessary knowledge and skills to comply with 
their obligations as employers and provide fair working conditions. SAB Limited 
requires that its owner drivers to pay workers in accordance with minimum wages, 
and register as employers in terms of the UIA and COIDA.161 The extent to which 
SAB polices these requirements and sanctions non-compliance on the part of the 
owner-drive is however uncertain.  
 
5.4.4  Analysis of the non-state regulation of the practice 
 
The above sections have discussed some non-state initiatives designed to regulate 
the practice of contracting work out to self-employed workers. Admittedly, they do 
not provide a comprehensive or exhaustive account of the measures initiated by 
trade unions, self-employed workers, bargaining councils and employers. The 
discussion nevertheless provides some useful insights about the role that non-state 
parties can play in ensuring that self-employed workers and/or their workers enjoy 
some degree of labour protection.  
 
                                                          
159 “From drivers to owner-entrepreneurs” accessed from the South Africa Info website at 
http://www.southafrica.info/business/trends/empowerment/famousbee-210710.htm on 
23/04/2011. 
160 Ibid.  












 A key observation that can be made relates to the relationship between the 
non-state institutions and initiatives on the one hand and state institutions and state 
law on the other. The discussion above shows that the state and non-state 
institutions and forms of regulation do not operate in isolation from each other. It 
demonstrates a high level of interaction and interdependency between non-state 
institutions and state institutions (the Ministry of Labour), state law (legislation 
such as the LRA, UIA and COIDA) and state-sanctioned labour standards (collective 
agreements).  
 
One could summarise the situation by saying that the non-state institutions 
have played a role in setting the parameters of whether and when labour law and 
collective agreements will be applicable to self-employed workers and/or their 
workers that are covered by them. The non-state institutions have also 
implemented measures to apply and enforce these laws and standards. However, 
this does not imply absolute harmony between state institutions and state law and 
the measures taken by non-state institutions.  
 
It must also be noted that none of the non-state institutions discussed 
envisage the extension of labour law to the self-employed workers. Although the 
institutions acknowledge the role of self-employed workers as workers who 
contribute their own labour, they seem to place more emphasis on self-employed 
workers’ decisions to profit from the labour of other workers and their potential to 
become successful entrepreneurs.  They therefore treat self-employed workers as 
entrepreneurs and employers.  
 
Importantly, the non-state regulation envisages that self-employed workers 












and labour rights of the workers they employ. A notable exception relates to the 
BIBC collective agreement which provides that firms that subcontract work to 
subcontractors will be held jointly and severally liable for the subcontractor’s 
contravention of the provisions of the collective agreement or the terms of an 
arbitration award. The provision’s efficacy in inducing large contractors to “become 
part of the enforcement mechanism with regard to sub-contractors”162 is unknown.  
 
 The measures implemented by non-state institutions are underscored by the 
principle that self-employed workers should comply with the standards set in 
labour law and collective agreements just as any other employer would be expected 
to. They however acknowledge their status as “emerging” entrepreneurs and 
provide additional support to place them in position where they can comply with 
legislation.  This “developmental” approach is evident in the blanket exemption of 
owner drivers possessing one vehicle from the NBCRFLI collective agreement. It is 
also reflected in the provision of business skills and employment training and 
services provided by employers, the BIBC and envisaged by SASCA.   
 
 Despite the association’s ultimate failure, the SASCA case study showed the 
role that organisation could play to address the power dynamics that characterise 
the relationship between the core enterprise, the self-employed worker and her/his 
workers. SASCA sought to grapple with the dilemma that most self-employed 
workers face, that is, their limited bargaining power vis-a-vis the core enterprise 
and the limitations that the product of that bargain places on the self-employed 
worker’s ability to determine working conditions for her/his workers. SASCA 
sought to harness the collective power of self-employed workers to enable them to 
                                                          












secure a bargain that would enable them to improve the working conditions of their 
workers.  
 
 The discussion of the role of non-state institutions highlights the dilemmas 
that the practice presents for policy-making: 
Should this emergent contractor be regarded as being in a vulnerable position, and should 
the relationship between the emergent contractor and the core enterprise be regulated? 
The core business controls such satellite enterprises or contractors through commercial 
contracts, of which service agreements ... are common forms. To seek to regulate this kind of 
[relationship] transgresses the boundary between commercial and labour regulation that 
has hitherto been regarded as inviolate. There is also no ready answer to the argument that 
the emergent contractor is simply an entrepreneur of the very kind industrial policy should 
seek to promote and who should as far as possible be left to his or her own devices.163 
 
The non-state institutions’ answer to this question is that the self employed worker 
is an entrepreneur. The different approaches they hav  adopted are unified in their 
focus on providing self-employed workers with the necessary support to enable 
them to develop their businesses and consequently be able to provide their workers 
with better working conditions. They do not envisage the extension of labour law to 
self-employed workers. With one exception, they do not envisage the imposition of 
liability on core enterprises for the labour rights and working conditions of the 
workers of self-employed workers.  
 
 On the other hand, the legal principles in parts 5.2 which envisage the 
possible extension of labour rights to self-employed workers who employ other 
workers. It is also at odds with the legal principles discussed in part 5.3, which 
envisage that core enterprises may be held liable for the labour rights and working 
conditions of the workers of self-employed workers as a result of the piercing of the 
corporate veil.  
                                                          
163 J Theron “The erosion of workers' rights and the presumption as to who is an employee” (2002) 













In light of the above, it will be necessary for legislators and policy-makers to 
carefully consider the implications of the interface between state and non-
regulation of the practice under scrutiny. The potential role that institutions such as 
bargaining councils, trade unions and even core enterprises could play in ensuring 
the effective application of labour law to self-employed workers and their workers 
cannot be under-estimated. Their strength lies in their proximity to the parties 
involved, which enables them to access and influence core enterprises and self-
employed workers through a number of innovative strategies.  
 
Notwithstanding their importance, non-state institutions should not be left to 
their own devices, but should operate within the parameters of a robust legal 
framework that specifically recognises and regulates the practice. Such a framework 
would set out clear principles determining when the self-employed workers and 
their workers must receive protection and the type and level of protection they 
would receive. This would require the crystallisation and more explicit articulation 
of the legal principles discussed in parts 5.2 and 5.3 to regulate the practice.  
   
CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this chapter was to consider whether South African law adequately 
recognises and regulates the practice of contracting work out to self-employed 
workers. It began by identifying certain challenges that labour law would have to 
address in order to effectively regulate this practice. One of these challenges was the 
need to move beyond three key assumptions underpinning conventional labour law, 
namely that the employer is a unitary and bounded entity, that the employment 












be restricted to employees as opposed to any other category of worker. The second 
related to the need for labour law to develop solutions that address the multi-
dimensional nature of new work arrangements which undermine the application of 
labour law. 
 
Parts 5.2 and 5.3 canvassed the body of rules that South African labour law 
has developed to regulate non-standard work arrangements in general. The 
discussion in these parts considered the legal approaches to addressing 
externalisation by commodification and externalisation by intermediation 
respectively. The primary aim was to identify any specific references to and rules 
governing the practice under scrutiny.  
 
This was only found in the Code of Good Practice, which provides that a 
worker who provides her/his services through a corporate entity and/or employs 
other workers is not precluded from employee status. It provided that in cases 
where a worker who employs other workers is found to be an employee, her/his 
workers may be found to be employees of the core employer if they are subject to 
the latter’s control. It was found that with the exception of this provision in the Code 
– which amounts to soft law and has no binding force – there has been no concerted 
effort to regulate the practice under scrutiny in a more comprehensive manner.  
 
The discussion then turned to whether the legal approaches designed to 
address other non-standard forms of work provided any lessons that could be 
applied to regulating the practice under scrutiny. It was found that a number of the 
principles underlying the various approaches could be extended and adapted to 












approaches could be extended to address the challenges that the practice poses to 
labour law to varying degrees. 
 
Chief amongst these was the corporate veil doctrine. This could be applied to 
the practice under scrutiny to allow for a broader approach to the identification of 
the employer and the allocation of employer obligations in relation to workers of 
the self-employed worker. Depending on the circumstances, the doctrine could be 
used to hold the core enterprise liable as sole employer, jointly and severally with 
the self-employed worker (the latter being the primary employer), or as a co-
employer or joint employer with the self-employed worker. This doctrine therefore 
transcends the narrow conception of the employer as a unitary and bounded entity, 
the understanding that the employment relationship is a bilateral one and the 
assumption that employer liability should only be imposed on the basis of a direct 
contractual nexus between employer and worker. 
  
Having exhausted the actual and potential contribution of state-centred 
labour law, the discussion shifted to consider the role that non-state institutions 
have played in addressing the practice under scrutiny. The discussion showed more 
direct and concerted efforts to regulate the practice within the construction sector 
and in relation to truck drivers. The measures adopted were based on the premise 
that the self-employed worker is not an employee but an emerging entrepreneur 
and entrepreneur who requires business support to enable him/her to comply with 
labour law and collective agreements. A key issue arising in this context was the 
divergence between the approaches state and non-state institutions, which gives 
rise to the need to probe the interface between these institutions for the regulation 













 The key finding from this chapter is that while the practice of contracting 
work out to self-employed workers is recognised in South African labour law, this 
recognition and the regulation thereof are fairly limited. Nevertheless, South African 
labour law can draw inspiration from the principles underlying the legal approaches 
that regulate other non-standard forms of work. These principles need to be 
crystallised and clearly articulated in legislation aimed at specifically regulating the 
practice under scrutiny.  The initiatives of non-state institutions would therefore 
need to be constrained by the binding legal principles set in relation to the practice.  
 
Chapter seven will discuss the key underlying principles and substantive 
principles that should form part of a framework of rules to regulate the practice 
under scrutiny. This preceded by an analysis of the role of the ILO in regulating 












CHAPTER 6: DOES THE ILO RECOGNISE AND REGULATE THE 




The International Labour Organisation (ILO) is the United Nations specialised 
agency whose mandate is to advance “opportunities for women and men to obtain 
and decent and productive work in conditions of freedom, security and human 
dignity”.1 It was established in 1919 at the end of the First World War. Part XIII of 
the Treaty of Versailles which was signed to end the First World War was devoted to 
labour and laid the foundation for the Constitution of the ILO.2  
 
The desire to establish a permanent labour organisation was borne out of the 
realization that “universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based 
upon social justice”.3  The founders were also driven by humanitarian objective to 
combat the exploitation of workers and improve their condition.4  In addition, they 
recognised the growing economic interdependence between states and the need to 
establish minimum labour standards to prevent unfair competition between states.5 
                                                          
1 ILO “The ILO at a glance” information brochure accessed from the ILO website at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/@webdev/documents/public
aton/wcms_082367.pdf on 12/02/2011. 
2 J M Servais International Labour Law (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2005) 24. 
3 Preamble of the ILO Constitution.  
4 ILO “The ILO: What it is, what it does” information booklet accessed from the ILO website at 
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history/lang--en/index.htm on 21/01/2011.  
5 B Hepple “Global Trade and Labour Law” in Bronstein, A, International and Comparative Labour 
Law: Current Challenges, (Palgrave MacMillan and ILO, 2009) 87; Servais International Labour Law 












These objectives and ideals continue to be valid and form part of the ILO’s 
ideological basis today.6  
 
The ILO’s work is guided by four strategic objectives. The first is to promote 
and realize standards and fundamental principles and rights at work.7 The second is 
to promote greater opportunities for people to have decent work and income.8 The 
third and fourth objectives are to enhance the coverage and effectiveness of social 
protection for all and to strengthen tripartism and social dialogue.9 The ILO’s efforts 
to achieve these objectives are based on a tripartite approach involving cooperation 
between governments, employers’ organisations and workers’ organisations.10 
 
The ILO has developed a number of approaches and strategies to realize its 
objectives. Central to the ILO’s mandate is the adoption and monitoring of the 
application of international labour standards in the form of conventions and 
recommendations.11 The ILO also develops and implements broader international 
policies and programmes to promote basic human rights, improve working and 
living conditions and enhance employment opportunities.12 Importantly, it provides 
                                                          
6 ILO (note 4). 
7 ILO “Mission and objectives” accessed from the ILO website at http://www.ilo.org/global/about 
the-ilo/mission-and-objectives/lang--en/index.htm on 30/01/2011. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid.  
10 ILO (note 4). 
11 ILO “The ILO at a glance” information brochure accessed from the ILO website at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/@webdev/documents/public
aton/wcms_082367.pdf on 12/02/2011. 
















technical assistance to help countries to effectively implement ILO policies as well as 
training, education and research activities to support its programmes.13 
  
The ILO’s standards and programmes extend beyond workers in standard 
employment. The Decent Work Agenda, which is central to the work of the ILO, aims 
to extend labour and social protection to “all workers, and in particular poor or 
disadvantaged workers”.14 During the course of its history, the Organisation has 
developed standards and programmes to protect marginalised and excluded 
workers including those in non-standard employment, the unemployed and those 
who labour in the informal economy.  
 
This chapter considers the history of ILO’s efforts to regulate what it has 
referred to as contract labour. Through a primary analysis of the Organisation’s of 
various ILO instruments, reports, discussions, draft instruments, and other 
documents, it traces the evolution of the ILO’s understanding of contract labour.  In 
addition, it analyses how the ILO’s formulation of responses to the problem has 
changed over time. As will be shown in the discussion below, contract labour is a 
complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon. The purpose of the analysis is to 
determine the extent to which the ILO has recognized and regulated the practice of 
contracting work out to self-employed workers, which is the focus of this study. 
 
The discussion is divided according to the three key periods which highlight 
important events in the history of the ILO. The first period spans the years 1949 to 
1992. The second period began in 1993 and ended 1998. The third period covers 
1999 to the present. 
                                                          
13 Ibid. 
14 ILO, “Decent Work Agenda” accessed from the ILO website at http://www.ilo.org/global/about 













As will be shown in part 6.1, the first period was characterized by a 
fragmented approach to addressing contract labour as it was recognised to varying 
degrees at different levels of the Organisation. During this period, contract labour 
was mentioned in some ILO instruments and more directly recognized as a problem 
by several ILO industrial committees. In addition, the International Labour 
Conference (ILC) made reference to the plight of self-employed worker and their 
employees in a resolution on the promotion of self-employment in 1990. While 
there was some recognition of contract labour at the apex of the organisation during 
this first period, the development of a coherent understanding of and strategy to 
address it was not a priority.  
 
Part 6.2 will cover the second period, which was marked by concerted efforts 
to put contract labour on the agenda at the centre of the Organisation. It will cover 
the build-up to the discussions on contract labour in the International Labour 
Conference in 1997 and 1998. The draft convention and recommendation on 
contract labour and their subsequent amendments will be discussed and analysed in 
details. Importantly, the reactions of government, employers and labour to the draft 
instruments will be outlined and the reasons for the Organisation’s failure to adopt 
them considered.  
 
The third period, which began in 1999, is covered in part 6.3. During this 
period the ILO progressively retreated from its earlier focus on contract labour 
towards situation of workers in need of protection. By 2003, it was clear that the 
ILO had chosen to focus more broadly on delineating the scope of the employment 
relationship. This was placed on the agenda of the 2003 International Labour 












delineating the scope of the employment relationship. The ILO adopted 
Recommendation 198 on the Employment Relationship in 2006.  
 
 What emerges from the analysis is that there was some recognition of the 
practice of contracting work out to self-employed workers during the discussions 
prior to 1998.  This understanding, however, was not fully translated into the 
provisions of the draft provisions on contract labour. The analysis in this chapter 
will reveal that measures taken after 1998 represent a regression from the 
possibility of regulating contract labour. Hence, Recommendation 198 is a blunt 
instrument that cannot address the many dimensions of contract labour, including 
contracting work out to self-employed workers.  
 
The disappointing outcome of the ILO’s endeavours, however, does not 
render the analysis fruitless. Some lessons can be learned from engaging with the 
reports, discussions, resolutions and draft instruments on contract labour and the 
employment relationship. These lessons enhance the process of conceptualising the 
practice under scrutiny, understanding the conflicting interests involved, and 
developing legal solutions to the problem. The lessons drawn from this analysis will 
be reflected in the next chapter, which will make recommendations on the 
regulation of contracting work out to self-employed workers in the South African 
context.  
 
6.1 1949-1992: A FRAGMENTED APPROACH TO CONTRACT 
LABOUR 
 
Prior to 1993, the ILO had not developed a coherent framework within which to 












was recognised and regulated in different ways and to varying degrees in a number 
of ILO bodies.  
 
A few of the ILO’s international instruments that regulated various issues, 
however, made some reference to contract labour in their provisions. In addition, 
contract labour was more directly recognized as a challenge by ILO industrial 
committees. These covered amongst others, the petroleum, clothing and the 
building, civil engineering and public works industries.15 The ILO instruments and 
the industrial committee conclusions on contract labour are discussed in section 
6.1.1.  
 
Another key development during this period was the recognition of contract 
labour in the ILO’s discussions on the promotion of self-employment. This 
development is pertinent to this work because it specifically recognised the 
problems arising when work was contracted to self-employed workers who in turn 
employed others to assist them. The discussion and resolutions on self-employment 
are discussed in section 6.1.2.  
 
Finally, section 6.1.3 provides a brief conclusion drawing the implications of 
these developments and the position in 1992.  
 
                                                          
15 Other industrial committees not discussed in this part are the Committee on Work on Plantations 
which discussed the matter in 1989 and 1994, the Forestry and Wood Industries Committee and 
the Food and Drink Industries Committee in 1991; the Inland Transport Committee; the Tripartite 
Technical Meeting for the Leather and Footwear Industry; The Iron and Steel Committee in 1992; 
the Chemical Industries Committee in 1995; the Metal Trades Committee in 1994; the Committee 
on Salaried Employees and Professional Workers in 1994. See International Labour Conference 
85th Session 1997 Report VI (1) Contract Labour, Sixth item on the agenda (Geneva: International 












6.1.1 Contract labour in ILO conventions and industrial committees 
 
Prior to 1993, only two conventions explicitly mentioned contract labour in their 
provisions. These were the Labour Clauses (Public Contracts) Convention of 1949 
and the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention of 1989.16  
 
The Labour Clauses (Public Contracts) Convention sought to protect workers 
from the negative consequences of competition for public tenders and ensure fair 
working conditions for workers performing work in pursuance of public contracts.17 
Article 1(3) enjoined public authorities to ensure the application of the convention 
to subcontractors and assignees of public contracts. The Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention called for special measures to ensure the protection of 
indigenous and tribal peoples employed in standard forms of work, including those 
who were employed by labour contractors.18 
 
In addition to these conventions, several ILO instruments relating to health 
and safety issues, provided for the allocation of responsibility in situations involving 
two or more employers operating on the same site.19 The Safety and Health in 
Construction Convention expressly referred to subcontractors as employers.20  
 
                                                          
16 ILO Conventions No. 94 and 169 respectively. See ILC 85th Session 1997 Report VI (1) Contract 
Labour (note 15) 71. 
17 Articles 1 and 2 of Convention No. 94. See ILC 85th Session 1997 Report VI (1) Contract Labour 
(note 15) 71. 
18 Article 20(3) (a) of ILO Convention 169. 
19 See for example article 8 of the Safety and Health in Construction Convention, 1988 (No. 167) and 
article 12 of the Safety and Health in Mines Convention 1995 (No. 176) and articles 6(2), 16 and 17 
of the Asbestos Convention, 1986 (No. 162).  













The brief analysis of the above conventions shows that there was some 
recognition of the notion of contract labour and the vulnerability of workers in 
contracting arrangements in the ILO. This recognition could be credited to the ILO’s 
highest decision-making organ. It could however be argued that the references to 
contract labour were merely incidental to the primary focus of the respective 
conventions. Contract labour was a peripheral issue as there was no overarching 
understanding or definition of it, nor any coherent strategy specifically aimed at 
addressing it at the highest level.  
 
Contract labour was more directly addressed by a number of ILO industrial 
committees from as early as 1955.21In 1955 and 1956, the ILO’s Petroleum 
Committee adopted a resolution concerning conditions of employment of contract 
labour in the industry.22 It noted the trend that oil firms were increasingly 
contracting work out to external contractors.23 It also noted some of the work 
contracted out was of an irregular or temporary nature, but that there was a greater 
tendency for firms to contract out permanent or core functions of the enterprises.24 
The committee referred to the workers employed by contractors as contract 
labour.25  
 
The Petroleum Committee noted that in many cases, oil firms engaged a 
combination of direct employees and contract workers to perform the same kind of 
                                                          
21 ILC 85th Session 1997 Report VI (1) Contract Labour (note 15) 71. 
22 Petroleum Committee, (Fifth Session, Caracas, April-May 1955 and Geneva, April 1956) 
Resolution 
No. 44 concerning conditions of employment of contract labour in the petroleum industry. This is 
annexed to ILC 85th Session 1997 Report VI (1) Contract Labour (note 15) 71. 
23 Preamble to the Petroleum Committee, (Fifth Session, Caracas, April-May 1955 and Geneva, April 















work alongside each other.26 However, there tended to be disparities between the 
working conditions of the two groups of workers, with contract workers often 
working on less favourable terms.27 This disparity was a source of potential division 
and discontent and could undermine harmonious relations amongst workers.28  
 
The Petroleum Committee resolved that the primary responsibility for 
guaranteeing favourable working conditions for contract workers lay with the 
contractor as their employer.29 It called for collective bargaining between the 
parties as the primary mechanism to regulate working conditions.30 In the absence 
of organizations representing these parties, the relevant public authority would be 
responsible for ensuring fair working conditions in contracting arrangements.31 
This would entail the enactment of legislation and measures such as the licensing of 
contractors, the development of standard contracts and monitoring through 
inspections and enforcement through penalties of violations.32  
 
The Petroleum Committee noted that that oil firms benefiting from contract 
labour also bore some responsibility to the workers.33 The Committee 
recommended that oil firms using contract labour should require contractors to 
provide fair wages and working conditions through contractual clauses and 
measures to ensure that contractors complied with them. They would also have to 
take measures to ensure adequate medical and supply services for contract labour 




















working in remote areas. Oil firms would also be required to avoid the arbitrary 
discharge of contract workers during the period of a contract.  
 
Contract labour was again the subject of discussion by the petroleum 
committee at its eighth session in 1973.34  In the preamble to the conclusions to this 
session, the Petroleum Committee noted the persistence development of new forms 
of contract labour and the threat that it posed to regular employment in the 
industry. The Committee attributed these developments to the failure to implement 
the resolutions of the fifth session resolutions in the petroleum industry.35  It noted 
that “similar problems [could] arise in other industries with regard to the use of 
contract and casual labour”. 36 
 
At its eighth session, the Petroleum Committee reaffirmed and expanded on 
the resolutions adopted at the fifth session. One proposal was to place limitations on 
the contracting out of technical processes for which equipment and permanent 
employees could be used by oil firms.37 The Committee also called on governments 
to take positive steps to ensure that statutory minimum working conditions were 
applicable to contract workers.38 It further proposed that oil firms assimilate 
temporary contract workers as permanent employees, where appropriate and after 
suitable training.39 Oil firms could also train their workers to increase their internal 
mobility and reduce the need for temporary personnel and contractors.40  
                                                          
34 Petroleum Committee, (Eighth Session, Geneva, April 1973), Conclusions (No. 65) concerning 
social problems of contract, subcontract and casual labour in the petroleum industry. This is 
annexed 
to International Labour Conference 85th Session 1997 Report VI (1) Contract Labour at 85-87. 
35 Preamble to Petroleum Committee Eighth Session (1973) Conclusions (note 34). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Item 2 of Petroleum Committee Eighth Session (1973) Conclusions (note 34). 
38 Item 6 of Petroleum Committee Eighth Session (1973) Conclusions (note 34). 
39 Item 11 of Petroleum Committee Eighth Session (1973) Conclusions (note 34). 













The clothing industry identified contract labour as a matter of concern during 
the ILO’s Second Tripartite Technical Meeting for the clothing industry in 1980.41 
The Meeting noted the prevalence of contract labour, including homework, in the 
industry.42 This was to a large extent attributable to the seasonality of the clothing 
industry and the need for flexibility to meet fluctuations in demand.43 
 
The Meeting noted the difficulty of defining contract labour and the diversity 
of forms of contracting and subcontracting arrangements.44  Some forms of contract 
labour were driven by wholesalers and retailers and others by manufacturers and 
some which spanned across international borders.45 The dearth of reliable data on 
contract labour hampered a full understanding of its nature and extent in the 
different countries.46 The Meeting called on the ILO to call on member states to 
provide appropriate statistics to facilitate further consideration of the subject.47 It 
also called on the ILO to give more frequent and comprehensive attention to the 
problems experienced in the clothing industry.48 
 
The meeting identified several challenges arising in contract arrangements. 
These included unfair treatment, unequal treatment of contract workers and non-
compliance with legislative provisions and collective agreements relating to wages, 
                                                          
41 Second Tripartite Technical Meeting for the Clothing Industry (Geneva, 23 September – 2 October 
1980), Conclusions (No. 7) concerning contract labour in the clothing industry. This is annexed to 
International Labour Conference 85th Session 1997 Report VI (1) Contract Labour at 87-91. 
42 Paragraph 1 of the Second Tripartite Technical Meeting for the Clothing Industry (1980) (note 
41). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Paragraph 2 of the Second Tripartite Technical Meeting for the Clothing Industry (1980) (note 
41). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid at paragraph 3. 
47 Ibid at paragraph 4. 












benefits and health and safety standards.49 These challenges were exacerbated in 
arrangements involving vulnerable groups of workers including undocumented 
migrants, women and children.50 Working conditions amongst home workers also 
generally tended to be poorer than those of other workers.51 
 
The Meeting identified a number of strategies to ensure that the advantages 
of subcontracting were not gained at the workers’ expense and ensure that workers 
were adequately remunerated and protected. It called for the adoption of minimum 
international labour standards which would be supervised by the ILO.52 It 
recommended the adoption of joint and several liability to prevent unfair 
competition in the context of subcontracting arrangements.53 
 
The Meeting called for the equality of treatment between home workers and 
factory workers, especially in relation to wage rates, holidays and social security.54 
It recommended the promotion of the active engagement of social partners in the 
enforcement of protective measures.55 In addition, it recommended that measures 
be taken to prevent labour trafficking and to protect undocumented migrant 
workers from abuse.56  
 
Finally, the Building, Civil Engineering and Public Works Committee of the 
ILO placed contract labour on the agenda of its twelfth session in 1992.57 At the end 
                                                          
49 Ibid at paragraph 7. 
50 Ibid at paragraphs 7, 17, 21. 
51 Ibid at paragraph 7. 
52 Ibid at paragraph 11. 
53 Ibid at paragraph 8. 
54 Ibid at paragraph 18. 
55 Ibid at paragraph 19. 
56 Ibid at paragraphs 21-4. 
57 Twelfth Session of the Building, Civil Engineering  and Public Works Committee (Geneva, 2-10 












of its discussions, the committee adopted a resolution on contract labour. In its 
resolution, it invited the Governing Body of the International Labour Office to 
request ILO member states to take a number of actions.  
 
The first was to ensure compliance with appropriate labour legislation in 
respect of all workers, including contract workers.58 States would also be required 
to ensure the statutory coverage of contract workers, the monitoring of their 
working conditions and enforcement of labour laws.59 States would also be 
requested to enable contract workers to have access to regular conditions of 
employment.60  
 
The above discussion shows that industrial committees took a direct and 
substantive approach to addressing contract labour within their respective 
domains. While there was a need for more clarity on its scope, it was understood to 
encompass job contracting and, in some industries, the use of temporary 
employment agencies. A common finding was that contract labour created 
inequality between contract workers and standard employees. There was also some 
recognition that contract workers were more likely to be drawn from certain 
vulnerable social groups. The committees called on the ILO to take action and also 
recognised the need to involve contractors, user enterprises and governments in 
efforts address contract labour. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in construction. This is annexed to ILC 85th Session 1997 Report VI (1) Contract Labour (note 15) at 
91-2. 
58 Item 1(a) of the Twelfth Session of the Building, Civil Engineering and Public Works Committee 
Resolution (note 57). 













While the committee discussions and resolutions contributed more substance 
to understanding and regulating contract labour, they had limited immediate impact 
more broadly within the ILO.  This was because the industrial committees were 
located on the periphery as opposed to the centre of the organisation. In addition, 
they had limited direct influence over decision-making bodies at the apex of the 
organisation. Nevertheless, the committee discussions helped to raise the profile of 
contract labour and provided some evidence to support further discussion on the 
subject.61 
 
6.1.2 Contract labour and the promotion of self-employment  
 
The ILO’s recognition and regulation of self-employment before 1990 was limited to 
their inclusion in some international labour instruments regulating a wide range of 
issues. For example, self-employed workers were included in key conventions 
relating to freedom of association, forced labour and equal opportunity.62  In 
addition, several ILO instruments on employment policy provided for various 
programmes to support and promote the self-employed or those who wanted to 
enter self-employment.63 Some ILO instruments on working conditions and social 
security also provided for the inclusion of self-employed workers.64   
                                                          
61 ILC 85th Session 1997 Report VI (1) Contract Labour 72. 
62 They were expressly or implicitly included in the Right to Organise Convention, No. 87, 948; the 
Rural Workers’ Organisations Convention No. 141 , 1974; the Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) Convention No. 111, 1958; the Forced Labour Convention No. 29, 1930; the Forced 
Labour (Indirect Compulsion) Recommendation No. 35, 1930. For a detailed discussion, see 
International Labour Conference 77th Session 1990, Report VII Promotion of Self Employment, 
Seventh item on the agenda. 
63 See Employment Policy Convention No. 122, 1964; Employment Policy Recommendation No. 122, 
1964: these read together, implicitly advocate the promotion of full, productive and freely chosen 
self-employment. The Older Workers’ Recommendation No. 162, 1980 refers to retirement 
preparation programmes providing information on, inter alia, the possibility of becoming self 
employed. The Employment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment Convention and its 












At this stage, the organisation had not comprehensively assessed the situation 
of self-employed workers, nor sought to develop a coherent strategy to assist and 
protect them. The move in this direction began with the discussion of the promotion 
of self-employment in the 77th session of the ILC. 65 A resolution on the promotion of 
self-employment was adopted in the same conference.66 This was significant in the 
history of the ILO as it identified key features of self-employment, its potential 
economic role and priorities for national self-employment policies and ILO action. 
(It is also pertinent to this thesis, as it recognised the involvement of self-employed 
workers in contracting arrangements). 
 
The Resolution acknowledged the developing interest in non-agricultural 
self-employment for generating employment under changed economic 
circumstances.67 It advocated the promotion of freely chosen and productive self-
employment which enabled individuals to “fulfil their potential and give free rein to 
their creativity and initiative”.68  In addition, it was necessary to upgrade “low 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
those wanting to set up their own businesses. The Human Resources Development 
Recommendation No. 168 (1983) suggests that member states prepare and regularly update 
national plans for providing technical and management training for the self-employed. For a 
detailed discussion, see ILC 77th Session 1990, Report VII Promotion of Self Employment (note 62) 
63-8. 
64 See e.g. the Night Work (Bakeries) Convention, No. 20, 1925; The Hours of Work and Rest Periods 
(Road Transport) Convention; the Income Security Recommendation, No. 67, 1944; The Social 
Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, No. 102, 1952 and the Invalidity, Old-Age and 
Survivors’ Benefits Convention No. 128, 1967. For a detailed discussion, see ILC 77th Session 1990, 
Report VII Promotion of Self Employment (note 62) 63-8. 
65A preliminary report was tabled before the ILC; see ILC 77th Session 1990, Report VII Promotion of 
Self Employment (note 62).  
66 Resolution concerning employment promotion, Resolution IV of the Resolutions adopted by the 
International Labour Conference at its 77th Session (Geneva: International Labour Conference, June 
1990). 
67 See item 1 of the Resolution concerning self employment (note 66). It identified slow economic 
growth, the ascendency of free market policies and technological changes as some of the key 
drivers of the trend. 












productivity but potentially viable self-employment activities”.69 It also affirmed the 
need to ensure that national policy and institutional frameworks facilitated access 
to self-employment opportunities.70  
 
The Resolution pointed out the complexity of defining self-employment and 
of distinguishing it from wage employment.71 It noted that self-employment entailed 
greater independence, control over labour time, risk-taking and responsibility for a 
range of economic and financial functions.72 These distinguishing characteristics 
were a matter of degree and a continuum existed between self-employed and wage 
workers.73  
 
A continuum also existed within the category of self-employed workers, 
ranging from the marginal to the prosperous self-employed workers.74 Self-
employed workers included own account workers who worked on their own, and 
self-employed employers or working proprietors who employed other workers.75 
Importantly, the Resolution recognised that the workers employed by the self-
employed in these contexts were particularly disadvantaged in terms of working 
conditions and protection.76 
 
Furthermore, the Resolution recognised that many self-employed workers 
were not genuinely independent and more closely resembled wage workers.77 It 
referred to these workers as the nominally self-employed and described nominal 
                                                          
69 Ibid.  
70 Ibid at item 14. 
71 Ibid at item 3. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid at items 4 and 5. 
74 Ibid at item 3. 
75 Ibid at item 5. 
76 Ibid at items 8 and 12. 












self-employment as precarious and based on exploitative and dependent 
relationships.78 Such relationships were closely associated with contracting and 
subcontracting arrangements and were driven by a desire to evade the obligations 
imposed by protective labour legislation.79 It is submitted that the nominally self-
employed workers can be equated to the self-employed workers like Jabu and Taryn 
who are the focus of this study. 
 
The Resolution proposed number of measures for the promotion and 
protection of self-employed workers and their workers. Many of these had a direct 
or indirect bearing on self-employed workers in contracting arrangements and their 
workers. These are discussed below.  
 
A key priority was the extension of labour standards and social protection to 
the self-employed and their workers.80 The Resolution emphasised the need to 
protect the nominal self-employed against subcontracting arrangements and labour 
contracts that resulted in their exploitation and the denial of their labour and social 
rights.81 It also recommended the promotion of social protection measures to cover 
both self-employed workers and their workers, who tended to be excluded from 
ordinary social protection schemes.82  
 
The Resolution also highlighted the need to design and implement direct 
measures to promote self-employment.83 These measures would improve the 
productivity and earnings of self-employed workers and their workers.84  Measures 
                                                          
78 Ibid at items 12 and 13. 
79 Ibid at items 12 and 13. 
80 Ibid at item 17. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid at item 16.   












would need to be taken to improve the access of the self-employed to credit, 
productive inputs, training and technical assistance.85 The Resolution made special 
mention of the nominal self-employed as beneficiaries of such initiatives.86  
 
The Resolution emphasised the importance of reviewing regulations that 
exempted small enterprises and self-employment units from complying with labour 
legislation.87 This would involve balancing the need to accommodate the special 
circumstances of self-employed workers with the need to protect the workers 
employed by self-employed workers.88 The ultimate aim was to ensure the parity of 
their working conditions with those of other workers.89 
 
A third priority was the promotion of freedom of association amongst the 
self-employed and their workers.90 The Resolution identified the need for the 
formation and strengthening of organisations by self-employed workers and co-
operatives to protect and further their interests.91 These organisations would play 
an important role in strengthening the bargaining power of otherwise vulnerable 
producers and supporting the nominal self-employed to become genuinely self-
employed.92 In addition, trade unions had to play a role through organizing the 
workers of self-employed workers.93 
  
 The Resolution envisaged that the measures identified in it would be 
facilitated and implemented by governments, business associations, trade unions 
                                                          
85 Ibid at items 16 (a) and (c). 
86 Ibid at items 16 (a) and (d). 
87 Ibid at item 17 (b).  
88 Ibid at item 17 (b). 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid at item 18. 
91 Ibid at items 18(b) and (f). 
92 Ibid at item 18 (f). 












academic and non-governmental institutions.94 It also highlighted the ILO’s 
invaluable role in promoting self-employment at both the national and international 
level through various initiatives.95 These included the facilitation of research; the 
provision of technical advice, training and assistance to national governments; and 
the encouragement of collaboration between various stakeholders.96  
 
 The General Conference resolution invited the Governing Body of the ILO to 
request the Director-General to inform member states and employers’ and workers’ 
organisations of the conclusions adopted therein.97 It also invited the Director 
General to take the conclusions into account in the development of the ILO 
Programme and Budget proposals for the 1992-3 and subsequent biennia, and the 
next medium-term plan.98  
 
 The discussions and conclusions on self-employment were important because 
they were the ILO’s first attempt to interrogate the potential for and challenges of 
promoting self-employment. The conclusions recognised the use of self-employment 
in the context of sub-contracting arrangements and the resultant poor working 
conditions of the workers involved.  Some of the recommendations made direct 
reference to the nominally self-employed and to workers in sub-contracting 
arrangements. Other recommendations related to self-employed workers and their 
workers in general, but had some bearing on self-employed workers in contracting 
arrangements and their workers.  
 
                                                          
94 See for example items 18(c) and (d) of the ILC Resolution concerning self employment 
promotion. 
95 See items 19-24 of the ILC Resolution concerning self employment promotion. 
96 Ibid. 













6.1.3 Conclusion: the position in 1992 
 
This part has shown that the period prior to 1992 was characterised by recognition 
of contract labour in different ILO organs, in different contexts and to varying 
degrees. Contract labour was recognised in certain ILO conventions, in the 
discussions and conclusions of industrial committee meetings and in the discussions 
and conclusions on self-employment. It is necessary to reflect on the significance of 
these seemingly fragmented developments for the practice under scrutiny. 
 
 The ILO conventions that made some reference to contract labour constituted 
“hard law” and had greater weight in terms of their pedigree. However, they were 
substantively weak as they did not provide a solid understanding of the concept of 
contract labour and its many dimensions. This was because contract labour was 
merely one of many aspects related to the subject matter of the conventions. On the 
other hand, the conclusions of the industrial committees, while weaker in pedigree, 
were the result of more focused engagement on contract labour and its 
consequences for workers involved therein.  
 
 Both the conventions and the conclusions of the industrial committees 
focused on the protection of the workers employed by contractors. They therefore 
paid little attention to the possible diversity in the nature and circumstances of the 
contractors. As a result, there was no recognition that in some cases, some 
contractors were self-employed workers who more closely resembled wage 
workers than entrepreneurs.  
 
 To a limited extent, contract labour and its relationship with self-employed 












self-employment. However, as indicated above, these themes were not central to the 
debate on self-employment nor the subsequent programmes developed to promote 
it. 
 
 The discussions and resolutions on the promotion of self-employed workers 
considered a number of dimensions/forms of contract labour and, crucially, 
recognised the possibility that in some cases, self-employed were engaged as 
contractors. The resolution described these as nominally self-employed workers 
who were engaged in dependent and exploitative arrangements. It recognised that 
these arrangements had implications for these self-employed workers and their 
employees. 
 
 The resolution on self-employment made some recommendations regarding 
self-employed worker-contractors. Some of these emphasised the need to avoid the 
exploitation of and extend labour and social protection to self-employed worker-
contractors and their workers. While this implied placing some obligations upon the 
user or core enterprise, the recommendations did not elaborate on how this could 
be achieved. Instead, the recommendations placed more emphasis on measures to 
turn the nominally self-employed into genuinely independent contractors who 
would be able to fulfil their labour and social obligations to their workers.  
 
 It must be noted that contract labour was not a central aspect of the 1990 
discussions on contract labour. Moreover, the programmes that were subsequently 
implemented to promote self-employment have paid little, if any, attention to 













 One may be tempted to conclude that the ILO’s position on contract labour in 
1992 was fragmented and of little consequence.  The more compelling conclusion is 
that, taken together, these patchy and uncoordinated interventions paved the way 
for the recognition of contract labour as a matter requiring attention. It is more 
likely that these initial limited interventions provided the necessary foundation for 
the consideration of contract labour at the centre and apex of the organisation. The 
developments in this regard will be discussed in chapter 6.2 below. 
 
6.2 1993-1998: PUTTING CONTRACT LABOUR ON THE ILO 
AGENDA 
 
This part considers the developments leading to the d velopment and consideration 
of international instruments at the International Labour Conference in 1998. The 
first section canvasses the initial discussions and research on contract labour from 
the early 1990s leading up to a formal discussion on contract labour at the 85th 
session of the ILC in 1997. The second section considers the draft convention and 
recommendation on contract labour which were considered by the 86th session of 
the ILC the following year. These draft instruments did not receive sufficient 
support for their adoption by the Conference. Section 6.2.3 provides a brief 
conclusion. 
 
6.2.1 The initial discussions and research  
 
The Governing Body of the ILO considered law and practice reports on contract 












labour on the agenda of the ILO.99 The reports had been prepared by the 
International Labour Office (“the Office”) and recommended that further research 
on the subject be undertaken to inform further discussions on the matter.100 The 
Office then commissioned 20 research studies which were used to compile a law 
and practice report (hereinafter “the first report”) which considered the nature, 
prevalence and regulation of contract labour and possible international action.101  
  
 The Governing Body adopted a resolution to include contract labour on the 
agenda of the 1997 session of the ILC.102 Pursuant to this resolution, and in 
preparation for the 1997 session of the ILC, the Office circulated the first report 
amongst member states, employers’ organisations and trade unions. The salient 
points of the report are discussed below. 
 
 The first report stated that contract labour could arise in bilateral 
relationships between user enterprises and workers or multilateral relationships 
involving intermediaries.103 In addition, two features had to be present. The first 
was the formal representation of the relationship between the user enterprise and 
the workers as one of independence and autonomy.104 The second was the 
asymmetrical relationship between the two parties due to the dependency of the 
                                                          
99 These were the 258th, 259th and 262nd   sessions of the Governing Body. See ILC 85th Session 1997 
Report VI (1) Contract Labour (note 15) 1. 
100 Ibid. 
101 The countries from which research was commissioned were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Cote d’Ivoire, India, Italy, Germany, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Portugal, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela. This report was 
tabled for discussion at the ILC Conference and is cited as ILC 85th Session 1997 Report VI (1) 
Contract Labour (note 15). 
102 This took place in the 262nd session of the Governing Body in March-April 1995. 













worker on the user enterprise resulting from the former’s subordination to the 
latter.105  
 
According to the first report: 
 
The term ‘contract labour’ is most often used to refer to situations in which the substance of 
the relationship appears to be similar to an employment relationship while the form is a 
commercial one, or at least where there seems to be some combination of employment and 
commercial aspects to the relationships established.106 
 
This could occur, for example, where an enterprise hired an individual or group of 
workers to carry out the normal work of the enterprise but gave them the status of 
independent self-employed contractors or subcontractors.107 It could also occur 
where the employer hired workers for the normal work of the enterprise through 
intermediaries who retained some of the employer functions such as payment of 
wages.108 The report noted that: 
 
Concerns arise in respect of these forms of contract labour mainly because of fear that the 
workers concerned, while substantively in the same relationship of dependency vis-à-vis 
the user employer as normal employees (although formally having the status of a 
commercial contractor or of an employee of a commercial contractor), will not receive the 
protection intended by labour law to be extended to such workers or that the employers’ 
obligation under the law will be displaced from the enterprise in the best position to ensure 
their observance of an intermediary not in such a position.109 
 
The report also highlighted another important dimension of contract labour. This 
involved an employer contracting all or part of its normal or core functions to 
another enterprise.110 Such situations could become problematic if they undermined 


















the positions of the existing workers of the first employer or they could shift 
production from more stable and secure enterprises to less viable ones which were 
less likely to fulfil their employer obligations.111  
 
 The report highlighted the diversity of arrangements falling under the banner 
of contract   and distinguished between “job contracting” to “labour only 
contracting”. 112 It defined the latter as an undertaking by a contractor or 
subcontractor to supply goods or services for a fee, with the contractor or 
subcontractor being paid on the basis of the work done and not the number of 
workers employed or the time taken to complete it.113 It defined labour only 
contracting as an arrangement whose dominant purpose was the supplier of labour 
by the contractor or subcontractor to the user enterprise.114 Under such 
arrangements, the user enterprise assumed the control and supervision of the 
workers and paid the contractor for the number of workers provided and not for the 
finished work.115 
 
 The critical question for this hesis is whether the ILO report recognised the 
dilemma caused by the contracting practice under scrutiny. In other words, did the 
report recognise the practice of contracting work out to self-employed workers like 
Taryn and Jabu? It is submitted that the report did recognise the practice as it 
referred to multilateral relationships where the intermediary, to whom work was 
                                                          
111 Ibid at 9. 
112 International Labour Conference 85th Session 1997 Report VI (1) Contract Labour (note 15) 7-8. 
Labour only contracting envisaged what have been described as labour broking or temporary work 
agency arrangements. In chapter four of this thesis it was argued that the term labour only 
(sub)contracting actually refers to situations involving contract for the performance of specified 
work, where the (sub)contractor was unable to provide the necessary tools and materials and 
primarily provided and supervised the labour that was required. 














contracted, was an individual.116 These relationships were particularly prevalent in 
the construction, agriculture, manufacturing and transport sectors and were 
common in Latin America and some francophone African countries.117  
 
 The report cited the example of talleristas in Argentina, who undertook to 
perform an agreed amount of work for a fixed price and employed other workers to 
assist them with the manufacture of products.118 Argentine jurisprudence 
recognised the dual status of talleristas, namely as home workers in relation to user 
enterprises and as employers of the workers engaged.119 These situations also 
raised the question of who the real employer of the contract workers was.120 The 
report also noted the definition of a tacheron in the Senegal Labour Code.121 This 
defined a tacheron as a master workman who contracted to do a piece of work and 
in turn recruited other workers to carry out the specific work.122  
 
 More pertinently, the report highlighted the prevalence of intermediaries or 
contractors that were not established firms or businesses and whose legal status 
was unclear.123 It also found that some arrangements that would otherwise be 
regarded as commercial relationships involved contractors or sub-contractors that 
did not have the economic or financial viability to meet their employer obligations 
to their workers.124 Workers under these relationships were usually more 
economically dependent on the user enterprise than the subcontractor.125  
                                                          
116 Ibid at 9-10. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid at 10. 
119 Ibid. 
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121 Ibid at 33. 
122 Section 95 of the Labour Code of Senegal, as at June 1996. 
123 ILC 85th Session 1997 Report VI (1) Contract Labour (note 15) 72. 














 The first report concluded that such arrangements qualified as contract 
labour and needed special protection.126 Thus, it can be said that the report clearly 
envisaged the practice of contracting work out to self-employers as falling within 
the scope of contract labour. It found that especially disconcerting where 
enterprises used it to contract out their core functions to labour only subcontractors 
and thus displaced permanent employees.127 
 
 The first report then identified the existing regulations of contract labour in 
the different jurisdictions covered in the country studies.128 These regulations took 
the form of legislation, judicial decisions and collective bargaining arrangements. In 
this respect, it discussed the extension of standard labour regulation to cover 
contract labour. It also considered the development of specific regulations to 
regulate contract labour. Finally, it considered the challenges that contract labour 
posed for collective bargaining and how the selected jurisdictions had responded to 
them.  
 
 The report also recognized the need to develop international labour 
standards to regulate contract labour. It identified two challenges to defining the 
scope and content of such standards. The first related to identifying the type of 
arrangements that would require regulation as contract labour relationships as 
opposed to normal employment or commercial relationships.129 The second related 
to determining the nature of the substantive protection that had to be provided to 
the workers concerned.130 Given the lack of consensus among countries about how 
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to approach these dilemmas, the report recommended that any instrument(s) on 
the subject be very flexible to allow member states to choose among different 
options for protection.131  
 
 Annexed to the first report was a questionnaire which sought the views of 
governments, employers’ organisations and workers’ organisations on the form and 
content of international labour standards on contract labour. The responses were 
collated into another report (“the second report”).132 The first and second reports 
were tabled before the 85th session of the ILC in June 1997 and were discussed by a 
specially constituted committee during that session. 
 
 The general conclusions of the Committee on Contract labour included a 
proposal for the adoption of a convention and recommendation on contract 
labour.133 The Conference adopted the report of the Committee and approved the 
proposal for the adoption of international instruments.134 The Conference also 
decided to place contract labour on the agenda its 86th session in 1998 for a second 
discussion regarding the proposed adoption of instruments.135 The preparations for 
the 86th session and the draft conventions are discussed in section 6.2.2 below. 
 
6.2.2 The draft instruments on contract labour 
 
                                                          
131 Ibid at 75. 
132 International Labour Conference 85th Session 1997 Report VI (2) Contract Labour. 
133 International Labour Conference “Resolution to place on the agenda of the next ordinary session 
of the Conference an item entitled ‘Contract Labour’ “. See Item II of the Resolutions adopted by the 
International Labour Conference at its 85th session (Geneva, June 1997). 
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Following the 85th session, the International Labour Office prepared a draft 
convention and draft recommendation on contract labour. These were incorporated 
into a report which was circulated for comment amongst member states, employers’ 
organisations and workers’ organisations for comment.136 The Office compiled the 
responses into a report and considered them in the amendment of the initial draft 
instruments.137 The recommended changes and the revised draft instruments were 
incorporated in a third report.138 The three reports were tabled for discussion at the 
86th session of the ILC in 1998. 
 
 The main aim of this section is to trace the trajectory of the draft instruments 
on contract labour. It is divided into four sub-sections. The first sub-section 
considers the provisions of the initial draft instruments, which shall be referred to 
the first or initial draft convention and recommendation. The second sub-section 
considers the main criticisms made by the governments and employers’ 
organisations of certain member states.  
 
 This is followed by a discussion of the second or revised draft convention and 
recommendation, with special attention to the changes made in the provisions. 
Essentially, it is argued that the revised draft instruments significantly diluted the 
definition of contract labour and the protection offered to contract workers in order 
to make it more palatable to member states and employers’ organisations that had 
raised objections. However, as will be shown in the final sub-section, the Conference 
failed to adopt a convention and recommendation on contract labour at its 86th 
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session. The final sub-section outlines the Conference’s conclusions on contract 
labour.  
 
The initial draft convention and recommendation 
 
The initial draft convention139 defined contract labour as work performed for a 
natural or legal person (user enterprise) “where the work is performed by the 
worker personally under actual conditions of dependency on or subordination to 
the user enterprise and these conditions are similar to those that characterize an 
employment relationship under national law and practice”.140  The definition also 
applied to work performed either in terms of a bilateral contract between the 
worker and user enterprise or where the worker was provided through a 
subcontractor or intermediary.141    
 
In summary, draft articles 1 and 2 envisaged that the following situations 
would fall within the scope of the convention: 
 
i) workers having a direct contractual relationship (other than a contract of 
employment) with the user enterprise where there was dependency or 
subordination similar to those characterising an employment relationship; 
ii) workers engaged to work through a subcontractor, whether or not a contract 
of employment relationship existed between the worker and the 
                                                          
139 This is included in ILC 86th Session 1998 Report V (1) Contract Labour (note 136). 
140 Article 1 of the first Draft Convention on Contract Labour, see ILC 86th Session 1998 Report V (1) 
Contract Labour (note 136). 
141 It defined a subcontractor as “a natural or legal person who performs work for a user enterprise 
under a contractual arrangement with it, other than a contract of employment” and an intermediary 
as “a natural or legal person who makes contract workers available to a user enterprise without 












subcontractor, provided the worker was dependent upon and subordinate to 
the user enterprise; 
iii) workers engaged to work for a user enterprise via an intermediary, where 
there was no employment relationship between the worker and the 
intermediary.  
 
In terms of draft article 2 of the first draft convention, two categories of workers 
were excluded from the scope of the proposed Convention. The first was workers 
who had a contract of employment with the user enterprise, as these would be 
covered by general employment legislation and conventions. The second were 
contract workers who were employees of a private employment agency providing 
contract labour to the user enterprise. These workers were specifically covered by a 
separate convention.142  
 
Draft article 2 also provided that the proposed convention would apply to all 
branches of economic activity and would cover all contract workers. However, 
states would have the power to exclude certain categories of contract workers who 
otherwise enjoyed adequate protection. States would also be able to exclude certain 
branches of economic activity from the application of the proposed convention 
where this would raise practical difficulties.  
 
The remaining provisions of the initial draft convention provided details on 
how states could protect contract workers. Some of these imposed obligations on 
member states to provide for the substantive rights of contract workers in their 
labour legislation and policies. They also imposed obligations on states to take 
measures to make these rights a reality for contract workers. In this regard, article 8 
                                                          












required states to apply the convention through laws and regulations and establish 
effective measures and remedies to ensure the proper application and enforcement 
of the regulations.143 
 
The initial draft convention required member states to take measures to 
ensure that contract workers received adequate protection as regards working time 
and other working conditions, maternity protection, occupational safety and health, 
remuneration, and statutory social security.144 Thus, states would have to provide 
adequate protection and clearly determine responsibilities for obligations relating 
to remuneration and social insurance contributions.145 It also required them to 
prevent accidents and injury to the health of contract workers arising from contract 
labour.  In addition, member states would have to ensure the compensation of 
contract workers for injuries and diseases resulting from the performance of 
contract labour.146  
 
Some of the provisions of the initial draft convention sought to promote 
parity between contract workers and ordinary employees. For instance, article 5 
required member states to promote equality of treatment between contract workers 
and employees, taking into account the similarity of the work and the working 
conditions.  More specifically, member states would have to ensure similar 
treatment regarding the right to organise and to bargain collectively, and freedom 
from employment or occupation-based discrimination.147 In addition, states would 
be required to “take measures to ensure that rights or obligations under labour or 
                                                          
143 Article 8 of the first Draft Convention on Contract Labour (note 140).  
144 Article 6 of the first Draft Convention on Contract Labour (note 140). 
145 Article 4 of the first Draft Convention on Contract Labour (note 140).  
146 Article 3 and 4(c) of the first Draft Convention on Contract Labour (note 140).  












social security laws or regulations [we]re not denied or avoided when contract 
labour is used.”148 
 
The initial draft recommendation on contract labour supplemented the draft 
convention with a number of provisions. Importantly, it provided a list of criteria to 
be considered when determining whether conditions of dependency or 
subordination existed for the purposes of identifying contract labour. 149 These 
factors included, inter alia, the degree of control that the user enterprise exercised 
over the timing and manner of work, the method for determining payment and the 
extent of the user enterprise’s investment and provision of tools and materials. 
Ironically, these were the same criteria that the courts have traditionally used to 
distinguish employment from self-employment. It was therefore unclear how the 
criteria would be used to distinguish between self-employment and contract labour. 
 
The initial draft recommendation reiterated the draft convention’s principle 
of equal treatment150 and encouraged states to take measures in respect of certain 
rights and privileges.151 It also recommended some measures to ensure realization 
                                                          
148 Article 7 of the first Draft Convention on Contract Labour (note 140). 
149 In terms of Paragraph 2 of the first Draft Recommendation on Contract Labour, attached to ILC 
86th Session 1998 Report V (1) Contract Labour (note 136). The factors were “(a) the extent to 
which the user enterprise determines when and how work should be performed, including working 
time and other conditions of work; (b) whether the user enterprise pays amounts due to the 
contract worker periodically and according to pre-established criteria;(c) the extent of supervisory 
authority and control of the user enterprise over the contract worker in respect to the work 
performed, including disciplinary authority; (d) the extent to which the user enterprise makes 
investments and provides tools, materials and machinery, among other things, to perform the work 
concerned; (e) whether the contract worker can make profits or run the risk of losses in performing 
the work; (f) whether the work is performed on a regular and continuous basis; (g) whether the 
contract worker works for a single user enterprise; (h) the extent to which work performed is 
integrated into the normal activities of the user enterprise and (i)  whether the user enterprise 
provides substantial job-specific training to the contract worker.” 
150 Paragraph 4 encouraged states to take measures to ensure the equality of treatment between 
contract workers and workers of user enterprises. 












and enforcement of the rights of contract workers, including the allocation of 
responsibility for rights of contract workers. The initial draft recommendation 
suggested three mechanisms for doing so.  
 
The first was the deeming of contract workers as the employees of the user 
enterprise or the user enterprise in certain instances.152 The second mechanism was 
the enactment of explicit provisions outlining the respective responsibilities of the 
subcontractor, intermediary and user enterprise for fulfilling duties owed to the 
contract workers.153 The third was that states could provide that the subcontractor 
or user enterprise would be held jointly and severally liable for the financial 
obligations towards contract workers.154  
 
In addition to rules on allocation of responsibility, the first draft 
recommendation proposed that states could require subcontractors and 
intermediaries to register with and obtain a licence from a competent authority.155 
Registration would be conditional upon the subcontractor or intermediary 
demonstrating its ability to meet its obligations towards contract workers.  
 
The draft recommendation also included additional proposals pertinent to 
the regulation of contract labour. For example, draft paragraph 13 encouraged 
states to compile and maintain statistics and other information on contract labour. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
informed about their conditions of work, to freedom of association, and to refuse to perform work 
constituting a danger to their health and safety in Paragraphs 3, 11(2) and 7 respectively.   
152 See paragraph 5 of the first Draft Recommendation (note 149). An example of such a case would 
be where contract labour was used to avoid duties imposed by labour and social security laws. 
153 See paragraph 8 of the first Draft Recommendation on Contract Labour (note 149). In the event 
that the responsible party failed to fulfil its obligations, the other party could be made to do so. 
154 Paragraph 9 of the first Draft Recommendation on Contract Labour (note 149).  












Draft paragraph 14 recommended that states take appropriate measures to protect 
foreign workers performing contract work within their territories.  
 
Criticisms of the initial draft instruments 
 
Member states were invited to comment on the first draft Convention and 
Recommendation.156 Broadly speaking, most of the supporters of the draft 
instruments were employee organisations and governments of developing states. 
There was generally little support for the proposed instruments amongst employer 
organizations and governments of developed member states. The key objections 
raised against the proposed instruments are highlighted below. 
 
At a fundamental level, some parties argued that contract labour fell beyond 
labour law and fell into the realm of commercial contracts, which were beyond the 
mandate of the ILO.157 Similarly, some parties argued that the regulation of contract 
labour was an unnecessary constraint on freedom of contract and business 
activity.158 They argued that such regulation would negatively impact economic 
efficiency and growth, labour market flexibility, employment levels and small and 
medium enterprise development.159  
 
                                                          
156The comments on the first draft instruments were collated in the second report before the ILC. 
ILC 
86th Session 1998, Contract Labour Report V (2A) (note 137). 
157 See for example, German employers’ association, at 10; Confederation of Swiss Employers, at18 
of 
ILC 86th Session 1998, Contract Labour Report V (2A) (note 137).  
158 See for example the governments of Australia and Austria, at 3 and Canada, at 6 of ILC 86th 
Session 













Some member states argued that the draft instruments effectively created a 
‘third category’ of workers situated between employees and independent 
contractors and having inferior rights to those of ordinary employees.160 Some 
governments, like Croatia, argued that an intermediate category of worker 
amounted to a fiction because the only basis for a relationship of dependency and 
subordination was an employment relationship giving rise to employee rights and 
obligations.161  Others, like Japan, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland, argued that the 
factual existence of subordination gave rise to employment protection regardless of 
the form of employment relationship.162 This made it unnecessary to establish a 
Convention for these situations.163  
 
There were also specific objections as to the definition of contract labour and 
to the scope of the proposed Convention’s coverage. Many states questioned the 
need to include employees of subcontractors within the scope of the convention as 
they were in principle entitled to employee rights against their employer, the 
subcontractor.164 These parties argued that it would be unfair to transfer the burden 
of these obligations on the core enterprise, who was not legally the employer of the 
contract workers.  
 
In addition, there was controversy about the proposal for equal treatment 
between the contract workers and those who had recognised employment 
relationships. Some states argued that it was impractical and unfair to require the 
                                                          
160 See for example Sweden, at 8 of ILC 86th Session 1998, Contract Labour Report V (2A) (note 137). 
161  ILC 86th Session, Geneva, June, 1998 Contract Labour Report V (2A), at 7. 
162 Ibid at 12, 37, 39 and 40 respectively. 
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164 See Denmark, at 29; the Netherlands, at 35; Norway, at 36; International Organisation of 
Employers, at 42; Australia, at 43; Canada, at 44 of ILC 86th Session 1998, Contract Labour Report V 












equal treatment of contract workers. 165  They maintained that the requirement of 
equal treatment would be a serious disincentive to the use of such flexible 
arrangements.166  
 
Some parties raised objections relating to the relationship between the draft 
instruments and the national legislation in the members states. Some states stated 
that their national legislation adequately regulated the situation of workers within 
and outside the employment relationship.167  Other parties expressed concern about 
the feasibility of an all-embracing and binding Convention given the diversity of 
situations in the different countries.168 They suggested that a non-binding 
instrument such as a recommendation would be more appropriate.169  
 
There were concerns that the measures proposed in the draft instruments 
were inappropriate because they were based on incorrect assumptions about the 
true cause of problems arising from contract labour. Some parties argued that the 
true problem lay in the fraudulent use of contract labour to evade employer 
obligations. 170   They suggested tha  it would be better to provide more clarity on 
the distinction between employees and independent contractors, and introduce 
measures to combat fraud by employees. Others were of the view  that the there was 
                                                          
165 Singapore, at 55 and UK’s Confederation of Business Industry at 57 of ILC 86th Session, Geneva, 
June, 1998 Contract Labour Report V (2A).  
166 On the other hand, Denmark argued that the Convention had not gone far enough and should 
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contracts, 53 and 59 of ILC 86th Session 1998, Contract Labour Report V (2A) (note 137). 
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a need to progressively expand the scope of protection offered by labour law to 
cover all workers working under the authority of the person recruiting them.171  
 
The revised draft instruments 
 
The International Labour Office made several amendments to the initial draft 
instruments.172 It divided the draft convention into two parts. Part I (draft articles 1 
to 7) would cover all contract workers regardless of whether they were in bilateral 
or triangular relationships, and the Part II (draft articles 8 to 13) would cover those 
in triangular relationships. Members signing the convention would be bound by Part 
I, and would have the option of accepting the provisions of Part II.  
 
Draft article 1 of the revised draft defined contract labour as:  
 
work performed for a natural or legal person (referred to as a ‘user enterprise’) by a person 
(referred to as a ‘contract worker’) where the work is performed by the contract worker 
personally under actual dependency on or subordination to the user enterprise and these 
conditions are similar to those that characterise an employment relationship under national 
law and practice but where the contract worker is not the employee of the user enterprise.  
This definition removed all references to subcontractors and intermediaries.  These 
terms had been identified as a source of confusion due to the different terminologies 
used in the various jurisdictions.173  
 
Part I of the revised draft required states to establish accessible, speedy and 
objective procedures for determining the existence of an employment 
relationship.174 It also required member states to take measures to ensure that 
                                                          
171 See Belgium at 4 of ILC 86th Session 1998, Contract Labour Report V (2A) (note 137). 
172 See “Suggested changes to proposed instruments on contract labour”, Annex to International 
Labour Conference 86th Session, Geneva, June 1998, Contract Labour Report V (2B) Addendum.  
173 Ibid at para 5. 












contract workers were not denied their social security rights.175 Furthermore, it 
required states to take measures to ensure adequate protection of contract workers 
in relation to rights to organise and bargain collectively, freedom from 
discrimination, minimum age, remuneration, occupational safety and health, 
compensation for work-related injuries and diseases and social security 
contributions. 176 
 
Part II applied only to workers who were employed by one enterprise and 
were made available to work for the user enterprise.177 Importantly, the definition 
recognised the possibility that the employing enterprise could be a natural or legal 
person. It contained one substantive provision which required member states to 
allocate the respective responsibilities of the user enterprise in relation to the 
contract workers.178  
 
The revised draft convention diluted the protection envisaged for contract 
workers in a number of ways. First, it relegated the provisions relating to triangular 
or multilateral relationships into the optional part of the convention. This effectively 
gave member states a choice as to whether or not they would be bound in terms of 
one of the key aspects of the proposed convention. Second, the revised draft 
excluded the provision in the initial draft that required the promotion of equal 
treatment between contract workers and standard employee. This provision was 
moved to the revised draft recommendation, which would have less binding force 
on member states.179   
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Third, the revised draft Convention no longer required that contract workers 
receive the same treatment as employees with respect to the right to organise and 
bargain collectively, freedom from discrimination and minimum age. The revised 
draft merely required that they receive ‘adequate protection’ in relation to these 
rights.180 Moreover, the second draft excluded the provision in the initial draft which 
required states to take positive measures to prevent accidents and injury of contract 
workers.  
 
The revised draft recommendation did not contain significant changes to the 
initial draft. A few amendments were made to the initial draft in relation to matters 
such as equality of treatment and the allocation of responsibilities in multilateral 
contracting arrangements.181  A notable addition was the provision encouraging 
states to periodically review national law and practice to determine whether there 
were situations involving the use of contract labour that necessitated the adoption 
of new measures.182  
 
Outcome of the discussions at the 86th session of the ILC 
 
At the first sitting of its 86th session, the ILC constituted a Committee on Contract 
Labour to deliberate on contract labour with a view to the adoption of international 
instruments on the matter. The Committee comprised about 190 members 
representing governments, employers and workers. It held 18 sittings during the 
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course of the 1998 ILC, and deliberated on the three reports including the two sets 
of draft instruments submitted to the Conference. 
 
The contract labour reports and the draft instruments were discussed and 
debated during the course of the 1998 session of the ILC. However, the members 
failed to adopt a resolution adopting a convention and recommendation on contract 
labour.  The International Labour Conference then adopted a resolution inviting the 
ILO’s Governing Body to place contract labour on the agenda of a future session of 
the Conference, with a view to adopting a convention and recommendation. 183 
 
The ILC also invited the Governing Body to instruct the Director-General to 
hold meetings of experts to examine three issues.184 The first was to determine 
which workers in the situations that had been identified by the Committee, were in 
need of protection. The second was to identify appropriate ways in which these 
workers could be protected, and the possibility of dealing separately with the 
various situations. The third was to consider how such workers would be defined, 
bearing in mind the different legal systems and language differences. In addition to 
considering these issues, the ILC invited the Governing Body to take other measures 
to complete the work began by the Committee on Contract Labour. 
6.2.3 Conclusion 
 
This part has explained how contract labour came to be at the centre of attention 
and how the debate gained momentum within the ILO. Importantly, it traced the 
trajectory of the draft instruments and the changes in the definition of contract 
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labour and in the protection offered to contract workers. It also canvassed the key 
objections that were raised against the initial draft instruments, which ultimately 
thwarted efforts to reach consensus and adopt the draft instruments on contract 
labour.  
 
 It is worth noting that during the period under scrutiny, the ILO adopted a 
Convention that appeared to include some of the very principles that had raised 
contention in the contract labour debate. The Home Work Convention, which was 
adopted in 1996, arguably regulates a species of contract labour. Article 1(a) of the 
Convention defines home work as work performed by a homeworker  i) in her/his 
home or any other place outside of the employer’s premises ii) for remuneration 
and iii) resulting a product or service meeting the employer’s specifications 
regardless of who provides the materials and equipment. These three criteria seem 
to cast the scope of the Convention widely and to include workers who are not 
necessarily employees, provided that they are not independent contractors.185  
 
The Convention requires member states to promote equality of treatment 
between home workers and other wage earners in respect of a number of rights 
including freedom of association, maternity protection and remuneration.186 It 
therefore appears to extend labour protection to workers falling outside the scope 
of the employment relationship. In addition, the Convention defines an employer as 
the person who gives (or contracts) home work out, either directly or through an 
intermediary.187 It therefore places primary responsibility for employer obligations 
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on the source and beneficiary of the work even if the home worker does not contract 
directly with the employer so defined.  
 
A possible explanation for the ILO’s adoption of a Convention that struck a 
similar cord as the failed contract labour instruments is the significantly narrower 
scope of the Home Workers Convention compared to the universal scope of the 
contract labour provisions. A full analysis of the provisions of the Home Work 
Convention is however beyond the scope of this discussion. We now turn to the 
events that unfolded in the wake of the failure to adopt instruments on contract 
labour. 
 
6.3 POST-1998: SETTLING FOR THE HIGHEST COMMON 
FACTOR 
 
This part considers the shift in the ILO’s attention from contract labour to the 
employment relationship following the 86th session of the ILC in 1998. It shows that 
these developments continued in the regressive direction signalled by the revisions 
to the draft instruments on contract labour. It essentially argues that the adoption of 
the Recommendation on the Employment Relationship in 2006 amounted to a 
settlement for the “highest common factor” amongst member states. In other words, 
the ILO settled for an international instrument whose terms were acceptable to all 
the social partners within the ILO.  
  
 Section 6.3.1 discusses the key findings of the meeting of experts which was 
convened pursuant to the 1998 ILC resolution to explore the situation of workers 
needing protection. Section 6.3.2 considers the discussions on contract labour 












recommendation on the employment relationship in the latter year. Finally, section 
6.3.3 reflects on the significance of the shift from contract labour to the employment 
relationship within the ILO. 
 
6.3.1 The meeting of experts 
 
The meeting of experts envisaged in the ILC Resolution was held in May 2000. 
Thirty-six experts were invited to a meeting to consider the situation of workers in 
need of protection. The meeting comprised 12 experts nominated after 
consultations with Governments, 12 after consultations with Employers and 12 
after consultations with Workers. The experts’ discussion was guided by a technical 
document which the Office had prepared for the meeting.188 The salient points 
raised in that document are discussed below. 
 
The technical document stated that the employment relationship remained 
the main form for the organisation and regulation of work.189 It noted the growing 
number of workers who were unprotected either because the law did not apply to 
them, or because they could not enforce the protections to which they were 
entitled.190  These changes were taking place in the context of globalisation, 
                                                          
188 ILO Meeting of Experts on Workers in Situation Needing Protection (The employment 
relationship: Scope), Basic Technical Document, Geneva, 15-19 May 2000. The Office compiled the 
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need of protection, the problems resulting from absence or inadequacy of protection and the 
responses to such situations and guidelines for possible international standard-setting action.  
189 ILO Meeting of Experts Technical Document (note 188) at paras 19 and 20.  












technological changes, shifts in economic policies, changes in the organisation of 
work and a changing working population.191 
 
The technical document argued that the increase in the number of 
unprotected workers was due to an increase in disguised and genuinely ambiguous 
employment relationships. Disguised employment involved a deliberate attempt to 
conceal the true nature of the legal relationship by changing its legal form, for 
instance, casting an employee as an independent contractor.192 Objectively 
ambiguous relationships had arisen in the context of changes in the organisation of 
work and the work practices granting workers greater autonomy to do their 
work.193 In addition to these developments, was an increase in multilateral work 
arrangements, which made it difficult to determine who the true employer is.194  
 
The technical document acknowledged that the move towards these “flexible” 
forms of work had not brought about increased the levels of competitiveness, 
investments and employment as promised by the proponents of the flexibility 
agenda.195 Instead, these forms of work had negative consequences for workers, 
their families, employers and broader society.196 Importantly, it resulted in 
segmentation and inequality between protected and unprotected workers.197 
 
The technical document concluded that the root of the problem of non-
protection was   “the all-or-nothing binary divide between those who [were] 
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employed and those that [were] independent contractors”.198 It suggested that this 
could be addressed by extending the concept of employment to include those 
workers in intermediate situations who are nevertheless dependent.199 Another 
possible approach was to provide basic protection for all workers irrespective of 
their status or the legal form of their relationship.200  
 
The document concluded that it was appropriate for international standards 
to be established to set the tone for regulation in member states and encourage 
them to take action.201 There was a need for measures to facilitate the refocusing of 
labour law through a number of measures.202 It was suggested that these measures 
could clarify the extent to which employment relationships should be regulated; 
improve enforcement machinery and facilitate workers’ access to the courts; fine-
tune legislation as employment relationships evolved in practice; and ensure basic 
protection for all workers.203  
 
After a week of discussions the meeting made some recommendations that 
were included in the common statement of their key findings. The experts 
recommended that states should adopt and continuously review national policies to 
clarify and adapt the scope of the regulation of the employment relationship in light 
of current employment realities.204 The experts also agreed that national policy 
might include, but not be limited to:205 
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i) providing clear guidance about employment relationships, particularly the 
distinction between dependent workers and self-employed persons; 
ii) providing effective worker protection; 
iii) combating disguised employment which deprived dependent workers of legal 
protection; 
iv) ensuring non-interference with  genuine commercial or genuine independent 
contracting; and 
v) providing access to appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms to determine 
the status of workers.  
 
The meeting also concluded that the ILO could play an important role through 
facilitating the collation and exchange of information, adopting international 
instruments, and providing technical cooperation and assistance to member 
countries concerning the development of appropriate policies.206   
 
It is worth noting that the employer experts were opposed to the adoption of 
an international instrument to address the situations discussed by the experts.207 
They argued that the situations involved were vague and had not been well-defined. 
They also claimed that a single response would be inappropriate given the diversity 
of situations that needed to be addressed and given the diversity of approaches in 
the different jurisdictions. They further emphasised the need to balance the 
protection of workers with the employers’ need for flexible working arrangements. 
They argued for interventions to be limited to measures to address fraudulent 
employment practices. 
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The employer experts essentially reiterated the objections they had raised 
against the draft instruments on contract labour. The subsequent adoption of the 
Recommendation on the Employment Relationship signifies the employers’ failure 
to prevent the adoption of any international instrument to protect vulnerable 
workers. The subsequent discussions at the International Labour Conference and 
actual content of the Recommendation, however, demonstrate that their views 
influenced the substance of the provisions.  
 
Following the meeting of experts, the ILO Governing Body placed the scope of 
the employment relationship on the agenda of the 91st session of the ILC which was 
held in 2003.208 The shifting of the focus to the employment relationship and the 
subsequent developments are considered in section 6.3.2 below. 
 
6.3.2 Towards the adoption of ILO Recommendation 198 on the 
Employment Relationship 
 
The report submitted to the 91st session of the ILC contextualised the shift from 
contract labour to the employment relationship against the backdrop of two key 
developments within the ILO.209 These were the adoption of the Declaration of the 
Fundamental Rights a d Principles at Work in 1998 and the Decent Work Agenda in 
1999. One consequence of these developments was the re-prioritisation of certain 
principles on the ILO agenda including freely chosen employment; fundamental 
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rights at work; adequate incomes; and adequate social protection.210 The Office 
linked these developments with the focus on the employment relationship thus:  
 
The lack of protection of many workers represents a significant challenge to the 
achievement of this goal [that is, decent work] in many countries and regions of the world. 
It is clear that work cannot be considered if the worker is not protected against the main 
risks associated with it. The Decent Work Agenda therefore provides a valid and important 
conceptual framework for addressing the lack of protection of dependent workers within 
the scope of the employment relationship.211 
 
The report prepared for discussion at the conference identified several reasons for 
the proliferation of dependent workers who lacked labour protection.212 These 
related to the nature of the law, including poor formulation and narrow scope.213 
Non-protection of workers was also attributable to the manner in which law was 
interpreted and applied, as well as problems with compliance and enforcement.214 
Workers were also unprotected because their relationships were objectively 
ambiguous or because employers deliberately disguised the true nature of their 
employment relationships.215  
 
 The discussion of the scope of the employment relationship focused on two 
categories of unprotected workers. The first comprised workers who were in 
bilateral employment relationships that were disguised or objectively ambiguous.216  
The second comprised workers who were engaged in “triangular” employment 
relationships which made it difficult to determine who their employer was and who 
should be responsible for their labour rights.217  
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At the end of the discussions, the Conference adopted several conclusions 
relating to the employment relationship. The Conference concluded that it was 
appropriate to adopt a recommendation on the employment relationship.218 The 
recommendation would not provide a universal definition of the employment 
relationship, but would provide member states with some guidance as to the nature 
of the employment relationship.219 The Conference stressed that the 
recommendation had to be flexible in light of the different social, economic, legal 
and industrial relations traditions in the member states.220  
 
The Conference envisaged that the recommendation would focus on 
“disguised employment relationships and on the need for mechanisms to ensure 
that persons with an employment relationship have access to the protection they 
are due at the national level”.221 At the same time, the recommendation would not 
interfere with genuine commercial contracts.222 The Conference noted that no 
consensus had been reached about the regulation of triangular relationships. 223   
 
 The Conference then invited the Governing Body to give them due 
consideration in its future action on the scope of the employment relationship. 
Subsequently, the Governing Body placed the employment relationship on the 
agenda of the 95th session of the ILC which was held in 2006. It was during this 
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session that the Conference adopted Recommendation 198 on the Employment 
Relationship. 
 
 Recommendation 198 on the Employment Relationship comprises three 
parts. Part I (articles 1 to 8) covers national policy of protection for workers in an 
employment relationship. Part II (articles 9 to 18) relates to the determination of 
the existence of an employment relationship. Part III (articles 19 to 22) relates to 
monitoring and implementation. 
 
 Part I recommends that member states formulate and apply a national policy 
for reviewing, clarifying and adapting the scope of relevant laws and regulations.224 
It also requires that national law or practice should clearly set out the nature and 
extent of protection given to workers in an employment relationship.225  
 
 Paragraph 4 of the Recommendation provides that national policy should 
provide guidance on effectively establishing the existence of an employment 
relationship and on distinguishing between employed and self-employed workers. 
National policy should also include measures to combat disguised employment 
relationships.226 It should also ensure the application of standards to workers in all 
forms of contractual relationships, including multilateral relationships, and should 
establish who is responsible for the rights of workers.227  
 
 Part I also recommends that states ensure effective protection of the certain 
vulnerable groups of workers including women workers, young workers, workers in 
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the informal economy, migrant workers and workers with disabilities.228 It also 
specifically mentions the need to consider the gender dimension of non-protection 
of workers and to have clear policies on gender equality to ensure better 
enforcement of laws.229 Paragraph 7 makes special mention of the need to take 
measures to protect and prevent the abuse of migrant workers.  
 
 Importantly, Part I makes provision for enforcing and securing compliance 
with national policies on the employment relationship.230 These include the 
provision of access to procedures and mechanisms for settling disputes regarding 
the existence and terms of an employment relationship.231 Another step 
recommended is the training of those involved in the implementation and 
enforcement of laws and policies on the relevant international labour standards, 
comparative law and case law.232  
  
 Part II relates to the determination of the existence of an employment 
relationship. It endorses the principle of primacy of fact which requires that 
precedence be given to the facts of a given situation as opposed to the form or 
character that the parties give their relationship.233 Paragraph 11 suggests that 
member states consider a number of measures in determining the existence of an 
employment relationship, including deeming provisions and legal presumptions.  
 
 Paragraph 13 lists a number of factors that could indicate the existence of an 
employment relationship. These include control over the work, integration into the 
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business, the requirement of personal service, the continuity of the relationship and 
the provision of tools, materials and equipment by the party requesting the work.234 
Other factors include periodicity of payment, the worker’s dependence on the 
income, the provision of payment in kind and the absence of risk for the worker.235 
These indicators are “all, by and large, used by national judiciaries in what is clearly 
emerging as a consistent and universal ‘multi-factor’ test.236  
 
 Part III recommends that states ensure that there is a mechanism to monitor 
developments in the labour market and in the organisation of work and to advise on 
the adoption and implementation of measures concerning the employment 
relationship.237 Where possible, member states should collect information and 
statistical data and undertake research on the organisation of work.238 Member 
states are also encouraged to establish national mechanisms to ensure that 
employment relationships can be effectively identified in the context of 
transnational arrangements.239  
 
6.3.3. The employment relationship: the highest common factor 
 
Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 above have related the events following the failure to adopt 
the draft contract labour instruments in 1998 to the adoption of Recommendation 
198 in 2006. This section argues that the employment relationship represented the 
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highest common factors that member states could agree upon. It also reflects on the 
significance and effect of the Recommendation. 
  
 It will be recalled from section 6.3.2 that the report on the employment 
relationship that was tabled before the ILC for discussion at its 91st session stated 
that the reason for the ILO’s shift in focus was attributable to broader developments 
in the ILO. These were the adoption of the Decent Work Agenda and the adoption of 
the Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Principles at Work.  
 
 It is submitted that the shift from contract labour to the employment 
relationship was instead a retreat from “a predictable lack of consensus around a 
project of ensuring that dependent workers come or remain within the protection of 
labour standards, even if they are not identified as employees”.240 The lack of 
consensus is attributable firstly, to the widely expressed government and employer 
view that anything that fell outside the employment relationship should not fall 
within the realm of labour law. It was also attributable to disputes relating to 
terminology and definition given the different ways in which it was understood in 
different member states and the diversity of situations that it covered.241  
 
 The 1997 and 1998 debates and the responses submitted to the Office had 
revealed that the employment relationship was a concept familiar to all the 
parties.242 Even the governments and employers’ organisations that were most 
opposed to the regulation of contract labour argued that the solution lay in the 
development of better approaches to define the employment relationship. Thus, the 
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employment relationship represented the highest common factor amongst the 
member states. 
 
 Having established the motivation behind the choice of the employment 
relationship as the site of policy intervention at an international level, we consider 
the significance of the Recommendation for the broader project of ensuring the 
protection of workers in need. What are its underlying principles and what 
approach does it adopt? Does it give us the tools to better understand and address 
the challenges that the changed world of work presents? 
 
 The point of departure of the Recommendation is that the binary divide 
between employment and self-employment continues to determine the scope of 
labour law. It is therefore ironic that the ILO associated the shift towards the 
employment relationship with the fulfilment of its mandate in terms of the Decent 
Work Agenda and the Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Principles at Work. 
This is because both the Decent Work Agenda and the Declaration stress the need to 
ensure a minimum floor of labour s andards and decent work for all workers 
regardless of their legal status or their location in the formal or informal economy. 
By focusing on defining and expanding the scope of the employment relationship in 
post 1998 discussions, and in Recommendation 198, the ILO has reinforced and 
entrenched the notion of the employment relationship as the gateway to (at least 
some fundamental) workers’ rights, a notion which these two initiatives seek to 
dislodge. 
 
 Another issue is that the Recommendation does not provide new perspectives 
and new approaches to address the world of work. Buzuidenhout et al argue that 












but do not add anything towards “the development of a clear theoretical 
understanding of the changing nature of work”.243 Rather, it reinforces the notion of 
the employment relationship as a bilateral and personal relationship, without 
addressing the problem of fragmenting organisations and work.244  
 
 The Recommendation does recognise the need for member states to ensure 
the protection of workers in multilateral relationships and take measures to allocate 
responsibility amongst multiple parties. However, it does not confront and address 
the deeply embedded normative and conceptual difficulties that are associated with 
the conventional understanding of the employment relationship.245 It therefore fails 
to provide a new paradigm to enable member states to grapple with the difficult 
issues arising from the growing complexities arising in the world of work.  
 
 Finally, the approach adopted by the Recommendation can be described as “a 
gentler processual approach” that merely encourages member states to develop 
their own policies to review, clarify and adapt the scope of labour law to protect 
workers in employment relationships.246 On the one hand, this non-prescriptive and 
soft law approach may appear to be timid and regressive on the ILO’s part.247 On the 
other hand, this approach may reflect “the furthest point to which [the ILO] could 
hope to advance in the face of ... policy disagreement at supranational level and 
considerable conceptual diversity between member states”.248 The outcome of the 
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discussions (i.e. the Recommendation) may be understandable given the ILO’s aim 




This chapter has surveyed the evolution of the ILO’s position in relation to contract 
labour. It considered the period prior to 1992, when the organisation recognised 
and regulated contract labour through certain conventions, the discussions on self-
employment and the industrial subcommittees. Contract labour was placed on the 
ILC agenda and the move to adopt international instruments accelerated between 
1993 and 1998. Following its failure to adopt a convention and recommendation on 
contract labour at the 1998 ILC, the Organisation retreated towards a focus on the 
less contentious and more universal employment relationship.  
 
 One critical question for this thesis is whether the ILO has adequately 
recognised the practice of contracting work out to self employed workers as an 
important dimension of contract work. In principle, the answer to this must be in 
the affirmative. The discussions and conclusions on self-employment and the 1997 
reports on contract labour recognised the fact that some contractors more closely 
resembled dependent workers than entrepreneurs. They recognised the multi-
dimensional nature of the practice and the difficulties of such situations for the 
contractors involved, as well as for the workers they employed.  
 
 However, as the contract labour debate progressed, the complexity and multi-
faceted nature of contract labour was diluted. The drafting and amendments to the 
draft instruments and progressively weakened the definition of contract labour and 
                                                          












the protections offered to contract workers. This trend is attributable to the desire 
to define and regulate contract labour on broadly acceptable terms that would 
attract the support of the social partners within the organisation. It can only be 
expected that over time, the nuances such as contracting work out to self-employed 
workers were lost in the process and did not feature in the legal instruments or the 
post-1998 debates. 
 
 It has been argued that the final compromise, namely Recommendation 198, 
is a blunt instrument that merely reinforces the binary divide and the conventional 
understanding of the employment relationship. It focuses on bilateral relationships 
and is almost silent on multilateral arrangements, and, worse still, contracting 
arrangements involving the likes of Taryn and Jabu. The provisions of the 
Recommendation do very little to provide conceptual and practical solutions to 
address the complexities of the changed world of work. Although disappointing, the 
final outcome of the ILO’s endeavours to regulate contract labour is hardly 
surprising given the conflicting interests of the social partners on the issue, its 
multi-dimensional nature and the divergences in its definition and regulation across 
member states.  
 
 It is submitted that the Recommendation itself offers very little by way of 
lessons for crafting a legal solution to the practice under scrutiny. However, much 
can be gleaned from the approaches discussed and recommendations made in 
relation to self employment and contract labour. The Resolution on self-
employment recommended the implementation of measures to ensure the 
extension of labour and social protection to the self-employed (including the 












protect self-employed and other workers in subcontracting arrangements from 
exploitation and the denial of their labour and social security rights.  
 
 The Resolution on self-employment made concrete recommendations in 
relation to self-employed workers in particular. These related to the promotion of 
organisation amongst self-employed workers, and particularly those that were in 
subcontracting arrangements, in order to increase their bargaining power vis-a-vis 
those who contracted work out to them. In addition, it recommended the promotion 
of support to self-employed workers to improve their productivity and earnings, 
enable the nominally self-employed to become genuinely self-employed, and 
improve their capacity to comply with labour standards. These measures have been 
promoted by non-state institutions in South Africa, as was discussed in chapter five. 
 
 The draft instruments on contract labour distinguished between bilateral 
contracting arrangements and triangular contracting arrangements. These 
situations can be equated to externalisation via commodification and externalisation 
via intermediation respectively. Although they did not recognise the potential 
intersection of these processes in the context of the practice under scrutiny, their 
general principles to regulate bilateral and triangular contracting arrangements 
may be applied to it. 
 
 The draft instruments provided for the extension of certain labour and social 
security rights to contract workers in bilateral arrangements, and the criteria 
indicating control by and dependence on the user enterprise were satisfied. There is 
no reason in principle why such protection should not be extended as between self-
employed worker and core enterprise even if the self-employed worker also 













 The draft instruments also provided several principles that could be applied 
to triangular contracting arrangements that could be applied to cover the workers 
of self-employed workers. These included the deeming of the contract workers 
employed by an intermediary or subcontractor to be the workers of the user 
enterprise and the enactment of provisions outlining the respective responsibilities 
of subcontractor or intermediary and the user enterprise. Another option was the 
joint and several liability of the user enterprise and the subcontractor or 
intermediary.   
 
  The possible inclusion of these principles within the S uth African context is 
discussed in the next chapter. Chapter seven inter alia outlines recommendations 
for regulating the practice of contracting work out to self-employed workers in 













CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
At the beginning of this thesis, we considered two scenarios involving Taryn, a home 
worker in the clothing sector, and Jabu, an owner-driver who works for a food 
processing firm. Both are engaged to do work on the basis that they are independent 
contractors. Although they personally do the work that is contracted to them, there 
is an express or tacit understanding that they may employ other workers to assist 
them with the work.  
 
Taryn and Jabu’s clients may convince them that they are emerging 
entrepreneurs who have a chance to grow and develop their businesses and become 
successful.   On the face of it,  this would mean neither Taryn nor Jabu is entitled to 
labour protection as they would both be regarded as independent contractors and 
therefore excluded from the ambit of South African labour law.  Moreover, as 
“entrepreneurs”, they are the employers of any workers they engage to assist them 
and are thereby responsible for the working conditions of these workers. This 
works in the clients’ favour because they would be able to make use of Taryn and 
Jabu’s labour and that of their workers without incurring employer liabilities in 
terms of the LRA, the BCEA, the SDA or any other labour legislation.  
 
This thesis has essentially considered arrangements like those of Taryn and 
Jabu and how they are regulated in the South African context. In order to do so, it 
began by asking three questions: what is labour law? What is its purpose? Who does 
it apply to? This was canvassed in chapter two of this thesis. Next, it was necessary 
to consider the assumptions that have underpinned labour law’s understanding of 












have become less relevant to the working world. The consequences of these changes 
for workers were also presented in chapter three.  
 
Having sketched the broad debates in chapters two and three, chapter four 
narrowed its focus to the practice of contracting work out to self-employed workers 
in South Africa. After identifying the broad trends in this regard, it examined the 
consequences of this practice for self-employed workers and their workers. Chapter 
five outlined the challenges that the practice presents for labour law and considered 
the extent to which South African law recognises and regulates this practice. 
Chapter six analysed the extent to which the ILO recognises and regulates the 
practice.  
 
This chapter draws seeks to draw together the key issues raised in and the 
lessons learned from this thesis. The first part (part 7.1) of this chapter seeks to 
draw out the critical issues in what shall be called the broader debates, particularly 
in so far as they relate to the scope of labour law. The second part (part 7.2) looks at 
the situation of self-employed workers and their workers and how the law has 
attempted to regulate the practice. Importantly, it makes some recommendations as 
to how the practice can be better regulated in South African law, drawing on 
existing principles in South African law as well as international and comparative 
perspectives. Part 7.3 ends with some concluding remarks on the limits of law. 
 
7.1 THE BROADER DEBATES ON THE SCOPE OF LABOUR LAW 
 
In order to contextualise the significance of the applicability of labour law to the 
practice under scrutiny, it was necessary to begin by considering the purpose of 












and institutional perspectives on the subject, it was concluded that labour law aims 
to address the imbalance of power between workers and employers, to empower 
workers and redistribute wealth between capital and labour and thus contribute to 
social justice.  
 
Labour law aims to bring about social transformation by improving the living 
standards of workers and their families and thus fostering societal well-being. It was 
argued that if economic development is understood in these terms of social 
transformation, the improvement of living standards, and social inclusion, then 
labour law is an essential component for fostering development. It was also found 
that employers stand to gain from providing for greater worker protection and 
security as it contributes to greater productivity, efficiency and competitiveness.  
 
The four pillars of the Decent Work Agenda were identified as key 
components of any labour law regime. The first pillar is aimed at job creation and 
relates to through measures aimed at skills development and the creation of 
sustainable livelihoods. The second relates to rights at work such as protection 
against unfair discrimination and employment security. The third relates to social 
protection and includes measures covering workplace safety, regulation of working 
time and work-life balance and the creation of social safety nets. Finally, social 
dialogue relates to engagement between workers’ and employers’ organisation.  
 
Labour law has however been challenged by the ascendancy of neoliberal 
ideology which has advocated greater labour market flexibility in the context of 
globalisation and greater market competition. Proponents of neoliberalism have 
argued that rigid labour laws relating to matters such as wage determination, 












adjust to rapidly changing market conditions and compete in global markets. They 
have also argued that rigid labour laws hamper countries’ ability to attract and 
retain foreign direct investment.  
 
In chapter three, it was argued that these claims are not conclusively borne 
out by the empirical evidence, and that these proponents fail to explain the 
existence of strong labour protection in some economies that are marked by high 
employment levels, high levels of investment and economic growth. It was 
concluded that given a choice between given a choice between the low road to 
development which undermines labour protection and the high road which 
promotes improved worker rights, the latter is preferable. Consequently, labour law 
continues to play a legitimate if not important role in promoting economic and 
social development.  
 
Labour law’s ability to perform a meaningful social and economic role is to 
some extent determined by its scope. As was explained in chapter two, the classical 
account of labour law associates labour law with the employment relationship and 
distinguishes between employment and self-employment. The origins of this binary 
distinction have been debated, with one view being that it has always been 
embedded in legal systems and with another being that it was adopted within the 
context of economic and social changes in Europe in the 18th century.  
 
While there is some disagreement about the origins of the employment 
relationship, there is some consensus that it is not a monolithic concept whose 
nature and parameters are cast in stone. As the discussion in chapter two revealed, 
the employment relationship is an organic concept that has evolved and been 












in the different jurisdictions.  Many jurisdictions have maintained the binary 
distinction between employee and independent contractor, but most of these have 
widened the scope of the employment relationship by expanding the criteria 
identifying the employment relationship and introduced mechanisms that ease the 
burden of proving its existence. Other jurisdictions have gone further and identified 
and recognised intermediate categories of workers who are not employees in the 
strict sense and who receive a limited level of labour protection.  
 
The discussion in chapters two and five revealed that that questions about 
the scope of labour law have preoccupied legislatures, courts, academics and 
international organisations all over the world for the past few decades and are likely 
to continue to do so in future.  A number of questions remain. Does the employment 
relationship continue to serve a legitimate purpose or is it merely a remnant of an 
outdated status-based system that must be discarded? Do the principles of fairness 
and equity demand the extension of labour law to all workers who depend on their 
labour? Should the distinction between employees and other categories of workers 
be retained, either as the gateway to labour law or as a means of determining the 
rights that workers should be entitled to and the method of delivery of the rights? 
These are difficult questions for which there are no easy answers.   
 
What then is the future of the contract of employment or the employment 
relationship? It is submitted that the prediction of its future must be grounded in an 
understanding of its historical evolution resulting from socio-economic and political 
changes and the interactions between the spheres of economic organisation, dispute 
resolution and political organisation.1 On the basis of this historical analysis, Deakin 
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argues that we can expect (and are already seeing) a similar cumulative process 
occurring in response to changes in the world of work.2 Consequently, we can 
envisage not one future, but “a number of different futures for the contract of 
employment”.3 Arthurs therefore rightly argues that “there can be no ‘answers’ – 
only contestations, no definitive ‘redrawing’ of ‘boundaries’ – only ongoing 
negotiations and tentative compromises”.4 The approach to be adopted will have to 
be “one of pragmatic adaptation and progressive solutions, both socially and 
legally”.5 
 
This study has highlighted the complexities of determining who should be 
entitled to labour protection and what role legal status should make in making this 
determination. In principle, it endorses the need to move beyond the contract of 
employment or the employment relationship as the primary axis around which 
labour and social protection revolve. However, it recognises that the conceptual 
underpinnings and practical implications of this approach need to be more fully 
explored and developed. 
 
In chapter three, it was argued that a further issue relating to labour law’s 
scope is that labour law continues to be premised on the paradigm of the standard 
employment relationship. This paradigm is characterised by a bilateral relationship 
where the employee works on the premises of the employee on a full-time and 
indefinite basis and presupposes a Fordist model of production. The standard 
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employment relationship was adopted in North America and Europe during the 
post-war “Golden Age” of economic prosperity when economic policy was premised 
on welfare state capitalism. These assumptions and models also informed the 
development of labour law in the global South, including African jurisdictions. 
 
However, over the last few decades, non-standard forms of work have 
proliferated in an increasingly globalised world characterised by greater 
competition and the quest for labour market flexibility. These changes have to a 
large extent been driven by the neoliberal agenda, which has been advocated by a 
number of international financial institutions. Importantly, it was highlighted that 
(at least some of) these non-standard forms of work existed before the Fordist era 
and, to some extent, continued to exist alongside the Fordist model. 
 
This study discussed three processes driving the proliferation of non-
standard work. The first is casualisation, which involves the changes in the temporal 
dimension of the standard employment relationship towards part-time, seasonal, 
casual and temporary work. Externalisation by commodification is characterised by 
the increased engagement of workers in terms of commercial contracts on the basis 
that they are independent contractors as opposed to employees. Externalisation via 
intermediation enables employers to benefit from the labour of workers who are 
ostensibly employed by another party with whom the employer has a commercial 
contract. Importantly, it was highlighted that these processes do not always occur in 
isolation, but may intersect with each other.  
 
A critical argument made in chapter three was that most workers in non-
standard work arrangements experience insecurity and instability of employment, 












work-related social security benefits. Workers in these arrangements are also 
unlikely to be organised. Their work can be described as precarious as they are 
largely excluded from the protection offered by labour law, either because they are 
not designated as employees or because they cannot effectively enforce their rights. 
Precarious work not only affects the well-being and living standards of these 
workers and their families, but contributes to segmentation of the workplace and 
social fragmentation, and thus exacerbates social inequality.  
 
 Undoubtedly, these non-standard forms of work challenge labour law’s ability 
to protect workers. Most jurisdictions have (to varying degrees) responded to these 
non-standard relationships through legislative and other means. These have largely 
been developed on an ad hoc basis in order to deal with specific work arrangements. 
They have therefore been developed on the basis that they address exceptions to the 
standard employment relationship. It could therefore be argued that labour law has 
not developed a new paradigm to replace the standard employment relationship, 
which remains the primary model upon which labour law is based.  
 
7.2 HOW SHOULD SA LABOUR LAW REGULATE THE PRACTICE 
OF CONTRACTING WORK OUT TO SELF-EMPLOYED WORKERS? 
 
This part concentrates on contracting work out to self-employed workers, which is 
the focus of this study. Section 7.2.1 recapitulates the key findings on the practice as 
described and analysed in chapter four. Section 7.2.2 then highlights the key 
findings on the challenges for regulation of the practice as found in chapter five. 
These sections form the basis for a discussion of the principles which should guide 
the development of more effective regulation in the practice in section 7.2.3. Finally, 












development of a framework for the protection of workers involved in contracting 
arrangements.  
 
7.2.1 Key findings on the practice 
 
Chapter four of this thesis focused on the practice of contracting work to self-
employed workers who in turn employ other workers to assist them. This practice 
has become prevalent in South Africa since the 1990s. This practice has enabled 
employers to contract work out to individuals who would ordinarily be regarded as 
employers on the basis that they are independent contractors. By engaging self-
employed workers on the basis of commercial as opposed to employment contracts, 
employers have sought to externalise the labour of self-employed workers by 
commodifying what would otherwise be regarded as an employment relationship.  
 
Where the employer expressly or tacitly authorises self-employed workers to 
employ others to assist them, core enterprises have effectively turned self-employed 
workers into employers who are therefore responsible for the working conditions of 
these additional workers. Core enterprises have therefore placed self-employed 
workers as buffers between themselves and these additional workers. This has been 
described as externalisation by intermediation throughout this thesis. The practice 
of contracting workers out in this way has been described as the point of the 
intersection of these two processes of externalisation.  
 
Core enterprises in South Africa justify this practice on the grounds that it 
empowers workers and promotes entrepreneurship and job creation. However, it is 
ultimately the core enterprises that are the real winners as it enables them to 












responsibilities associated with it. Core enterprises may argue that this practice is 
their contribution towards realising South Africa’s small enterprise development 
and BEE policies. But the analysis in chapter four revealed that the practice may just 
be a strategy to enable them to undermine the application of labour law and 
attenuate its effectiveness in protecting the workers.  
 
Chapter four demonstrated that this practice has far-reaching consequences 
for self-employed workers and their workers. These workers do not have the 
benefit of working time protection, paid leave, health and safety protection and 
access to social protection and unemployment or work-related illness or injury. In 
addition, they cannot access meaningful training and skills development 
opportunities. It was further argued that the externalisation of the workers 
facilitates the casualisation of their work. Having excluded the risks and duties 
associated with employing the workers, the core enterprises operate without regard 
to the obligation to provide for employment security. The case studies highlighted 
the fact that self-employed workers and their workers constitute a dispensable 
workforce that core enterprises can discard at whim without regard to fair reasons, 
fair procedure and termination benefits.  
 
The cumulative effect of the issues highlighted in chapter four is that self-
employed workers and their workers constitute a marginal workforce whose 
working conditions are inferior to those of standard employees. Their position is 
exacerbated by the fact that, for a number of reasons, these workers are difficult to 
unionise. The non-unionisation of these workers further entrenches division and 













The discussion in chapter four showed that the practice could also be 
understood in terms of the processes of vertical disintegration and informalisation. 
The end result of the latter approach is that work in terms of this practice is being 
performed without the protection of labour law.  The structuralist account, which 
can be equated to informalisation from above, was used to explain the relationships 
between large firms and subordinated economic units and workers that serve to 
reduce the firm’s labour costs, resulting in poor working conditions for the workers. 
 
7.2.2 Key findings on the regulation of the practice 
 
Chapter five began by identifying two key challenges that the practice of contracting 
work out to self-employed workers presents for labour law. The first challenge is 
that the practice undermines three key assumptions underlying conventional labour 
law. These assumptions are that the employer is a unitary and bounded entity, that 
the employment relationship is bilateral and personal, and that there is a clear 
divide between employment and self-employment. This discussion drew extensively 
from the work of Davis and Freedland, Freedland and Fudge. The second challenge 
that the practice presents relates to its multi-dimensional nature. This arises from 
the fact that the practice is primarily constituted by the intersection of 
externalisation via commodification and externalisation via intermediation, and 
may in turn give rise to casualisation.  
 
It was argued in chapter five that, in order to adequately regulate the practice 
of contracting work out to self-employed workers, labour law would have to adopt 
principles and concepts that transcend the above assumptions underpinning 
conventional labour law. It would also have to develop regulatory responses that 












challenges formed the basis on which the South African legal approaches examined 
in the chapter were assessed. 
 
The core of chapter five examined the body of South African laws that 
regulate non-standard forms of work. It considered the legal approaches that are 
applicable to externalisation via commodification. These comprise laws and 
principles that essentially expand the concept of the employee within the 
parameters of the binary divide, as developed by the courts, the statutory 
presumption of employment and the Code of Good Practice on Who is an Employee. 
It also considered the provision in the BCEA which allows the Minister of Labour to 
deem any category of workers as employees. Finally, it considered the Constitution’s 
concept of a worker as developed by Le Roux, and its potential to be used as a 
broader concept that would transcend the binary divide.  
 
Chapter five also considered the legal approaches that have been developed 
to regulate externalisation via intermediation. These include the statutory joint and 
several liability provisions relating o temporary employment agencies, and the 
business transfer provisions. In addition, it includes the corporate veil doctrine as it 
has been developed by the courts.  
 
Each of these legal approaches was examined to determine the extent to 
which it directly applied or could be extended to regulate the practice of contracting 
work out to self-employed workers. It was found that only the Code of Good Practice 
explicitly recognises the practice and provides for the protection of both the self-
employed workers and their workers. It provides that a worker who meets the test 
for employment through the application of the dominant impression test or the 












merely because s/he provides her/his services via the medium of a corporate entity 
and/or employs other workers to assist her/him. It also provides that the workers 
of the self-employed worker could also be found to be employees of the core 
enterprise provided the core enterprise exercises some degree of control over these 
workers. The Code of Good Practice, however amounts to soft-law and does not 
necessarily bind the Courts.  
 
It was found that some of the remaining legal approaches could be extended 
to apply to self-employed workers and their workers despite the fact that they were 
not specifically designed to regulate the practice under scrutiny. This included the 
deeming of certain categories of workers to be employees, which could be applied to 
bring self employed workers within the scope of labour protection. It was suggested 
that the Minister could determine on the basis of occupational categories where the 
practice is found to be prevalent, including those mentioned in the case studies. It 
was also argued that, in principle, a self-employed worker could be designated as a 
worker as envisaged in section 23 of the Constitution. However, the Court’s 
development of this constitutional concept is yet to extend its use to bridging the 
binary divide between employee and independent contractor.  
 
Importantly, the corporate veil doctrine was found to be potentially 
applicable to both self-employed workers and their workers. On the one hand, the 
doctrine could be applied to hold a core enterprise jointly and severally liable (with 
the self-employed worker being the employer) for the labour rights and working 
conditions of the workers of self-employed workers. It could also be used to hold 
that the self-employed worker are in reality employed by the core enterprise only, 
or by the core enterprise and the self-employed workers together as co-employers 












the veil between the self-employed worker and the core enterprise to find that the 
self-employed worker is an employee of the core enterprise.  
 
The key finding of the discussion of existing South African approaches is that 
the direct recognition and regulation of the practice under scrutiny was fairly 
limited as it was only found in a soft-law instrument which offered a very limited 
remedy or solution for self-employed workers and their workers. It was also found 
that the broader body of legal approaches were not directly applicable but could be 
extended to regulate the practice. These findings make a strong case for the 
development of more direct and robust regulation in the form of legislation directly 
regulating the practice under scrutiny.  
 
This legislation would be enacted by Parliament which is the highest source 
of law-making power in South Africa. This could take the form of a separate Act of 
Parliament dedicated to the regulation of the practice under scrutiny. Alternatively, 
the legislative changes could be brought about by the insertion of additional 
provisions into the existing labour legislation.  
 
The case for legislation to specifically regulate contracting work out to self-
employed workers was buttressed by the fact that presently non-state institutions 
appear to have the carte blanche to determine whether and when labour law will be 
applicable to self-employed workers and their workers. The discussion in the final 
part of chapter five showed that the strategies that these institutions have 
developed to regulate the practice on developing the entrepreneurial potential of 
self-employed workers in the hope that this will put them in a position to provide 
fair working conditions for their workers. Essentially, these strategies preclude the 












In addition, they (with one exception) prevent the imposition of any liability for the 
working conditions of the workers of self-employed workers onto the core 
enterprise.  
 
It is submitted that this situation is untenable and can only be remedied by 
the enactment of appropriate legislation which would provide some clarity and a 
framework for the application of labour law to self-employed workers and their 
workers. Non-state institutions would then have to operate within the parameters 
of this legal framework and ensure that their initiatives did not inhibit the 
application of labour law. This approach would still recognise the valuable 
contribution that non-state institutions could make to the regulation of the practice 
given their greater ability to access and influence self-employed workers and their 
workers through a number of strategies. 
 
Chapter six analysed the extent to which the ILO has recognised and 
regulated the practice of contracting work out to self-employed workers through an 
analysis of its discussions on self-employment, contract labour and the employment 
relationship. It found that the discussions on self-employment promotion identified 
the concept of the nominally self-employed who work in terms of contracting 
arrangements. While the resolution on self-employment promotion called for 
measures to extend labour and social protection to self-employed workers and their 
workers in contracting arrangements, no international labour standards were 
adopted to give effect. The resolution on self-employment promotion was primarily 
geared towards the provision of entrepreneurial support to self-employed workers 













The initial report on contract labour identified the contracting out of work to 
self-employed workers who in turn employed other workers as one of the many 
facets of contract labour. However, as the ILO’s move to adopt international labour 
standards on contract labour gained momentum, the definition and protection 
afforded to contract workers were progressively excluded and no attention was 
specifically given to the practice under scrutiny. These draft instruments were not 
adopted and the final outcome of the ILO’s endeavours was Recommendation 198 
which does little in recognising and regulating the practice under scrutiny. Chapter 
six concluded that, notwithstanding the disappointing outcome, the ILO’s earlier 
work in relation to self-employment promotion and contract labour did provide 
some enlightenment on regulating the practice.  
 
7.2.3 Towards the development of more effective regulation of the practice 
 
Having identified the current state of South Africa’s regulation of the practice and 
pointed out the need for the regulation of the practice, it is necessary to consider 
what principles should inform the enactment of the proposed legislation. As a 
starting point, the development of effective regulation must be aligned to the pursuit 
of the principal goals and purposes of labour law as set out in chapter two. In that 
chapter, it was argued that the predominant purpose of labour law is to protect 
workers and ensure a fairer balance between them and more powerful employers. 
By doing so, labour law empowers workers and contributes to their well-being, to 
improved living standards and thus, social transformation and economic 
development.  
 
It is submitted that giving full effect to the purpose of labour law would 












employment status and regardless of the type of arrangements under which they 
work. This will entail the acceptance of the principle that a person who works for 
another and purports to employ others to assist her/him in respect of that work 
may be entitled to labour law’s protection. This would accord with ILO’s Decent 
Work Agenda, which aims to secure decent work for all workers regardless of their 
legal status and regardless of where they work. In the South African context, the 
most appropriate vehicle for the broader delivery of labour rights to may be found 
in the constitutional right of “everyone” to fair labour practices.  
 
Importantly, the proposed legislation must respond appropriately to the 
challenges that the practice raises for labour law as expounded in chapter five and 
reiterated in section 7.2.2 above. This means that it must transcend the assumptions 
underlying conventional labour law and embrace principles that reflect the realities 
of the practice. This will imply a holistic perspective which recognises the 
multilateral nature of the relationship between the core enterprise, the self-
employed worker and her/his workers. This would allow for the recognition of 
more than one employer, and/or the possible distribution of employer obligations 
between more than employer to ensure that the core enterprise bears (at least some 
of) the risks and responsibilities that are associated with the workers.  
 
It is submitted that a holistic perspective of the practice would enable the law 
to give recognition to the multi-dimensional nature of the practice and to 
incorporate measures to address the structural relationship between the core-
enterprise self-employed worker relationship and the relationship between the self-
employed worker and her/his workers. It would also give effect to the principle of 
giving effect to substance over form by disregarding privity of contract and capital 












South African Labour courts in decisions identifying an employee and applying the 
corporate veil doctrine. It has also been recognised in the presumption of 
employment provisions and in the Code of Good Practice on Who is an Employee. 
 
   A final principle is that an effective approach must also be sensitive to the 
dynamics that have given rise to this practice in South Africa. It must strike a 
delicate balance between the need to protect vulnerable workers and to encourage 
and support nascent entrepreneurship.  
 
7.2.4 Substantive principles of the proposed regulatory framework 
 
This section outlines the key principles that could be included in the legislation to 
regulate the practice of contracting work out to self-employed workers. The 
principles are largely drawn from lessons learned from the South African legal 
system and the ILO’s regulation of the practice. These recommendations are 
tentative at best and aim to highlight the issues that the legislation must recognise 
and address. It presents a number of possible options without prescribing which 
approach should be taken with regard to certain issues.  
 
Any legal framework seeking to regulate the practice of contracting work out 
to self- employed workers would have to begin by defining a self- employed worker. 
It is suggested that a self-employed worker would be identified by the following 
features: 
 
 a person performing work relating to a core enterprise’s core or ancillary 












 the work is performed in terms of a commercial contract that states that the 
self-employed worker is an independent contractor, either in her/his 
personal capacity or via a corporate entity; 
 the contract requires the person to perform the work personally, but 
expressly or tacitly allows him/her to hire others to assist him/her; 
 the person personally performs the work and also hires other workers to 
assist him/her during the normal course of work; and  
 the work is performed under circumstances in which there is an unequal 
balance of power between the self-employed worker and the core enterprise 
giving out the work and renders the former dependent on the latter. 
 
In addition to the above criteria, two other factors would have to be considered and 
a decision made as to whether they would be incorporated into the definition. The 
first is whether the definition would include all workers meeting these 
requirements or whether it would only cover workers at the lower end of the labour 
market, such as truck drivers and home workers. The discussion of the practice in 
chapter four emphasised that those at the lower end of the market with lower skills 
levels are the most vulnerable and have little or no bargaining power in relation to 
the core enterprises giving out the work. By contrast, workers at the higher end of 
the labour market such as software engineers possess scarce skills and have greater 
bargaining power vis-a-vis enterprises they contract with and would not necessarily 
need protection.  
 
If the objective is to protect the workers at the lower end, then one would 
have to determine how to achieve this. One way would be to use an income 
threshold and to exclude workers earning more than the maximum amount 












the fact that they met all the substantive requirements. A better option would be to 
provide a list of examples of workers who could require protection, for example 
building workers, home workers, miners and owner drivers.  This would not 
constitute a closed list, but would give some indication of the type of workers 
targeted by the regulation. The list could also be subject to revision to ensure that 
attention was drawn to new categories of workers needing protection.  
 
The second factor which would have to be considered is whether the 
provisions would only apply in cases where the self-employed worker contracted 
exclusively with one core enterprise or whether it could apply in relation to a self 
employed worker contracting with several core enterprises. Traditionally, 
exclusivity has been treated as a factor indicating an employment relationship and 
the ability to service many “clients” an indicator of independence.  
 
It is submitted that this assumption should not be applied strictly in the 
interest of ensuring maximum protection for self-employed workers and their 
workers. It would therefore be permissible to include self-employed workers with 
multiple clients within the scope of the provisions, provided that the features 
outlined above were present in respect of each relationship sought to be covered by 
the provisions.  
 
Having dispensed with the definitional issues, we now turn to the 
consequences of a finding that a particular person was a self-employed worker. 
What status would be ascribed to a self-employed worker? They could be deemed to 
be an employee as defined in labour legislation, or as a worker in terms of section 
23 of the Constitution. It would be useful to consider what the implications of such a 












the self-employed worker to the full suite of labour rights and the designation as a 
worker would entitle them to a limited bundle of labour rights. Another option 
would be to discard these categories and regulate the self-employed workers as a 
unique group of workers, and determine the labour rights that they would be 
entitled to in this capacity.  
 
Regardless of the designation as employee, worker or self-employed worker, 
it would be the core enterprise that contracted the work out to the self-employed 
worker that would be responsible for her/his labour rights. The self-employed 
worker would be entitled to this protection in her/his capacity regardless of 
whether s/he also received business support from the state or a non-state 
institution. Provision would have to be made to ensure that core enterprises did not 
escape these obligations by placing several intermediaries between themselves and 
self-employed workers.  Provision would also have to be made for the 
apportionment of these obligations on a pro rata basis in cases where the self-
employed worker provided services to more than one core enterprise, provided the 
definitional criteria were met in respect to each of them.6 
 
The consequences for the workers hired by self-employed workers would 
have to be carefully considered. A critical question would be how the law would 
treat the relationship between the self employed worker and the hired workers. On 
the one hand, the law could recognise and give effect to this relationship, thus 
allowing a self-employed worker to have a dual status as both a worker needing 
protection and an employer bound to guarantee the labour rights of her/his 
workers. This would give effect to contractual freedom (as expressed in the contract 
                                                          
6 J Fudge “The legal boundaries of the employer, precarious workers and labour protection” in G 
Davidov and B Langille Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law: Goals and Means in the Regulation 
of 












regardless of whether both parties were genuinely free when entering the contract) 
and recognise the self-employed worker as the true employer of the hired workers 
and hold him/her primarily responsible for their terms and conditions of work and 
their statutory rights.  
 
However, in recognition of the overarching power that the core enterprise 
exercises over such arrangements, some responsibility for these workers would 
have to be ascribed to it. This could be achieved by holding the core enterprise 
jointly and severally liable for the self-employed worker’s failure to meet its 
employer obligations. This approach could be supported on the basis that joint and 
several liability would provide an incentive to core enterprises to contract on 
favourable terms that would enable self-employed workers to meet their employer 
obligations and take measures to ensure that this was done in practice. 
 
On the other hand, the law could disregard the contract purportedly 
concluded between the self-employed workers and the hired workers and place the 
core enterprise in the former’s shoes. The second option would entail disregarding 
privity of contract and deeming the core enterprise to be the employer of the 
workers hired by the self-employed workers. The core enterprise would therefore 
be primarily and solely responsible for the terms and conditions of work and 
statutory entitlements of these workers in addition to those of the self-employed 
workers.  
 
On what basis could this deviation from the common law doctrine of privity of 
contract be justified? On one hand, it could be argued that the core enterprise’s 
express or tacit authorisation to engage workers to assist could be construed as an 












the core enterprise’s behalf.7  A less tenuous and more appealing justification would 
be the need to give effect to substance over form in order to ensure equity and 
fairness. This principle is already recognised in South African law. This would 
recognise the risk that in most cases self-employed workers operating on the scale 
of a micro or very small enterprise would not be in a position to meet these 
requirements. It would also place the risk and responsibility for the workers upon 
the party benefiting the most from the fruits of their labour. 
 
Given the choice between finding the self-employed worker or the core 
enterprise to be the employer, one would have to determine whether the regulatory 
framework would incorporate one to the exclusion of the other or whether it would 
include both as alternative solutions depending on the circumstances. This decision 
would involve balancing the rights of the workers against the interests of the core 
enterprise. Given the diversity of situations that may arise involving self-employed 
workers, it would be prudent to include both options. To maximise protection for 
the workers, it is suggested that the default position be that the core enterprise be 
deemed to be the true employer. Parties would only be allowed to invoke the joint 
and several liability principle in exceptional circumstances.  
 
The consequence of the suggested provisions would be to disregard any 
attempts to treat the self-employed worker and her/his workers operating under an 
entity separate from the core enterprise. Provision would however have to be made 
for the fact that a self-employed worker’s circumstances do not necessarily remain 
static and that s/he may advance to a stage where s/he becomes a genuine 
entrepreneur. Given the government’s identification of small businesses as an 
engine for economic growth, care must be taken to ensure that the regulatory 
                                                          












framework proposed would not unnecessarily stifle small business development. 
Some thought would have to be dedicated to determining what factors could be 
used to identify an emerging entrepreneur and decide what support would be 
appropriate.  
 
 Finally, the legislation should make provision for special measures to be 
taken with regard to particular categories of self-employees and their workers. An 
example would be home workers who may have special needs by virtue of the 
location of their work.  
 
7.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This thesis has analysed the legal regulation of the practice of contracting work out 
to self-employed workers in South Africa. The practice has provided a microcosm 
within to examine some of the broader challenges that labour law faces in 
protecting workers in an ever-changing world of work. Having examined the 
dynamics and consequences of the practice in South Africa and the shortcomings of 
the current legal framework, it made some tentative suggestions as to how the 
practice should be regulated in South Africa.   
 
The recommendations made are by no means a panacea for the challenges 
that labour law continues to face in ensuring its continued relevance in the world of 
work. Admittedly, the recommended legislation would not “wipe the slate clean” to 
completely eliminate the assumptions that continue to underpin labour law. 
Nevertheless, the principles underlying the proposed legislation – most of which 
South Africa has already recognised in relation to other non-standard work 












divide and on the standard employment relationship as determinants of labour 
law’s scope.  
 
It is suggested that the incorporation of such principles which grapple with 
the complexities presented by the changed world of work may contribute to freeing 
labour law of the limitations imposed by the conventional assumptions. Given the 
diversity of the arrangements characterising the world of work and the continuous 
changes, it is difficult to say whether a new paradigm would be appropriate or 
predict what such a paradigm would look like.   
 
A further limitation of the recommended legislation is that ensuring its 
relevance to the practice it regulates would not eliminate it in its entirety. This is 
because labour law, like any other branch of law, faces a number of limitations to its 
ability to ensure the translation of its rules and principles into tangible and 
meaningful outcomes for the people it applies to. It is therefore submitted that the 
enactment of the legislation envisaged in part 7.2 above will not protect the workers 
in contracting arrangements unless certain broader socio-economic challenges are 
addressed.  
 
One such challenge relates to the fact that many workers are and continue to 
be unaware of their rights in terms of labour law. Another is the high levels of 
poverty and unemployment, which render many workers complicit in the 
infringement of their labour rights. A third issue is the increasing fragmentation of 
workers in the changed world of work and the inability of trade unions to bridge the 
divisions and build solidarity  amongst workers employed under more diversified 
relationships. The final hurdle is the tendency for employers to seek to avoid the 
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